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Introduction
This thesis begins with an outline of the motivation underlying the presented research.
Furthermore, the methodological foundation of the thesis is briefly introduced. Thereby,
a critical acclaim of its limitations as well as of essential assumptions is given. The
introduction closes with an overview of the presented work.
1.1 Motivation
The implementation of the Internal Energy Market (IEM) is a declared goal of the
European Commission which is currently enforced by the third legislative package for
electricity and gas markets.1 Thereby, the IEM is no political end in itself but directly
supports the target of economic, secure and sustainable energy supply in Europe. Since
the coalescence of the national markets evolves both on an institutional level as well as
in physical terms, synergies can be achieved with respect to all aspects of the energy
policy triangle. Whereas the institutional market integration especially allows for a
better coordination of trade and of regulation, the physical coupling by the means of
transmission network extensions largely determines the magnitude of the attainable
benefits.
With regard to electricity markets, the international transmission network contributes
to system security by balancing regional deficits and surpluses of supply. Furthermore,
structural differences in the local costs of electricity production can be exploited to
achieve the least-cost supply mix within the interconnected system. This also refers
to renewable energy sources (RES), whose levelized energy costs are influenced by the
local yield of the primary energy source. In this context, the transmission network also
performs the task of balancing temporal supply fluctuations.
1Directive 2009/72/EC, 13 July 2009.
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Under consideration of these factors of influence, the availability of cross-border trans-
mission capacities finally determines the ratio of national electricity market prices. Pro-
vided that thermal line capacities do not impose a binding restriction on international
trade, the national marginal costs of supply converge such that all markets reveal the
same price for electricity. However, if the optimal level of electricity exchange is pre-
vented by limited network capacities, the national prices will diverge. In this case, the
markets reveal the opportunity costs of congestion and regional scarcities. Ultimately,
these transparent signals set incentives for market participants to adapt their decisions
to the structural conditions. Furthermore, the economic benefit of network extensions
is revealed to transmission system operators (TSOs) and regulators.
The tasks of the national transmission network coincide with those of the cross-border
interconnectors, although security of supply and arbitrage opportunities are now primar-
ily defined on a local level. However, the visibility of the opportunity costs of internal
congestion is limited. Since most of the European markets rely on uniform pricing
systems which constitute one bidding zone per country, national bottlenecks will not
be reflected by regional prices.2 Instead, trade within the national markets neglects the
existence of physical transmission constraints. Since the regional TSO has the legal obli-
gation to ensure system security, she counteracts the resulting overload of the network
by operative adjustments of dispatch schedules (so-called re-dispatch) or by strategic
transmission investments. However, recent experience e. g. from Germany reveals that
the geographical development of supply and demand and hence the required transmis-
sion volumes evolve faster than the network extensions. In the meantime, the need for
short-term congestion management increases considerably.
Since the main reasons for the delay of national transmission extensions is mainly caused
by a time-consuming process of approving as well as by the opposition of the local popu-
lation, one strategy is to simplify the bureaucratic process and to enforce the investments
legally. This path has for example been adopted in Germany by the enactment of the
Energy Transmission Extension Law (German: Energieleitungsausbaugesetz, EnLAG)
and the Law on the Acceleration of Network Extensions (German: Netzausbaubeschle-
unigungsprozess, NABEG). This strategy aims at the retention of the single German
price zone and accepts the necessity to apply re-dispatch in times of congestion.
An internationalized approach has been suggested by the European Agency for the Coop-
eration of Energy Regulators (ACER) in their 2011 Framework Guidelines on Capacity
Allocation and Congestion Management for Electricity (CACM). ACER promotes the
implementation of regional bidding zones which reflect the fundamental market and
2Norway and Sweden as well as Italy have established several bidding zones per country, which
allow for a market splitting in times of congestion. However, all nodes within each zone are still priced
uniformly.
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network structure in Europe and which are thus decoupled from national borders. In
consequence, congestion management between zones is implicitly integrated into whole-
sale market trade, such that the need for re-dispatch is ideally reduced. This zonal
pricing strategy aims at a European view on congestion and at the intensification of
regional price signals in comparison to the status quo. Again, market participants are
intended to react to regional incentives and to reduce the stress of the network until
necessary extensions have been made. However, zonal pricing comes with several chal-
lenges. Since the definition of zones shall not only be based on the fundamental market
structure but also on criteria of welfare, liquidity, competition and re-dispatch costs, it
is by no means trivial.3 The smaller the zones, the more important local liquidity and
market concentration become for the efficiency of the markets.
In the end, the weighting of uniform pricing on the one hand and zonal or even nodal
pricing on the other hand largely depends on the trade-off between price signals, static
and dynamic incentives, liquidity, competition and distribution effects.4 With the ex-
ception of the last point, the combination of the said aspects determines the overall
efficiency of a market design and its congestion management. However, the magnitude
of distribution effects is not to be neglected since it influences the political feasibility of
a given design.5
The thesis at hand addresses itself to various aspects of the described trade-off. The aim
of the presented research is to indicate the potential benefits of improving congestion
management and to identify some of the associated obstacles. Due to the complexity
of the issues at hand, the understanding of the interdependencies between fundamental
factors and design choices is of special importance for the development of national and
European electricity market policies. With regard to the European context, this thesis
presents a methodology to identify suitable bidding zones under consideration of the
fundamental market structure. The application of the approach reveals both local het-
erogeneity as well as cross-border similarities within Central Western Europe, which may
jointly shape an alternative definition of regional markets. The presented research indi-
cates that an international solution to congestion management may combine favorable
aspects of nodal and uniform pricing into a beneficial zonal design.
A further contribution of the thesis is an in-depth evaluation of the regional impact of
congestion management using the example of Germany. Thereby, the influence of nodal
3Cf. ACER (2011).
4Nodal pricing is an extreme form of market splitting, in which each node of the network constitutes
one bidding zone.
5Furthermore, the pricing systems may require different institutional approaches, which reflect the
complexity of the market clearing process. Nodal pricing systems are usually implemented in combination
with a central Independent System Operator (ISO), whereas zonal and uniform pricing systems allow
for a more decentralized approach. The discussion of the institutional setup is however outside the scope
of this thesis.
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and uniform pricing schemes on the local allocation of generation and producer surplus
is analyzed. The presented results thus demonstrate the effect of regional transmission
bottlenecks on a market’s allocative efficiency and furthermore indicate the relevance of
local incentives as drivers for dynamic efficiency. The findings also suggest that the mag-
nitude of the distribution effects resulting from an introduction of local bidding zones
may be greater than the corresponding gain in market efficiency. Given the findings
with regard to the impact of congestion management on the national wholesale market,
the importance of a well-designed re-dispatch mechanism is highlighted. Based on a
theoretical analysis of incentives for the TSO and re-dispatched generators induced by
different re-dispatch remuneration schemes, the thesis also provides a quantitative indi-
cation of the importance of design choices on the relative efficiency of internal congestion
management.
On the basis of the findings of the presented thesis, further research on the impact of
liquidity and market power on the eligibility of congestion management schemes may
be conducted. Also the relevance of institutional changes required by a potential re-
structuring of the European markets and their congestion management needs to be
evaluated further. This includes both the initial costs of a regime switch as well as
the day-to-day transaction costs of market operation. Furthermore, continuing analy-
ses of strategic interactions between market participants and TSOs and their impact
on investment decisions may be considered. Finally, these considerations may impact
the regulation of the transmission network. Overall, the complexity of the thematic
constellation indicates that policy definition should be supported by a high variety of
research. Besides economic aspects, the importance of electrotechnical developments
and advancements in information technology needs to be highlighted at this point.
1.2 Methodology
In this thesis, three distinct methodologies are used to evaluate congestion management
mechanisms and their economic impact on the electricity market. The central part of
the quantitative analyses is conducted by the means of a fundamental electricity market
model, which optimizes the European power plant dispatch as well as the corresponding
re-dispatch in high temporal resolution. Thereby, a normative cost-minimization ap-
proach is applied, which reflects the perspective of the social planner. The analysis of
the dispatch results is partly supported by a cluster analysis based on Ward’s minimum
variance criterion, which identifies structural similarities in the optimal marginal costs
of production. The third methodological building block is constituted by a theoretical
analysis of different re-dispatch remuneration schemes and their impact on the surplus
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of re-dispatched generators. In the following, the advantages and caveats of the methods
are summarized.
1.2.1 The Fundamental Electricity Market Model NEULING
In the course of the presented research, the fundamental electricity market model NEUL-
ING has been developed.6 The purpose of the model is to analyze the cost-minimal
allocation of generation in the European electricity market under consideration of the
power flows on the intermeshed high-voltage transmission network. On this basis, the
costs of electricity production as well as the costs of congestion can be determined. The
latter are either derived from dispatch calculations or are specified in the course of the
re-dispatch optimization. The dispatch model is applied in various scenarios which rep-
resent diverse wholesale market designs and consider different resolutions with regard to
the transmission network. The re-dispatch scenarios are distinguished with regard to the
associated remuneration schemes. Thereby, the remuneration schemes are represented
by exogenous cost parameters, which are derived according to individual criteria.
The model follows a normative approach which is characterized by the pre-defined ob-
jective of cost-minimization. The optimization is therefore conducted from the point
of view of a social planner. The problem is specified subject to economic and tech-
nical constraints, as well as subject to a central balance equation which ensures that
the exogenously given demand is served at each location and at every point of time.
The assumption of inflexible demand constitutes the equality of the cost-minimization
problem to a welfare maximization approach. According to the first welfare theorem,
a competitive market may reproduce the welfare-maximizing allocation. The results of
the model-based analysis may thus be interpreted as the market outcome under perfect
competition. Accordingly, market power cannot be replicated by the model. Although
market power is an important issue in the analysis of congestion management mecha-
nisms, the application of the model is driven by the motivation to determine the impact
of fundamental factors such as the location of generation, demand and network capacities
on the market. Nonetheless, the model reveals regional scarcities which may ultimately
give rise to market power.
The assumption on inelastic demand simplifies the specification of the model and its
solution, since it enables a linear problem formulation. Incorporating demand elasticity
would require the definition of a corresponding assumption as well as a non-linear model
setup. The latter would complicate the solution of the already highly complex model.7
6A detailed model description as well as a discussion of the relevant literature is given in chapter 2.
7In the highest spatial resolution and under consideration of 8760 consecutive hours, the dispatch
model takes approximately six days to solve.
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For the given dispatch model, the real-time elasticity of electricity demand is of relevance,
since it allows for the adaptation of consumption to hourly price signals. The empirical
literature on the real-time elasticity however indicates that the corresponding values
are very small.8 Although the incorporation of demand elasticity into the model would
reduce the overall costs of electricity supply, the absolute magnitude of the deviations
are assumed to be small.
Another central assumption of the model is perfect foresight. In consequence, the impact
of uncertainty and risk preferences on the market is neglected. With regard to the model
results, this property will lead to an underestimation of the true dispatch and re-dispatch
costs. However, with respect to the purpose of the presented analyses, this simplification
facilitates the interpretation of the results considerably.
This is especially true with respect to the marginal costs of supply, which are of special
importance for the identification of opportunity costs of congestion as well as for the
derivation of local producer surplus. However, the explanatory value of the marginal
costs with respect to market prices is limited. The dispatch model provides short-run
marginal costs of supply through the value of the shadow price of the balance equation
in the optimum. These marginals can be interpreted as market prices under certain
assumptions, such as perfect competition and overcapacities. In reality however, the
assumption on overcapacities can only be fulfilled temporarily. Therefore, the short-
run marginal costs cannot be interpreted as long-run equilibrium prices of an energy-
only market. Equilibrium prices would include scarcity pricing according to the peak-
load pricing model which guarantees the recovery of fixed costs in the long-run.9 In
consequence, the marginal costs only indicate a lower bound of the market prices.
Furthermore, some rather technical details of the model formulation limit the degree to
which the model approximates reality. These include the lack of unit commitment and
physical ramping constraints, which increases the flexibility of the model and thus lowers
the total costs and the volatility of the marginal costs. With regard to the re-dispatch
model, the neglect of inter-temporal constraints needs to be emphasized. Although this
implies an overestimation of ramping costs, it also increases the flexibility of the model
artificially.
An important feature of NEULING is its DC load flow model, which provides a linear
approximation of the physical power flows induced by local consumption and production.
Especially with regard to the focus of the model applications in the context of congestion
management, this is an indispensable quality. Although the relative performance of the
DC load flow in comparison to alternative power flow models still needs to be tested
8Cf. Lijesen (2007) for estimates for the Dutch market and an overview of previous studies.
9For an introduction, see Stoft (2002).
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for the specific framework, the literature suggests a high adequacy of the method for
the evaluation of congestion management schemes.10 Nonetheless, the linear DC load
flow can neither replicate transmission losses nor reactive power flows, such that the
explanatory value of the results is reduced. Especially due to the neglect of reacitve
power flows congestion may be underestimated, especially in hours with relatively high
reactive power flows in comparison to active flows (cf. Green (2007)). Furthermore, the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of the so-called slack bus needs to be tested in
greater detail.11
The underlying network model as well as the technical parameters have been provided
by the Institute for Energy Systems, Energy Efficiency and Energy Management (ie3) at
TU Dortmund University and have been applied repeatedly.12 However, the model only
represents an aggregated network which is reduced significantly in comparison to the
true European high-voltage network. Additional aggregations carried out for the sake of
some market design scenarios further impair the degree to which the model represents
real-world power flows.
Since NEULING does not include investment decisions in its present setup, the model
requires the specification of assumptions on generation capacities. The assumptions
are based on the power plant data base of the Institute of Energy Economics at the
University of Cologne which provides geo-coded data as well as information on projected
capacity commissioning and decommissioning. This enables the definition of plausible
scenarios, but does not provide an accurate forecast. With respect to assumptions on
local demand and RES capacities, extensive research has been conducted for the purpose
of this thesis. The data has been collected from public sources and has been treated
with due diligence. This process facilitates a bottom-up assignment of present-day RES
capacities to the model regions, whereas forecasted extensions are allocated on the basis
of additional criteria such as local potentials. With regard to local demand, the projected
development of the regional population is used as an indicator. Finally, the choice of
the cost parameters is decisive. The assumptions on fuel and CO2 costs are based on
public sources whereas the values of other parameters are based on own assumptions
which reflect the author’s experience.
Finally, the universal validity of the model results is limited by a general caveat of
mathematical programs with discrete cost functions. Due to the technology-specific
definition of variable costs which is for the most part independent from the hourly level
of generation, the supply function is not strictly monotone. In consequence, the solution
10A literature review is provided in chapter 2.
11Although Schweppe et al. (1988) states that the definition of the slack bus is not overly critical,
other sources such as Waniek (2010) suggest the selection of a node with high input.
12Cf. Waniek (2010).
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of the overall least-cost dispatch is not necessarily unique in the sense that the optimal
level of total costs can be achieved by only one combination of variable values and
shadow prices. Although the application of the DC load flow reduces the chance that
the dispatch of capacities of the same technology at different nodes has an identical
impact on the total system costs, this does not necessarily eliminate the underlying
problem of non-unique solutions. Although the repeated computation of one scenario
with the same algorithm will generate identical solutions, a change of the algorithm may
yield a different outcome. The assessment of the associated effect in the given context
is a subject of further research.
1.2.2 Cluster Analysis
One aim of the thesis at hand is to identify structural differences between nodal price
regions as well as to evaluate the loss of information produced by merging nodes into
bidding zones. According to the underlying intuition, the welfare loss induced by the
definition of bidding zones is the smaller, the greater the fundamental similarity between
the nodes is. The criterion for similarity is given by the hourly marginal cost curves of
the nodes as calculated by NEULING, which contain all relevant information on the local
structure of supply and demand as well as on the opportunity costs of congestion induced
at the node. The comparison of the marginal cost curves is accomplished by applying
a hierarchical cluster analysis on the basis of Ward’s minimum variance criterion (cf.
Ward (1963)). This general approach has e. g. been suggested in Bjørndal and Jørnsten
(2001).
Cluster analysis is a tool from multivariate statistics which is used to group variables
with multiple observations according to the variables’ similarity. Thereby, the available
approaches differ in their basic definition of similarity.13 Connectivity models as the
one applied in this thesis rely on metrics which measure e. g. the Euclidean distances
between the variables’ observations. The clusters are then identified in a hierarchical
process. Thus, the variables are grouped in the order of increasing distances (so-called
agglomerative clustering) or split in the order of decreasing distances (divisive cluster-
ing). As a result, the number and composition of clusters are given subject to critical
distance levels. In the presented analysis, a hierarchical approach is chosen.
Hierarchical models are complemented by various algorithms which allow for different
linkage criteria. For example, the single-linkage approach defines the smallest distance
between the individual elements of two classes as decision criterion and compares the re-
spective values of all available combinations of classes. Alternatively, the average-linkage
13Refer to Handl (2010) for an introduction.
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approach uses the average of the distances between the individual elements of two classes
as a measure for similarity. Although both approaches are common, they are assumed
not to capture the full information contained in the marginal cost curves. Since an ag-
gregation of nodes is supposed to yield homogeneous zones in terms of absolute height
of as well as in terms of variation in marginal costs, Ward’s minimum variance criterion
is implemented instead. The underlying algorithm finally minimizes the variance of the
hourly prices within clusters and thus maximizes the variance between clusters.
Furthermore, the hierarchical model has two major advantages with respect to the anal-
ysis at hand. First, the continuous computation of optimal clusters for each possible
level of aggregation provides the complete range of combinations from which to choose
in only one model run. Since the desired number of price zones can hardly be specified
beforehand, this property simplifies the analysis considerably. Second, the hierarchical
model provides the leaps in critical distance levels between clustering steps. The evolu-
tion of the distances in the course of the clustering process reveals the rise in in-cluster
heterogeneity induced by each additional aggregation. On this basis, a heuristic devel-
oped by Mojena (1977) and Milligan and Cooper (1985) can be applied to identify the
critical clustering step at which the heterogeneity increases exponentially. This point
can be used as an indicator for the optimal number of clusters. However, the underlying
criterion has been developed in a general context which may not be perfectly suited for
the analysis at hand.
However, sensitivity analyses should be conducted with regard to alternative clustering
approaches. Especially centroid-based clustering may provide a powerful tool due to
its efficient algorithms. Instead of explicitly evaluating distances between variables,
centroid-based clustering defines cluster centers and measures the distance of the data
points to the centers. Each variable is then grouped to the nearest center, which is not
necessarily an element of the original data set. However, most of the associated heuristic
k-means algorithms require an ex-ante specification of the number of cluster centers k,
whose location is then optimized. Furthermore, the results are sensitive to the given
starting points of the centers’ locations.
In the end, the method is a substitute for an integrated optimization of the size and
location of bidding zones. Theoretically, each constellation would need to be tested
with regard to the associated loss in efficiency as indicated by the increase in total
system costs induced by internal re-dispatch. Then, the loss would have to be weighted
against a quantitative measure of the aggregation’s benefit, for example with respect to
transaction costs, liquidity and market power. The derivation of such a measure however
requires additional research. Furthermore, the computational effort associated with this
approach appears not to be manageable at the moment.
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1.2.3 Theoretical Evaluation of Re-dispatch Remuneration Schemes
The last methodological building block of the presented thesis is provided by a theoretical
model of producer surplus under nodal and zonal pricing, as e. g. applied in Ding and
Fuller (2005) and Hermans et al. (2011), which is extended to incorporate the impact
of re-dispatch remuneration schemes. In the zonal setup, the producer surplus thus
originates from wholesale market trade as well as from re-dispatch. The aim of the model
is to provide deeper insights into the incentives and the dynamic efficiency induced by
re-dispatch.
The applied benchmark for the efficient allocation of generation and producer surplus
is provided by nodal pricing. In the analytical part of the analysis, it is assumed that
re-dispatch may implement the first-best allocation of generation, irrespective of the
remuneration scheme. Furthermore, the designs are assumed not to influence the zonal
spot market. The differences in the re-dispatch designs finally show in their ability to
replicate the nodal producer surplus by payments to or charges from the re-dispatched
generators. The model thus demonstrates whether and under which theoretical condi-
tions the designs achieve the efficient outcome.
The analytical model relies on several very strict assumptions. First, the generators
are modeled as price-taking market participants. In consequence, any considerations
on the influence of market power or on strategic behavior in general are restricted to
the qualitative discussion. Second, the model provides a static snapshot of producer
surplus at times of re-dispatch. Accordingly, the hourly producer surplus is assumed
to be the only relevant indicator of dynamic efficiency. However, this assumption can
only be fulfilled in an ideal world with perfect foresight and without economies of scale
in generation, as well as under the condition that the electricity network is planned
efficiently by a central institution.
The definition of nodal pricing as a benchmark for dynamic efficiency is thus the most
critical property of the model. According to Brunekreeft et al. (2005), the lumpiness
of transmission investments may lead to large deviations between present nodal prices
and their long-run equilibrium. The uncertainty of network extensions may therefore
complicate the price forecast on which a power plant investment decision is based. Fur-
thermore, Inderst and Wambach (2007) state that due to the long planning horizons
for generation and network capacity investments, the alternating expectations on in-
vestments are likely to effect capacity developments. This is confirmed by Rious et al.
(2011), who show that the costs of anticipating power plant investments may determine
the degree to which the TSO takes new generation into account when planning the
network.
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Nonetheless, the literature on dynamically efficient pricing schemes suggests that nodal
pricing is still the first-best instrument to induce an optimal use of the transmission
network. Therefore, it is usually one component of the said pricing models. With
regard to the presented analysis, the model can thus be interpreted as a framework
which imposes minimum requirements on the re-dispatch designs. Any demonstrated
deviations from the efficiency benchmark thus indicate even greater challenges in a more
realistic setting.
1.3 Thesis Outline
As a preparation for the following sections, chapter 2 gives a detailed representation of
the fundamental electricity market model NEULING, which has been developed for the
purpose of the presented research. In addition to the model equations, references to the
relevant literature on electricity market models and power flow models are provided.
In chapter 3, the implications of establishing zonal pricing in Europe are analyzed with
regard to potential zonal delimitations and associated effects on total system costs.
Thereby, a nodal model sets the benchmark for efficiency and provides high-resolution
input data for a cluster analysis based on Ward’s minimum variance method. The
proposed zonal configurations are tested for sensitivity to the number of zones and
structural changes in the electricity market. Furthermore, dispatch and re-dispatch
costs are computed to assess the costs of electricity generation and transmission. The
results highlight that suitable bidding zones are not bound to national borders and that
losses in static efficiency resulting from the aggregation of nodes into zones are relatively
small.
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the analysis of re-dispatch, which is still a widespread
congestion management mechanism in Europe. Its popularity mainly stems from the
possibility to adhere to uniform pricing on the national spot markets. Nonetheless, given
the substantial delay in network expansions and increasing internal congestion, this
approach has its limitations. The necessity to coordinate generation and transmission
investments suggests an integration of local price signals into congestion management.
With the help of theoretical models, the presented approach analyzes the short- and
long-term efficiency of different re-dispatch designs and thus evaluates their ability to
set regional incentives. The results show that although a well-designed re-dispatch is
able to implement the optimal allocation of production, the mechanism does not induce
dynamically efficient incentives for generators. Moreover, some designs may introduce
additional distortions.
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In chapter 5, the impact of congestion management on the efficiency of electricity mar-
kets and its influence on the allocation of costs and surpluses is quantified. Using the
example of Germany, the impact of congestion management on the wholesale market is
demonstrated by a comparison of the current uniform pricing system to nodal pricing
as a benchmark for short-term efficiency. Both approaches deviate in their ability to
internalize the opportunity costs of congestion and thus in the allocation of generation.
In consequence, the presented analysis reveals significant distribution effects within Ger-
many as well as differences in the overall wholesale market costs. The analysis of the
uniform pricing system is complemented by the evaluation of three re-dispatch designs,
which resolve internal congestion after the clearing of the spot market. Since even a
well-designed re-dispatch mechanism will most likely miss the efficient allocation of gen-
eration in practice, the analysis indicates the magnitude of the associated bias. The
results show that the details of the re-dispatch design largely determine the degree to
which additional distortions are introduced.
Chapter 2
The NEULING Model
This chapter introduces the fundamental electricity market model NEULING, which has
been developed for the purpose of this thesis. The underlying methodology is discussed
in the context of the existing literature. Hereby, a special focus is on the classification
of the applied DC load flow approach. Furthermore, the equations of the dispatch and
re-dispatch models are presented in detail.
2.1 Some Conceptual Foundations
Electricity market models are a well established tool to analyze the fundamental prin-
ciples governing the operation and the development of power markets. According to
Ventosa et al. (2005), three modeling streams can be distinguished. First, simulation
models aim at the reproduction of observed market conditions and results, for example
to identify strategic behavior on the part of market participants. An example for this
approach can be found in von Hirschhausen et al. (2007). Second, optimization models
compute the market outcome with respect to a specified normative goal, for example
profit maximization or welfare maximization. Profit-maximizing models usually reflect
the perspective of a single price-taking market participant, as in Gatzen (2008). In
contrast, welfare maximization reflects the perspective of a social planner or, according
to the first welfare theorem, the result of a perfectly competitive market. A welfare
maximizing approach is e. g. implemented in Leuthold et al. (2012). The third cate-
gory according to Ventosa et al. (2005) comprises equilibrium models, which explicitly
consider the strategic behavior of individual market players. Thereby, the models may
consider one- or multi-stage settings (for an application, see Shanbhag et al. (2011)).
The electricity market model NEULING presented in this chapter has been developed
for the purpose of an in-depth analysis of the European electricity market. The focus
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of the model applications is on the identification of fundamental drivers of the market
outcome such as the local generation and transmission network capacities. Furthermore,
the impact of market design choices and congestion management shall be analyzed under
consideration of physical power flows. In this context and under consideration of the
large scale of the problem at hand, the method of choice is a normative social planner
approach. The following discussion thus focuses on fundamental optimization models as
well as on approaches to power flow modeling.
2.1.1 Fundamental Electricity Market Models
Fundamental electricity market models optimize the satisfaction of demand by a set
of power plants from the point of view of a social planner. The supply side may be
defined by the available technologies (e.g. renewable, conventional and storage plants),
their capacities and specific costs, as well as by technical constraints which restrict the
plants’ operation. Demand is either modeled as invariant and exogenously given, or as
cost sensitive and flexible.14 Both approaches reflect different assumptions regarding
the price elasticity of electricity demand. Furthermore, demand my be differentiated
according to products such as electricity and balancing reserves. The complexity of
the optimization problem is finally driven by the structure and number of the technical
or economic constraints, by intertemporality and the number of variables, which among
others depends on the spatial and temporal resolution as well as on the modeling of elec-
tricity transmission (see section 2.1.2). The central results of the optimization comprise
information on the spatial and temporal allocation of demand and supply, on regional
power exchange, the costs and benefits of electricity supply as well as on the marginal
values of production and transmission.
Fundamental electricity market models may be distinguished in cost minimization and
welfare maximization approaches. The concepts usually imply different assumptions
on demand elasticity. Generally, cost minimizing models make use of fixed (i. e. com-
pletely inelastic) demand values and therefore only optimize supply. In contrast, welfare
maximizing models usually compute the optimal difference between the utility and the
cost functions. Therefore, the objective function implicitly comprises information on
the slope of the inverted demand function, and thus on elasticity. Independent of these
classical model setups, both mathematical problem formulations can theoretically be
adapted to inelastic and elastic demand functions. The combination of welfare maxi-
mization and inelastic demand however requires a specification of the value of lost load
14Since (marginal cost-based) prices are an ex-post interpretation of the market clearing constraint’s
dual variable, demand cannot be represented by a direct function of the market price. Instead, the value
of consumption is calculated as the space below the inverted demand function in dependency of the
supplied quantity.
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(VOLL), in order to provide the solvers with a bounded solution space. Irrespective of
the assumed demand elasticity, both setups are connected via the duality of the welfare
maximization problem and the expenditure minimization problem of the social planner.
The concept of duality implies that the objective function of one problem forms a con-
straint of the other and vice versa. Furthermore, it ensures that the optimal solutions of
the primal variables are identical in both problems and that the models’ dual variables
take the reciprocal values of each other.15 Concerning the social planner approach in
general, the first welfare theorem implies that the socially optimal outcome can be im-
plemented in a perfectly competitive market. In the context of the electricity market,
this is illustrated in Schweppe et al. (1988).
Both cost minimization and welfare maximization approaches have been widely applied.
For the case of welfare maximization, examples can be found in Weigt (2006) and Green
(2007), whereas cost minimization models are applied in Bartels (2009) and Nicolosi
(2012). With regard to the model specification and parameterization, welfare maximiz-
ing models require a non-linear problem formulation and the definition of assumptions
on demand elasticity. Since the real-time elasticity of electricity demand is assumed
to be small, the simplification applied in cost-minimizing models is often accepted in
exchange for less computational effort.16
Non-linear elements may also be introduced into fundamental electricity market models
by considerations of unit commitment, as in Leuthold et al. (2012). With the help of
mixed-integer problem formulations, technical ramping constraints an minimum load
conditions may be considered in greater detail. Again, this increases the computational
complexity of the models. However, the alternative of applying linearized operational
constraints as e. g. discussed in Kuntz and Mu¨sgens (2007) has been shown not to impair
the quality of the results significantly (see Abrell et al. (2008)).
Further issues influencing the complexity of the model are the considered time horizon
as well as the applied temporal resolution. The time horizon is especially relevant for
investment models which consider the economic impact of additional capacities over
their respective lifetime.17 With regard to dispatch models or dispatch components
of investment models, the temporal resolution influences the representativeness of the
results. Instead of computing the operation of power plants over an entire year, the
definition of type-days allows for a reduction of the computational effort. Type-days are
usually chosen to reflect typical combinations of load and feed-in from renewable energy
sources (RES) and thus often neglect extreme events. This approach is applied both
in dispatch as well as in combined dispatch and investment models, such as in Nu¨ßler
15A general comment on duality can e. g. be found in Chiang and Wainwright (2005).
16On the real-time elasticity of electricity demand, see Lijesen (2007).
17Cf. EWI (2011).
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(2012) and EWI (2011). In contrast, Gatzen (2008) chooses a model specification with
reflects 8760 consecutive hours of a given year for the purpose of the assessment of the
profitability of pumped-storage plants. As demonstrated in Nicolosi (2012), the temporal
resolution may influence the results of investment models considerably, especially in
systems with a high share of RES.
Time is also an important factor in stochastic electricity market models, which allow for
the representation of a gradual disclosure of market-relevant information. In contrast
to models which are based on the assumption of perfect foresight, unit commitment or
investment decisions may be made without full knowledge about future developments.
This may e. g. concern the production of RES or the evolution of demand. Corresponding
examples may be found in Meibom et al. (2006) and Abrell and Kunz (2012).
Furthermore, fundamental electricity market models can be differentiated according to
the representation of the transmission network. An overview of common approaches is
given in the following.
2.1.2 The Power Flow Model
The consideration of electricity exchange is an important property of fundamental elec-
tricity market models which aim at a realistic representation of an interconnected elec-
tricity system. A simple approach to the analysis of power exchange is the definition of
one-node regions and the use of variables which define bi-directional flows between the
regions. In this setup, the limits of power exchange are commonly defined by so-called
net transfer capacities (NTC). Since the physical flows in the real world are governed by
Kirchhoff’s and Ohm’s laws, the NTC-approach is a substantial simplification. Given
that the constellation of local consumption and production influences the power flows
on the entire network, the results of NTC-based models will be sub-optimal or even
infeasible in reality.
The available alternatives are alternating current approaches (AC), direct-current ap-
proaches (DC) and the use of power transfer distribution matrices (PTDF). The prop-
erties of the models are discussed in detail in Schweppe et al. (1988) and Stigler and
Todem (2005) (both AC and DC), as well as in Waniek (2010) (PTDF) and Nu¨ßler
(2012) (all approaches). The AC approach constitutes the most detailed representation
of power flows, since it considers both active and reactive power as well as transmission
losses. Thus, the flows on highly complex networks can be reproduced. However, solving
Chapter 2. The NEULING Model 17
the AC models requires an iterative process which may not converge at all times.18 Fur-
thermore, the integration of an AC approach into large-scale electricity market models
is challenging. Thus, applications as in Barth (2007) are rare.
The DC approach provides a linear approximation of power flows and can thus be
directly incorporated into electricity market models. The linearization is achieved by
a neglect of reactive power flows, by the assumption of small phase angles and by a
normalization of the voltage magnitudes to one. According to Schweppe et al. (1988),
all of the assumptions become more inaccurate for lower voltage and distribution lines,
as well as in times of high line loading. Furthermore, assuming a constant rather than
a time-variant resistance-reactance ratio will lead to approximation errors. As stated in
Schweppe et al. (1988), the last assumption may however facilitate the interpretation of
a market model’s results. Purchala et al. (2005) test the validity of the DC assumptions
and conclude that the overall performance of the approximation is good, although errors
on individual lines may occasionally be significant.
Power transfer distribution factors also allow for a linear representation of power flows.
Just as the DC approach, PTDF matrices can neither reflect reactive power flows nor
losses. The underlying factors may either be derived from AC or from DC models and
reflect the load flows in a specific consumption and production constellation. Thus, the
matrices vary with the use of the network. However, the matrices are usually defined
on the basis of a representative constellation rather than for each each of them. Baldick
(2002) and Lui and Gross (2002) demonstrate theoretically and empirically that this
approximation is usually justifiable. However, Duthaler et al. (2008) highlight that
the approximation error becomes substantial if the calculations are based on a zonal
model. This is especially the case, if the zones are not defined in accordance with
the fundamental market structure. In general, a new calculation of PTDF matrices is
inevitable in the case of a change in the network topology.
Both DC and PTDF approaches have been applied in various settings. The DC approach
is often applied in the context of nodal pricing models. For example, Overbye et al.
(2004) demonstrate that the DC-based power flow calculation in locational marginal
pricing models is fairly close to the AC solution using the case of the Midwest U.S.
transmission system. Further applications in nodal pricing scenarios are among others
presented in Weigt (2006), Green (2007) and Kunz (2009). In contrast, the PTDF ap-
proach is often used in the analysis of international power flows. Waniek (2010) demon-
strates that the application of PTDF matrices is preferred to NTC-based specifications
of international transmission capacities with respect to welfare.
18Cf. Groschke et al. (2009).
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Both approaches are also common in the fundamental analysis of re-dispatch. Re-
dispatch is a congestion management approach applied within bidding zones that re-
solves internal congestion by the means of adjusting power plant generation schedules.
Just as in the case of dispatch models, the re-dispatch optimization problem can be
specified by a social planner approach. Thereby, the accurate representation of power
flows is of special importance. Nu¨ßler (2012) uses a PTDF approach to calculate re-
dispatch in the German market. Also Linnemann et al. (2011) use a PTDF approach
and furthermore demonstrate a method to integrate (n-1)-security constraints into a
re-dispatch model by the means of an iterative process. DC approaches are applied in
Kunz (2011) and Go¨rner et al. (2008), who also emphasize the possibility of network
topology optimization as a congestion management option.
2.1.3 Classification of the NEULING Model
The New European Linear Investment and Grid Model NEULING as applied in the
thesis at hand calculates the cost-minimal generation dispatch and re-dispatch of a given
power plant portfolio for 8760 hours of a year. The high temporal resolution allows for
the consideration of general structural patterns such as seasonal variations in load as
well as of extreme events.
The spot market dispatch of conventional power plants is determined such that the
residual demand (exogenous system demand including network losses less electricity
produced by renewable energy sources and less must-run generation from combined
heat and power plants) is met in each hour. Furthermore, the demand for positive
and negative balancing reserve needs to be covered. The conventional power plant
fleet including hydro storage (Hyd-S), pumped storage (Hyd-PS) and compressed air
energy storage (CAES) plants is grouped into 25 so-called vintage classes according
to primary fuel, age and technological characteristics such as efficiency. Each vintage
class is then dispatched under consideration of variable and ramping costs, as well as
linearized minimum- and part-load restrictions.
The cost-minimal nodal dispatch is subject to network restrictions implemented by a DC
power flow model. The DC power flow gives an approximation of the physical flows over
the high-voltage alternating current transmission network in the so-called core model
regions. Thereby, both losses as well as reactive power are neglected in order to keep
the problem linear. The lines’ physical capacities are standardized and multiplied with
a factor of 0.8 in order to account for a security margin. Furthermore, interconnectors
to and in between so-called satellite regions are implemented by the use of net transfer
capacities (NTC).
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The basic spatial resolution of NEULING gives a nodal representation of the core model
regions. Depending on the object of investigation, the nodes can be aggregated into
zones. Although the zonal dispatch assumes internal copperplates, the information on
the nodal net injections is preserved. Thus, the usage of the internal grid can be deter-
mined ex-post and the necessary re-dispatch in case of violations of network constraints
can be calculated based on the plants’ operating status and their utilization.
The optimal flow-based re-dispatch is represented by the least-cost combination of up-
ward and downward ramping, which at the same time relieves the overloaded line and
keeps the balance between demand and supply at each node. The marginal costs of
a plant’s upward re-dispatch are given by its variable fuel and ramping costs, while
the marginal savings of its downward re-dispatch equal the avoided costs of genera-
tion. This basic setup corresponds to a cost-based mechanism in which the generators
are either compensated or charged as to render them indifferent with regard to being
re-dispatched.
2.2 Technical Model Description: Dispatch
In the following, the dispatch problem as solved by NEULING is introduced in detail. Its
core is defined by cost equations as well as by market clearing and load flow constraints.
Further equations restrict the dispatch solution by imposing technical limits on power
plant operation. Additionally, the provision of positive and negative reserve may set
upper or lower bounds to spot market production.
2.2.1 Total Costs of Electricity Production
NEULING minimizes total costs of electricity production TC over all model regions
n for a given year y. Thereby, TC comprises variable costs of production V CPROD,
variable ramping costs V CRTO and fixed operation and maintenance costs FCOM :
min
y
!TCy = V C
PROD
y + V C
RTO
y + FC
OM
y . (2.1)
The variable costs of production equal the sum of fuel and CO2 costs fuel c as well
as miscellaneous variable costs other vc multiplied by electricity production GEN over
regions n and all generation technologies t. The set of technologies includes both con-
ventional (nuclear and thermal) as well as storage technologies such as pumped hydro
storage, hydro reservoirs and compressed air energy storage (CAES). The latter subset
may be addressed separately by the use of the index st. Compared to producing units,
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relatively higher costs apply to the portion of capacities which are kept ready to oper-
ate without actively contributing to the hourly demand-supply-balance in order to avoid
start-ups or to provide positive balancing reserve: These capacities (CAP RTO−GEN)
are priced with part load fuel costs fuel cPL and other vc. Furthermore, compressors
of pumped storage or CAES plants operating (COMP ) and those only ready to operate
(CAP RTO COMP ) also induce other vc. The associated consumption of energy is
priced implicitly with the marginal cost of electricity supply since it raises the demand
for electricity.
V CPRODy =
∑
h,n,t
GENy,h,n,t ∗ (fuel cy,h,n,t + other vcn,t) (2.2)
+
∑
h,n,t
(CAP RTOy,h,n,t −GENy,h,n,t)
∗ (fuel cPLy,h,n,t + other vcn,t)
+
∑
h,n,st
COMPy,h,n,st ∗ other vcn,st
+
∑
h,n,st
(CAP RTO COMPy,h,n,st − COMPy,h,n,st) ∗ other vcn,st
Variable costs of ramping procedures are approximated by the part of capacity ramped-
up in a given hour CAP UP and CAP UP COMP , multiplied by fuel and attrition
costs (start attr) incurred during the required start-up time start time. Whereas ramp-
ing up is thus associated with costs, ramping down is assumed to be free. However,
reducing generation comes at the price of opportunity costs of ramping up again at a
later point in time. Ramping costs are relevant for generation units of conventional
technologies as well as for turbines and compressors of storage plants.
V CRTOy =
∑
h,n,t
CAP UPy,h,n,t (2.3)
∗ (fuel cy,h,n,t + start attrt) ∗ start timey,h,n,t
+
∑
h,n,st
CAP UP COMP ∗ start attrt ∗ start timey,h,n,t
Additionally to the variable costs of electricity supply, fixed operation and maintenance
costs fom c per installed MW of capacity instcap enter the calculation of the total
annual costs.
FCOM =
∑
n,t
instcapy,n,t ∗ fom ct (2.4)
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2.2.2 Market Clearing and Network Capacity Constraints
The central constraint in the optimization is the balance equation which ensures that de-
mand is met at all times. The hourly demand values of load include both final consump-
tion and network losses, but not the consumption of storage plants which is modeled
endogenously. Energy produced by renewable energy sources renewables is provided
exogenously to the model and reduces total demand to residual demand res load:
res loady,h,n = loady,h,n − renewablesy,h,n (2.5)
The residual load is then provided for by domestic generation and power exchange
between model regions. Exchange between so-called core regions (NETINPUT ) is
represented by a DC load flow, whereas trade with and between so-called satellite regions
EXC is based on net transfer capacities (NTC). Consumption of storage plants increases
the required production, while curtailment of electricity produced by renewable energy
sources (RES-E) decreases total supply. Curtailment comes at costs of zero and is
thus applied when there is excess supply, either due to renewable infeed or ramping
constraints and balancing market obligations of conventional capacities. It is restricted
by the hourly infeed from renewables, such that CURTAILy,h,n ≤ renewablesy,h,n. The
balance equation is now given by:
∑
t
GENy,h,n,t −
∑
st
COMPy,h,n,t −NETINPUTy,h,n +
∑
m
EXCy,h,m,n (2.6)
= res loady,h,n +
∑
m
EXCy,h,n,m + CURTAILy,h,n
Thereby, NETINPUT is specified as follows, where DELTA is a free variable repre-
senting the phase-angle at a given node and b is the network susceptance matrix which
represents the susceptances of all lines connecting nodes n and m:19
NETINPUTy,h,n =
∑
m
by,n,m ∗DELTAy,h,m (2.7)
The DC load flow is restricted by the available line capacities:
−av sec ∗ cap liney,l ≤
∑
n
ky,n,l ∗DELTAy,h,n ≤ av sec ∗ line capy,l (2.8)
where av sec times line cap equals the thermal capacity of line l reduced by a security
margin which is a linear substitute for a (n-1)-security criterion. k represents the network
transfer matrix which relates the susceptance of a line to its start- and end-nodes. In
19In a DC load flow, the susceptance of a line defines the degree to which power fed in at a connected
node flows through the given line. It is determined by the reactance and resistance of the line.
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order to guarantee the solvability of the DC load flow problem, DELTA is set to zero
at the so-called slack node via a non-zero parameter slack. If all bus injections were
specified, the energy balance constraint would almost certainely not be satisfied due
to an overspecification of the model (cf. Schweppe et al. (1988)). Thus, the following
equation is specified:
slackn ∗DELTAy,h,n = 0 (2.9)
The positive variable EXC is restricted via the following constraint to the available net
transfer capacity ntc cap, which typically varies per season:
EXCy,h,n,m ≤ av ntch ∗ ntc capy,n,m (2.10)
2.2.3 Balancing Reserve Market Constraints
NEULING only considers the capacity provision of balancing reserve markets, not the
call. Thus, the model calculates the least-cost alternatives for positive and negative
reserve which implies a reduction of available capacities for spot market production
and an increase of must-run generation respectively. The central balancing market con-
straints balance national supply and demand for each reserve product (here: secondary
reserve SR and tertiary reserve TR) under consideration of prequalification constraints.
Thereby, demand is specified per country c.
The example for positive secondary reserve SR pos shows that standing and spinning
reserves (POS SR STAND and POS SR SPIN) are differentiated. Standing reserves
may be provided by (extramarginal) generating units not operating at the spot market,
which start up quickly enough as to ensure timely production. Less flexible technologies
may only serve as spinning reserve, i.e. when they are already generating and guarantee
sufficiently quick increases in production levels. Accordingly, technology specific bi-
nary prequalification parameters (av SR stand and av SR SPIN) are assigned under
consideration of the plants’ flexibility and the lead times for the given reserve prod-
uct. Furthermore, a separate variable for compressors of storage plants participating in
the balancing market, POS SR COMP , is introduced. Compressors may only provide
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positive reserve by ramping-down (spinning) units, thus reducing consumption.
SR posc =
∑
n∈c,t
av SR standt ∗ POS SR STANDy,h,n,t (2.11)
+
∑
n∈c,t
av SR spint ∗ POS SR SPINy,h,n,t
+
∑
n∈c,st
av SR spinst ∗ POS SR COMPy,h,n,st
The case of negative secondary reserve SR neg is different to the extent that it can
either be provided by spinning generation capacities ramping down or by both standing
and (not yet fully used) spinning compressor capacities increasing their consumption.
SR negc =
∑
n∈c,t
av SR spint ∗NEG SRy,h,n,t (2.12)
+
∑
n∈c,t
av SR spinst ∗NEG SR SPIN COMPy,h,n,st
+
∑
n∈c,st
av SR standst ∗NEG SR STAND COMPy,h,n,st
Both equations 2.11 and 2.12 can be reproduced for the case of tertiary reserve.
2.2.4 Storage Constraints
Storage plants require separate equations accounting for the intertemporal constraints on
storage levels. The storage volume is implicitly given by the installed capacity inst cap
of the generating units multiplied by a volume factor vol factor, which gives the av-
erage regional ratio of capacity and storage. The storage level (STORAGE LEV EL)
at the beginning of the modelled time period is determined by an additional factor,
initial level:
STORAGE LEV ELy,h=1,n,st (2.13)
= initial leveln,st ∗ vol factorn,st ∗ inst capy,n,st
The upper and lower bounds of the storage level are given by the size of the storage
and buffers for additional charging and discharging due to calls of secondary or tertiary
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balancing reserve (SR, TR).
STORAGE LEV ELy,h,n,st (2.14)
≤ vol factorn,st ∗ inst capy,n,st
− av SR spinst ∗NEG SR SPIN COMPy,h,n,st
− av SR standst ∗NEG SR STAND COMPy,h,n,st
− av TR spinst ∗NEG TR SPIN COMPy,h,n,st
− av TR standst ∗NEG TR STAND COMPy,h,n,st
STORAGE LEV ELy,h,n,st (2.15)
≥ av SR spinst ∗ POS SR SPINy,h,n,st
+ av SR standst ∗ POS SR STANDy,h,n,st
+ av TR spinst ∗ POS TR SPINy,h,n,st
+ av TR standst ∗ POS TR STANDy,h,n,st
The intertemporality of storage plant dispatch is embodied by the following dynamic
equation relating the hourly change of the storage level to the preceding compressor and
generator operation. Thereby, the efficiencies (eff , eff comp) of both components are
accounted for, as well as natural inflow ex inflow in the case of hydro storage.
STORAGE LEV ELy,h,n,st (2.16)
= STORAGE LEV ELy,h−1,n,st
+ eff compst ∗ COMPy,h−1,n,st −
1
eff compst
∗GENy,h−1,n,st
+ ex inflowh−1,n,st ∗ vol factorn,st ∗ inst capy,n,st
Furthermore, a yearly cycle may be defined for pumped storage and CAES plants by
the use of the following equation:
STORAGE LEV ELy,h=1,n,st (2.17)
= STORAGE LEV ELy,h=8760,n,st
+ eff compst ∗ COMPy,h=8760,n,st −
1
eff compst
∗GENy,h=8760,n,st
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2.2.5 Operational Constraints
The operation of power plants at the spot market is physically limited by their technical
availability av tech (typically varying per season) and potential balancing market obli-
gations. This is reflected via the capacity ready to operate CAP RTO. Its lower bound
is given by the level of spot market production and the contracted positive reserve pro-
vided by spinning units. The latter ensures that the corresponding capacities are ready
to operate in the (hypothetical) case of a call.
CAP RTOy,h,n,t ≥ GENy,h,n,t (2.18)
+ av SR spint ∗ POS SR SPINy,h,n,t
+ av TR spint ∗ POS TR SPINy,h,n,t
The upper bound of CAP RTO is defined by the plants availability and the provision
of positive standing reserves. The latter ensures that production may be increased in
case of a call, but does not require the capacity to be ramped-up already.
CAP RTOy,h,n,t ≤ av techh,n,t ∗ inst capy,n,t (2.19)
− av SR standt ∗ POS SR STANDy,h,n,t
− av TR standt ∗ POS TR STANDy,h,n,t
The level of capacity ready to operated can be influenced on an hourly basis by upward
and downward ramping, CAP UP and CAP DOWN . Thus, the following dynamic
constraint holds:
CAP RTOy,h,n,t = CAP RTOy,h−1,n,t (2.20)
+ CAP UPy,h−1,n,t − CAP DOWNy,h−1,n,t
The variable CAP RTO eventually restricts the level of spot market production. While
the upper level of production is implicitly stated by 2.18, its lower bound is set by
an approximation of minimal load levels (min load ∗ CAP RTO) plus obligations on
negative reserve markets. The additive connection ensures that a call of negative reserve
does not lead to the plant being switched off completely. Furthermore, the connection
between CAP RTO and generation indirectly ensures that spinning reserves are only
provided by producing units.
GENy,h,n,t ≥ min loadt ∗ CAP RTOy,h,n,t (2.21)
+ av SR spint ∗NEG SRy,h,n,t
+ av TR spint ∗NEG TRy,h,n,t
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The restrictions on and imposed by capacity ready to operate also apply to compressor
units. Thereby, the specific definitions of reserves provided by compressors have to be
accounted for.
CAP RTO COMPy,h,n,st ≥ COMPy,h,n,st (2.22)
+ av SR spinst ∗NEG SR SPIN COMPy,h,n,st
+ av TR spinst ∗NEG TR SPIN COMPy,h,n,st
CAP RTO COMPy,h,n,st ≤ av techh,n,st ∗ inst capy,n,st (2.23)
− av SR standst ∗NEG SR STAND COMPy,h,n,st
− av SR standst ∗NEG TR STAND COMPy,h,n,st
CAP RTO COMPy,h,n,st = CAP RTO COMPy,h−1,n,st (2.24)
+ CAP UP COMPy,h−1,n,st
− CAP DOWN COMPy,h−1,n,st
COMPy,h,n,st ≥ min loadst ∗ CAP RTO COMPy,h,n,st (2.25)
+ av SR spinst ∗ POS SRy,h,n,st
+ av SR spinst ∗ POS TRy,h,n,st
2.3 Technical Model Description: Re-dispatch
The concept of re-dispatch may be categorized as curative congestion management.
Curative instruments address congestion after the closure of the dispatch markets and
the announcement of the resulting generation schedules.20 Consequently, they imply the
invisibility of network constraints within the bidding zone and the potential infeasibility
of power flows resulting from trade.
In accordance with common practice, the re-dispatch module of NEULING is therefore
decoupled from the dispatch problem. The connection between both parts is established
by transferring the dispatch results to the re-dispatch model: (Dispatch-) Optimal gen-
eration levels, balancing market obligations and the NTC-based exchange between core
and satellite regions eventually enter the re-dispatch calculation as exogenous input
parameters. The re-dispatch module also requires information on further parameters
20In contrast, preventive congestion management mechanisms aim at influencing the dispatch before
market closure as to reduce the risk of overloading network elements.
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such as demand, RES-E and variable costs, which remain unchanged with respect to
the dispatch. Concerning the modules’ inputs, the crucial difference lies in the net-
work parameters. As a basis for re-dispatch, all flows over the entire network have to
be calculated, whereas the dispatch only considers transmission between bidding zones.
Therefore, the set of transmission lines is more comprehensive in the second model step.
Furthermore, the lines’ start and end nodes have to be redefined.
In the following, the implementation of re-dispatch in NEULING is discussed equation
by equation.
2.3.1 Re-dispatch Costs
The objective function of the re-dispatch module is defined by the sum of the hourly
variable costs of re-dispatch, which is minimized in the course of the solution process.
min! RCy =
∑
h,n
V C REDISy,h,n (2.26)
The variable costs equal the sum of additional fuel and CO2 costs, other variable
costs of production and ramping costs incurred by increasing generation at one point
(GEN REDIS up) and the corresponding savings realized by decreasing generation at
another point (GEN REDIS down).21 In the case of upward re-dispatch, separate
variables are introduced for standing and part load generators: Positive re-dispatch of
standing generators (GEN REDIS upSTAND) is restricted to quick-starting technolo-
gies, while re-dispatch from part load operation (GEN REDIS upPL) is priced with
part load variable costs (vcPL). Furthermore, the consumption of compressors may be
decreased as an option of positive re-dispatch (COMP REDIS up) or increased as a
negative re-dispatch option (COMP REDIS down). Since compressors are quick start-
ing units and do not incur significant losses from part load operation, the variables are
not distinguished any further. The underlying cost parameters equal those of the dis-
patch model and are summarized by the production costs vc or vcCOMP , and ramping
21The model does not explicitly consider any remuneration schemes which compensate re-dispatched
generators. This is consistent with the chosen social planner approach. Nonetheless, the variable costs
of re-dispatch as calculated by NEULING may be thought of as the outcome of perfect cost-based
re-dispatch. For a detailed discussion of re-dispatch remuneration schemes refer to chapter 4.3.
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costs vc rto or vc rtoCOMP .
V C REDISy,h,n =
∑
t
GEN REDIS upy,h,n,t ∗ (vcy,h,n,t + vc rtoy,h,n,t) (2.27)
+
∑
t
GEN REDIS upSTANDy,h,n,t ∗ (vcy,h,n,t + vc rtoy,h,n,t)
+
∑
t
GEN REDIS upPLy,h,n,t ∗
(
vcPLy,h,n,t + vc rtoy,h,n,t
)
−
∑
t
GEN REDIS downy,h,n,t ∗ vcy,h,n,t
+
∑
st
COMP REDIS downy,h,n,st ∗
(
vcCOMPy,h,n,st + vc rto
COMP
y,h,n,st
)
−
∑
st
COMP REDIS upy,h,n,st ∗ vc
COMP
y,h,n,t
2.3.2 Balance and Network Capacity Constraints
In order to quantify the need for re-dispatch, the power flows resulting from the dispatch
have to be calculated once more. Since in a zonal setup the dispatch model only considers
a limited set of network constraints, the true flows are obscured. Therefore, the re-
dispatch model uses the nodal results for generator and compressor operation (gen,
comp), NTC-based trade (exc), the curtailment of RES-E (curtail), as well as the nodal
residual demand parameters as inputs for the calculation of the associated load flow-
based nodal net exchange NETINPUT DIS. The net exchange is defined analogously
to chapter 2.2.2.
∑
t
geny,h,n,t −
∑
st
compy,h,n,st −NETINPUT DISy,h,n +
∑
m
excy,h,m,n (2.28)
= res loady,h,n +
∑
m
excy,h,n,m − curtaily,h,n
Again, the load flow calculation requires the fixation of the dispatch-related phase angle
(DELTA DIS) at the slack node.
slackn ∗DELTA DISy,h,n = 0 (2.29)
After these preparatory load flow calculations, the re-dispatch balance equation can be
defined. It implicitly requires the modifications of the DC power flows not to impair the
local balance of supply and residual demand. Thus, all re-dispatch related changes in the
nodal balance need to net out exactly. Changes may be induced by ramping domestic
generators and compressors up or down, by additional RES-E curtailment (RES down)
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and/or by modifying the load flow-based net exchange NETINPUT REDIS.
∑
t
(
GEN REDIS upy,h,n,t +GEN REDIS up
STAND
y,h,n,t
)
(2.30)
+
∑
t
(
GEN REDIS upPLy,h,n,t −GEN REDIS downy,h,n,t
)
−
∑
st
(COMP REDIS downy,h,n,st − COMP REDIS upy,h,n,st)
−RES downy,h,n −NETINPUT REDISy,h,n
=0
For the calculation of the re-dispatch induced power flows, a separate slack condition
has to be defined.
slackn ∗DELTA REDISy,h,n = 0 (2.31)
The final goal of the re-dispatch is to relieve overloaded transmission lines. Thus, the
sum of dispatch and re-dispatch related load flows needs to respect the individual line
capacities.
−av sec ∗ cap liney,l ≤
∑
n
ky,n,l ∗DELTA DISy,h,n (2.32)
+
∑
n
ky,n,l ∗DELTA REDISy,h,n ≤ av sec ∗ line capy,l
2.3.3 Operational Constraints
The last part of the re-dispatch model consists of the capacity constraints which limit
the ramping of generators and compressors. First the upward re-dispatch out of part
load generation is restricted to the capacity currently in part load operation (capPL),
which is an output of the dispatch.
GEN REDIS upPLy,h,n,t ≤ cap
PL
y,h,n,t (2.33)
Furthermore, the positive re-dispatch of capacities standing or in full load operation is
limited to the unused capacity cap unused. Again, cap unused is an output from the
dispatch model and equals the part of capacity neither used for generation nor reserved
for balancing services. As stated above, capacities standing as a result of the dispatch
may only start up if the technology is flexible enough.
GEN REDIS upSTANDy,h,n,t +GEN REDIS upy,h,n,t ≤ cap unusedy,h,n,t (2.34)
Chapter 2. The NEULING Model 30
In the case of downward re-dispatch, GEN REDIS down is limited by the dispatch
level of generation as well as by technological or reserve-related minimum load levels
(min gen).
GEN REDIS downy,h,n,t ≤ geny,h,n,t −min geny,h,n,t (2.35)
Analogously, the re-dispatch from compressors is limited.
COMP REDIS upy,h,n,st ≤ compy,h,n,st −min compy,h,n,st (2.36)
COMP REDIS downy,h,n,st ≤ cap comp unusedy,h,n,st (2.37)
Concerning the use of storage technologies, positive re-dispatch of the generators requires
sufficiently high storage levels. The hourly storage level values (storage) are given by
the dispatch.
storagey,h,n,st −
1
effst
(
GEN REDIS upSTANDy,h,n,t +GEN REDIS upy,h,n,t
)
≥ 0
(2.38)
Finally, RES-E curtailment in the course of congestion management is restricted to the
remaining in-feed after dispatch.
RES downy,h,n ≤ renewablesy,h,n − curtaily,h,n (2.39)
Chapter 3
From Nodal to Zonal Pricing -
A Bottom-Up Approach to the
Second-Best∗
Congestion management schemes have taken a prominent place in current electricity
market design discussions. In this paper, the implications of establishing zonal pricing in
Europe are analyzed with regard to potential zonal delimitations and associated effects on
total system costs. Thereby, a nodal model sets the benchmark for efficiency and provides
high-resolution input data for a cluster analysis based on Ward’s minimum variance
method. The proposed zonal configurations are tested for sensitivity to the number of
zones and structural changes in the electricity market. Furthermore, dispatch and re-
dispatch costs are computed to assess the costs of electricity generation and transmission.
The results highlight that suitable bidding zones are not bound to national borders and
that losses in static efficiency resulting from the aggregation of nodes into zones are
relatively small.
3.1 Introduction
On the way to the internal energy market (IEM) special attention is paid to possi-
ble advancements in congestion management schemes. Important improvements have
already been made by the successive introduction of implicit auctions of transmission
capacities, e.g. in the case of the Central Western European (CWE) market coupling
∗Paper submitted to Energy Economics. A previous version of this paper was presented in May 2012
at the 9th International Conference on the European Energy Market, held in Florence, Italy.
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between France, the BeNeLux states and Germany. Following this process, the scope of
the discussion has broadened to include national transmission networks as well.
In the recently published Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion
Management for Electricity (CACM, ACER (2011)) the Agency for the Cooperation
of Energy Regulators (ACER) explicitly recommends the definition of bidding areas
or zones whose implementation is meant to support adequate congestion management
and to contribute towards local price signals. Thereby, the zonal delimitations shall
be proposed by the transmission system operators (TSOs) and may span one or more
control areas in case no significant congestion occurs within or between areas.
However, the CACM guidelines do not clarify at which degree of congestion a bottleneck
qualifies as significant. Instead, ACER defines ”overall market efficiency” as the main
principle in the definition of zones, including aspects of ”socio economic welfare, liquidity,
competition, network structure and topology, planned network reinforcement and re-
dispatching costs” (cf. ACER (2011), p. 7). Especially, the TSOs’ analysis of zonal
delimitations shall be based on detailed data on re-dispatching costs and structural
congestion.
Relevant criteria for the evaluation of zonal market configurations are also discussed
in Frontier Economics and Consentec (2011) and Supponen (2011). In Frontier Eco-
nomics and Consentec (2011), the consequences of a potential division of the German-
Austrian bidding zone are analyzed with regard to technical and economic implications.
The mainly qualitative evaluation covers changes in market concentration, liquidity and
transactions costs as well as in static and dynamic market efficiency and is based on
a hypothetical division of today’s market zone into two separate areas along the most
critical bottleneck observed in the year 2009. On the said line, congestion arises at 10%
of the hours of the year. Supponen (2011) introduces further criteria for the choice of
bidding zones such as the direction of the wind power flow and a coincidence of zonal
boundaries with physical congestion points. Finally, a zonal configuration is proposed
which divides the European market into 45 zones. Thereby, Germany, the BeNeLux
countries, France, Austria and Switzerland are assigned to 11 zones.
A stronger focus on quantitative measures is put in Stoft (1997), Walton and Tabors
(1996) and Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001). Stoft (1997) states that the definition of zones
should be based on nodal price differences which comprise all relevant information on
network related costs. This is underlined by the findings in Stoft (1996) which show
that the loss in welfare by creating uniformly priced zones despite internal congestion is
proportional to the squared error in the uniform prices. In Green (2007), the decrease in
welfare induced by implementing a single price zone instead of nodal pricing is quantified
for the English andWelsh system as 1.3% of the generators’ revenues. Walton and Tabors
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(1996) therefore combine statistical tests for price uniformity with information from
practical experience to identify zones, but do not formalize a method to test the results’
adequacy. In Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2001), the authors show that absolute differences
in nodal prices do not yet provide an adequate basis for the definition of zones since
similar price differences may lead to variations in the optimal zonal configurations in
different scenarios. Thus, cluster analysis is suggested as one possible methodological
refinement.
Cluster analysis is i. a. used in Olmos and Pe´rez-Arriaga (2008) and Yang et al. (2006).
Authors in Olmos and Pe´rez-Arriaga (2008) apply two clustering methods, Autoregres-
sive Kohonen Maps and the k-means algorithm, to a set of power transfer distribu-
tion factors (PTDF) due to a lack of information needed for nodal price computations.
PTDFs give the relative impact of a marginal change in the net input of a node on
any given line in the system and therefore do not reflect all relevant information on the
structure of the electricity system. In Yang et al. (2006), a set of potentially congested
lines is identified by the means of probability analysis. Then, sensitivities of nodal power
injections to the flows over the congested lines are computed and used as a substitute
for nodal prices in a fuzzy c-means cluster analysis.
The research presented in this paper develops a set of market zones for the CWE region,
Switzerland and Austria (CWE+) for both 2015 and 2020 on the basis of hourly nodal
prices and a hierarchical cluster analysis. Knowing that zonal pricing is in general the
second-best solution to enhancing efficiency (see e.g. Hogan (1998)), the error made in
aggregating nodes into zones is reduced by including as much information on the (spatial)
market structure as possible. The underlying methodology is introduced in section 3.2
while section 3.3 describes the data basis and relevant assumptions. In section 3.4 the
results of the nodal model and the zonal aggregation are discussed. In order to challenge
the newly defined market zones, their dispatch and re-dispatch is calculated. Thus, the
change in total system costs by switching from the first-best nodal solution to a zonal
system is quantified. Some implications of the gained insights are given in section 3.5.
3.2 Methodology
The derivation of market zones and the subsequent evaluation of total system costs
are based on two methodological building blocks. The NEULING model optimizes the
European (re-)dispatch for given nodal and zonal configurations, while the latter result
from cluster analysis subject to a minimum variance criterion.
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3.2.1 The NEULING Model
The New European Linear Investment and Grid Model (NEULING, cf. chapter 2) is
used to calculate the cost-minimal generation dispatch and re-dispatch of a given power
plant portfolio for 8760 hours of a year. The high temporal resolution allows for the
consideration of general structural patterns such as seasonal variations in load as well
as of extreme events. Thus, an adequate data base for the later cluster analysis is
generated.
3.2.1.1 Dispatch and DC-Load-Flow
The spot market dispatch of conventional power plants is determined such that the
residual demand (exogenous system demand including network losses less electricity
produced by renewable energy sources (RES-E) and less must-run generation from com-
bined heat and power plants) is met in each hour. Furthermore, the demand for positive
and negative balancing reserve needs to be covered. The conventional power plant fleet
including hydro storage (Hyd-S), pumped storage (Hyd-PS) and compressed air energy
storage (CAES) plants is grouped into 25 so-called vintage classes according to primary
fuel, age and technological characteristics such as efficiency. Each vintage class is then
dispatched under consideration of variable and ramping costs, as well as minimum- and
part-load restrictions.
The cost-minimal nodal dispatch is subject to network restrictions implemented by a DC
power flow model as introduced in Schweppe et al. (1988) and applied e.g. in Leuthold
et al. (2008). The DC power flow gives an approximation of the physical flows over
the high-voltage alternating current transmission network in the so-called core model
regions (cf. Schweppe et al. (1988) for the derivation of the DC model and Groschke
et al. (2009) for a discussion on optimal power flow models). Thereby, both losses as well
as reactive power are neglected in order to keep the problem linear. The lines’ physical
capacities are standardized and multiplied with a factor of 0.8 in order to account for
a security margin. Furthermore, interconnectors to and in between so-called satellite
regions are implemented by the use of net transfer capacities (NTC).
3.2.1.2 Re-dispatch
The basic spatial resolution of NEULING gives a nodal representation of the core model
regions. Depending on the object of investigation, the nodes can be aggregated into
zones. Although the zonal dispatch assumes internal copperplates, the information on
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the nodal net injections is preserved. Thus, the usage of the internal grid can be deter-
mined ex-post and the necessary re-dispatch in case of violations of network constraints
can be calculated based on the plants’ operating status and their utilization.
The optimal flow-based re-dispatch is represented by the least-cost combination of up-
ward and downward ramping, which at the same time relieves the overloaded line and
keeps the balance between demand and supply at each node. The marginal costs of
a plant’s upward re-dispatch are given by its variable fuel and ramping costs, while
the marginal savings of its downward re-dispatch equal the avoided costs of generation.
This setup corresponds to a cost-based mechanism in which the generators are either
compensated or charged as to render them indifferent with regard to being re-dispatched.
In theory, the nodal injections after cost-based re-dispatch correspond to those of the
optimal nodal dispatch if no additional restrictions on technical flexibility apply and
the plants’ cost functions are identical in dispatch and re-dispatch (cf. Hermans et al.
(2011)). In this case, the total costs of both designs are equal. However, this assump-
tion is not trivial. Due to the time lag between day-ahead dispatch and re-dispatch
the technical restrictions on the latter are tighter, thus increasing the variable costs of
generation. Furthermore, intraday trade requires costly adjustments of the re-dispatch
schedule on short notice.
In the presented approach, re-dispatch is priced with the hourly variable costs of the
dispatch. Furthermore, the same technical flexibility as in the dispatch is assumed, with
the exception of limiting quick starts of non-spinning units to open cycle gas turbines
(OCGT) and hydro power. Both assumptions underestimate the true costs of re-dispatch
by trend. However, re-dispatch is modeled by the hour such that ramping costs are
overestimated in comparison to an intertemporal optimization. This is especially true if
structural congestion requires continuous re-dispatch.
3.2.2 Cluster Analysis
In multivariate statistics, cluster analysis is used to group variables with multiple ob-
servations according to the variables’ similarity. Two prominent model-classes are
connectivity-based and centroid-based clustering, which differ in their basic definition of
similarity (refer to Handl (2010) for an introduction). Connectivity models rely on met-
rics such as Euclidean distances between the variables’ observations to identify clusters
in a hierarchical process. Thus, clusters are merged in the order of increasing distances
(agglomerative clustering) or split in the order of decreasing distances (divisive). As
a result, the number and composition of clusters are given subject to critical distance
levels. Hierarchical models are complemented by various algorithms which allow for
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different linkage criteria. The best choice of an algorithm finally depends on the struc-
ture of the given data set. Instead of explicitly evaluating distances between variables,
centroid-based clustering defines cluster centers and measures the distance of the data
points to the centers. Each variable is then grouped to the nearest center, which is not
necessarily an element of the original data set. Most of the associated heuristic k-means
algorithms require an ex-ante specification of the number of cluster centers k, whose
location is then optimized. Furthermore, the results are sensitive to the given starting
points of the centers’ locations.
Since the goal of the presented research is to identify structural differences between price
regions as well as the loss of information produced by merging nodes into zones, the leaps
in critical distance levels between clustering steps contain valuable information which is
easily provided by agglomerative hierarchical methods. Furthermore, the desired number
of price zones cannot be specified beforehand. Thus, the continuous computation of
optimal clusters for each possible level of aggregation provides the complete range from
which to choose in only one model run. In consequence, a hierarchical model is applied.
The input data for the cluster analysis is provided by NEULING and consists of 8760
observations of marginal costs of generation for each node. Since an aggregation of nodes
is supposed to yield homogeneous zones in terms of absolute height of and variation in
marginal costs, Ward’s minimum variance criterion (cf. Ward (1963)) is implemented.
At each clustering step k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} where N equals the number of nodes, the
algorithm merges two classes such that the resulting increase in in-cluster variance is
minimal. The ith cluster at stage k is represented by Ci,k. At the beginning of each
clustering step, the sum Ei,k of the squared Euclidean distances between the price vectors
pn at node n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and the cluster Ci,k’s mean vector p¯i,k is calculated, if n is
an element of the set Ci,k:
Ei,k =
∑
n∈Ci,k
(pn − p¯i,k)
′(pn − p¯i,k). (3.1)
Ei,k is thus a measure for the homogeneity of a cluster and is equal to zero at the starting
point where every node forms a separate cluster. The measure for the quality of the
complete cluster set is given by the sum of Ei,k over all clusters Ci,k. In consequence, the
optimal configuration of clusters is chosen as the combination that yields the minimal
decrease in quality:
arg minIk∆ :=
∑
i∈Ik
Ei,k −
∑
j∈Ik−1
Ej,k−1. (3.2)
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Here, Ik represents a feasible cluster set at the k
th stage of the algorithm. Thereby, only
combinations of neighboring nodes give valid clusters. This restriction is implemented
in an additional constraint that includes a binary parameter bn,m which is equal to 1 if
the nodes n and m are adjacent, and zero otherwise.
The result of the hierarchical clustering can be further evaluated by analyzing the critical
distances at which two clusters are merged, which equal the sum of all optimal E∗i,k over i
at step k. These distances are denoted by dk and increase with the number of clustering
steps. In order to identify the ideal level of aggregation, Mojena (1977) proposes a
benchmark based on the normalized measure
dˆk =
dk − d¯
sd
(3.3)
which increases monotonically over k and where d¯ is the mean over all dk and sd is the
standard deviation of dk. Based on simulations, Milligan and Cooper (1985) recommend
to choose the previously optimized cluster set containing N + 1− k∗ clusters, where k∗
is determined by the index of the first cluster step at which dˆk > 1.25 holds.
3.3 Data and Parametrization
The regional coverage used in the model runs is given in figure 3.1. The core regions
Austria, Switzerland, Germany and Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium and France
are divided into 72 basic regions, which each represent one node of the DC network.22
The shape of the regions is chosen to best reflect the grid structure, but also considers
the boundaries of national administrative areas.23 Directly adjacent countries as well as
Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries are modeled as national, one-node regions.
The network structure as well as relevant technical parameters such as line resistance,
reactance and capacity are kindly provided by the Institute for Energy Systems, En-
ergy Efficiency and Energy Management (ie3) at TU Dortmund University. Planned
grid extensions are considered on the basis of the Ten-Year Network Development Plan
provided by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
(ENTSO-E (2010)). Besides the core regions, also the neighboring countries connected
to the core regions via the AC network are considered as one node each in the DC load
flow. In total, NEULING ’s DC load-flow simulates the optimal power flow between 79
22The node representing Luxembourg is merged with the adjacent German node. In the following,
the corresponding data is subsumed under the label ”DE”.
23The German model regions were first defined in Nu¨ßler (2012). All other core regions have been
developed in the course of the work presented in this paper.
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nodes via 434 lines (2015) and 446 lines (2020) respectively. Additionally, the NTC
values of interconnectors to and between satellite regions are implemented according to
ENTSO-E.
Figure 3.1: Regional coverage of NEULING
Source: Own illustration.
The power plant database of the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of
Cologne (EWI) provides geo-coded data of the existing and planned European conven-
tional generation capacities, including expected decommissioning dates. The installed
capacities per main technology are given on a national level in table 3.1. Fuel and CO2
price assumptions are based on EWI (2011) and given in table 3.2.
Table 3.1: Installed generation capacities in 2015 and 2020 per main technology
[MW] Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Gas Oil Hyd-S Hyd-PS CAES
AT
2015 0 300 470 5,020 450 3,490 4,140 0
2020 0 300 470 5,960 370 3,490 4,500 0
CH
2015 3,220 0 0 900 10 7,050 3,380 0
2020 2,860 0 0 1,270 0 7,050 4,980 0
DE
2015 12,050 18,950 27,080 20,770 0 230 7,630 320
2020 8,100 17,490 29,070 18,450 0 230 9,630 320
NL
2015 450 0 9,560 20,910 160 0 0 0
2020 450 0 9,560 19,650 160 0 0 0
BE
2015 5,560 0 1,940 5,910 50 0 1,180 0
2020 3,840 0 1,670 5,440 50 0 1,180 0
FR
2015 63,130 0 7,060 8,800 6,340 10,390 5,510 0
2020 59,550 0 5,340 8,720 1,570 10,390 5,510 0
Source: Own calculation based on EWI power plant database.
Data of the regional installed capacities of combined heat and power plants (CHP) is
also available in EWI’s database. In combination with hourly heat demand curves, the
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Table 3.2: Fuel and CO2 price assumptions
[EUR/MWhth] Uranium Lignite Hard Coal Nat. Gas Oil
2015 3.60 1.40 13.20 25.70 47.20
2020 3.60 1.40 13.40 28.10 50.25
CO2 2015: 22.00 EUR/tCO2, 2020: 35.00 EUR/tCO2
Source: EWI (2011).
local feed-in of electricity from CHP is calculated. The assumptions on total electricity
production are based on EURELECTRIC (2011). The data on fossil-fuel plants is sup-
plemented by location-specific capacities of renewable energy sources for all core regions
which have been researched for the purpose of this study.24 The location of today’s ca-
pacities, regional potentials and historic regional developments are used to allocate the
forecasted installations given in the EU-wide National Renewable Energy Action Plans
(NREAP, cf. EC (2010)). The feed-in structure of wind and solar power is derived from
locational hourly data on wind speeds and solar radiation provided for the year 2008 (cf.
EuroWind (2011) and figure 3.2). Thus, the concurrence of power generation between
regions and between RES-technologies is consistent. From the given data, total elec-
tricity production from RES is calculated as to match the values given in the NREAP.
Regional load data is derived from information on regional electricity demand or popula-
tion and its future development.25 Total demand includes network losses and is assumed
according to EURELECTRIC (2011). Aggregated data on RES and demand is given in
table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Total consumption and electricity production from RES per technology in
2015 and 2020
[TWh] Consumption
RES-E
Hydro Biomass Solar
Wind Wind
Other
(Total) Onshore Offshore
AT
2015 70.8 28.5 19.7 4.8 0.2 3.8 0.0 0.0
2020 77.0 29.0 19.8 5.2 0.3 3.8 0.0 0.0
CH
2015 64.3 18.1 17.6 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
2020 65.1 18.5 17.6 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0
DE
2015 546.7 158.6 19.4 42.3 26.2 62.2 8.0 0.4
2020 524.4 217.7 20.1 49.8 41.5 72.9 31.8 1.7
NL
2015 126.7 27.5 0.2 13.4 0.3 9.5 4.2 0.0
2020 139.2 50.3 0.7 16.6 0.6 13.4 19.0 0.0
BE
2015 100.2 13.1 0.4 6.0 0.6 2.1 4.0 0.0
2020 113.9 23.1 0.4 11.0 1.1 4.3 6.2 0.0
FR
2015 513.9 67.6 23.5 10.5 2.6 22.7 8.0 0.3
2020 533.4 104.7 23.2 17.2 5.9 39.9 18.0 0.5
Source: Own calculation based on EURELECTRIC (2011), EC (2010).
24For the case of Germany, the data base of the currently installed capacities was established by
Nu¨ßler (2012).
25For Germany, the regional demand structure has been provided by Nu¨ßler (2012).
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Figure 3.2: Regional wind speeds onshore and global solar irradiation in the core
regions
Source: Own illustration based on EuroWind (2011).
3.4 Results and Discussion
In the following section, the results of NEULING and of the cluster analysis are pre-
sented. The first scenario year discussed in detail is 2015. The stability of the results is
then controlled for by a comparison with calculations for the year 2020. This relates to
the CACM guidelines, which propose a regular assessment of zonal delimitations every
two years. Regarding the effort of market participants to prepare for changes in zonal
definitions, Frontier Economics and Consentec (2011) suggest a time frame of five years
between those modifications. Furthermore, an auxiliary scenario in which a flow-based
market coupling of national copperplates is implemented provides a further benchmark.
3.4.1 Nodal Dispatch
As a first result of the nodal dispatch calculations, the generation mix for the years
2015 and 2020 is given in figure 3.3, both for core and satellite model regions. The
characteristics of the respective national power plant fleets translate in deviations in the
use of primary fuels.
Table 3.4 gives an overview of the demand-weighted average marginal-cost-based prices
(AMC) in 2015, both for the nodal model and a flow-based coupling of the national
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Figure 3.3: Annual electricity generation in the nodal model in the years 2015 and
2020 per country and technology
Source: Own calculation.
copperplates (CU). In each case, the marginal prices comprise generation- and network-
based costs. The only difference between the calculations consists in the assumptions
concerning the transmission capacities between the core regions. In the nodal model,
the full network as described in section 3.3 is implemented. In contrast, the underly-
ing assumption in the national model is that network capacities within countries are
abundant.
Table 3.4: Average marginal costs (AMC) of electricity supply in 2015
[EUR/MWh] AT CH DE NL BE FR
Nodal Pricing
AMC 53.65 53.52 51.74 53.27 53.54 51.54
Min. AMC 45.24 52.83 50.05 49.95 53.19 50.80
at Node Tauern Chamoson Roehrsdorf Eemshaven Avelgem Bordeaux
Max. AMC 55.51 54.93 52.88 58.01 54.18 52.92
at Node Wien Sils Eichstetten Vierverlaten Gramme Sierentz
National Market Coupling (Copperplate)
AMC 51.72 52.98 52.04 52.58 53.30 50.72
Source: Own calculation.
On a national level, both the demand-weighted average nodal costs as well as the aver-
age marginal costs of the copperplates are rather homogeneous such that the maximum
difference between countries amounts to no more than 2.11 EUR/MWh and 2.58 EU-
R/MWh respectively. Furthermore, the comparison shows that national marginal costs
of supply are by trend lower in the CU than in the nodal model. In the given set-up, this
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result is straight forward: Since the CU computation is less restrictive, it allows for the
realization of greater efficiency gains from international trade. Thereby, the observed
homogeneity of the copperplates’ marginal costs implies a high degree of interconnection
between the national markets.26 At the same time, the deviations between the nodal
and the CU set-ups already hint the relevance of costs of congestion in evaluations of
total costs of electricity supply, at least as long as national copperplates are fiction rather
than fact.
The true impact of regional constraints is revealed by the differences in the nodal dis-
tribution of marginal costs as shown in table 3.4. While on a national level the average
marginal costs of electricity supply are mostly lower in the CU calculation, average
marginal prices at some locations in the nodal case clearly undercut the former. On the
one hand, this is due to the fact that locational marginal prices reflect the flow-based
effect of a change in the nodal net input on congested lines. In case the effect is relieving,
the node’s marginal network costs are negative and reduce the overall price. Analogously,
a congestion aggravating effect is associated with positive costs. Both kinds of externali-
ties are ignored in the CU case. On the other hand, differences in marginal prices reflect
variations in the generation mix at each node including the contribution of RES, as well
as locational demand. As a result of both effects, the difference between the overall
maximum AMC (Vierverlaten, NL) and their minimum (Tauern, AT) amounts to 12.77
EUR/MWh on average. While the generation in Tauern is exclusively hydro-based, the
only power plants available at Vierverlaten are gas-fired. Additionally, Vierverlaten is
a net-importing node with a disadvantageous position in the network. But even the
deviations in marginal cost-based prices of nodes within one country can be substantial.
Due to the steep increase in the national merit order between the dominating hydro and
gas-fired technologies, the highest in-country difference is observable in Austria (10.27
EUR/MWh). These observations do not only highlight the regional heterogeneity of
the power market but also the implications of locational marginal pricing for the spatial
distribution of rents.
The analysis of the DC power flows and the utilization of the transmission network
resulting from the nodal model shows that 68 out of 390 lines in or between core re-
gions are subject to congestion in the course of the year 2015.27 Those lines’ average
utilization amounts to 44%, whereas congestion of at least one of these lines occurs in
7,284 (83%) hours of the year. The most critical line is found to be the connection
between Vierverlaten and Eemshaven in the Netherlands, which is congested in 5,111
26The Ten Year Network Development Plan (ENTSO-E (2010)) as implemented in the analysis as-
sumes grid extensions between the countries of the CWE region, Austria and Switzerland of 8.9 GW
between the years 2010 and 2015.
27Congestion is hereby referred to as a 100% rate of utilization of the lines’ available capacity, i.e.
after the reduction by the security margin.
Chapter 3. From Nodal to Zonal Pricing 43
(57%) hours and has an average rate of utilization of 83%. In contrast to Vierverlaten,
Eemshaven is a low-cost, net-exporting node connected to offshore wind farms and the
high voltage direct current line to Norway. Only 15 of the said 68 lines are interconnec-
tors between countries, which have an average utilization of 42% and of which at least
one is congested in 2,954 hours (58%). This finding underlines that by 2015 internal
congestion is of greater relevance than international bottlenecks.
The generation mix of the year 2020 is mainly characterized by increasing shares of
RES-E and a crowding-out of hard-coal based generation. Furthermore, the CWE+
region becomes a net-importer by 2020 (net-imports 2015: -65 TWh, 2020: 63 TWh).
The resulting changes in the marginal costs of supply are noticeable both in height and
regional development. First, the AMC rise substantially in the core regions. Tauern
does no longer account for the least marginal cost but observes a rise of 15 EUR/MWh
between the model years. The associated rise in Austria’s AMC is the strongest among
all core regions and is due to higher exports which require a stronger utilization of con-
ventional technologies and increase the opportunity costs of hydro power. In contrast,
the in absolute terms stronger increase in French exports does lead to a smaller increase
in AMC since the slope of the national merit order is less steep. Now Le Havre, an im-
portant node with regard to the connection of French offshore wind power plants, shows
the lowest average marginal prices in 2020.28 Overall, the heterogeneity of the CWE+
regions is increased compared to 2015. The spread between minimal and maximal AMC
now amounts to 17.25 EUR/MWh and France accounts for the highest in-country vari-
ance (14.60 EUR/MWh).
Table 3.5: Average marginal costs (AMC) of electricity supply in 2020
[EUR/MWh] AT CH DE NL BE FR
Nodal Pricing
AMC 64.08 62.24 60.75 61.63 62.21 55.66
Min. AMC 60.17 60.00 58.87 60.19 59.29 48.52
at Node Tauern Chamoson Lauchstaedt Eemshaven Avelgem Le Havre
Max. AMC 65.77 64.86 62.49 64.27 65.04 63.14
at Node Wien Sils Eichstetten Vierverlaten Gramme Sierentz
National Market Coupling (Copperplate)
AMC 60.45 61.60 60.65 61.96 63.71 57.09
Source: Own calculation.
3.4.2 Cluster Analysis
The hourly locational marginal prices computed for 2015 and 2020 serve as an input for
two runs of the clustering model described in section 3.3. The result of the model is a tree
28The installed offshore wind capacities connected to Le Havre rise from 1,560 MW in 2015 to 2,350
MW in 2020.
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or dendrogram which illustrates the successive grouping of nodes into clusters, starting
with 72 single-node zones and ending with one all-encompassing cluster. The first quarter
of the 2015 dendrogram is dominated by groupings of German nodes which exhibit the
smallest in group variance. Furthermore, the first Dutch and the first Austrian nodes
are clustered. Although this result shows a preferred grouping of small nodes at the
first stages which is due to the structural similarities within limited geographical areas,
the first major French nodes (Paris, Le Havre and Avoine) are also clustered during the
first 19 steps of the algorithm. After half of the clustering steps, the cluster size is still
heterogeneous. Nonetheless, several big clusters are already observable, e.g. North-West
Germany (9 nodes), Eastern Germany (8) and Northern France (4). Furthermore, the
first cross-border cluster of the well connected (11.1 GW) nodes Herbertingen (DE),
Buers (AT), Westtirol (AT) has been formed. In this case, international clustering is
preferred to merging the two Eastern Austrian nodes with their western neighbors since
the Austrian network and generation structure exhibits an east-west divide. After 3/4 of
the clustering steps the dominant cluster comprises a corridor of 20 nodes from Central
Germany to parts of the Netherlands. Other significant groups are formed by nodes of
Eastern Germany (8), Southern Germany, Switzerland and Austria (8), the Netherlands
and Belgium (6), North-West France (6), Southern France (5) and Eastern Switzerland
(4).
The differences in the quality of the clusters between the clustering stages (cf. equation
3.2) increases exponentially with the number of steps. Nonetheless, the test for the
statistically optimal number of clusters (cf. equation 3.3) determines a small number
of six zones as the optimal configuration for 2015. This equals the number of countries
included in the core regions, except that the cluster analysis does not follow national
borders. The cut of the dendrogram at this stage shows 4 big clusters and two single-
node zones, namely Vierverlaten (NL) and Tauern (AT).
As discussed in the previous section, these outliers exhibit the overall highest and the
lowest average marginal costs respectively. Figure 3.4 illustrates the particularities of
the nodes in comparison to their neighbors: In the case of Vierverlaten, the node’s
marginal cost curve is strictly higher and more volatile than those of its neighbors.
Thereby, the price spikes are driven by the volume of Vierverlaten’s imports and the
associated stress imposed on the network. The connection to Eemshaven is congested
as of the early morning hours, which is reflected by the beginning of the price deviations
within the Netherlands.29 As opposed to Vierverlaten, the marginal cost curve of the
outlier Tauern is more stable and strictly lower than those of its neighboring nodes
29As highlighted in table 3.4 and evident from figure 3.4, Eemshaven is also an extreme node, although
no outlier at the given clustering stage. In contrast to Vierverlaten, Eemshaven is characterized by low
and stable prices resulting from the yield of offshore wind power, the interconnector to Norway and
positive external effects on the network.
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due to the high availability of hydro power. Furthermore, the said east-west divide in
Austria results in a separation of Tauern from both Eastern Austria and the western
nodes Buers and Westtirol (also standing out in figure 3.4). In consequence, the cluster
algorithm does not merge the outlier nodes with other clusters until the fourth to last
(Vierverlaten) and second to last step (Tauern).
Figure 3.4: Marginal costs of a random day in the Netherlands (left) and Austria
Source: Own calculation.
Since an extreme imbalance in the number of nodes per zone most-likely constitutes
a political no-go, the two outlier nodes are added to the respective neighboring zone
with the best network connection. In return, other clusters are split. This method is
problematical for two reasons. First, the optimal splitting of clusters may produce new
single-node zones and the more steps of the clustering have to be reversed, the more
outliers by tendency appear. Second, the inefficiency created by the inclusion of extreme
nodes is especially high (cf. section 3.3 and Stoft (1996)). Nonetheless, the strategy is
kept due to the lack of a quantitative measure of minimum zonal size and leads to the six
zones given in figure 3.5. Thereby, the only non-split country is Belgium. As sensitivity,
a nine-zone example is also created. In the latter, France is divided among three zones,
East Switzerland is separated from Southern Germany and an Eastern German zone is
created.
Based on the nodal prices from 2020, the cluster analysis is repeated. Unlike in 2015,
the heuristic test of the results gives five (instead of six) as the optimal number of zones.
Although this configuration requires one additional aggregation step, the result does
not imply that the market in 2020 is more homogeneous than five years before. On the
contrary, the regional concentration of RES as well as overall demand growth lead to a
higher degree of diversification in locational marginal prices in 2020 (cf. section 3.4.1).
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Figure 3.5: Results of the cluster analysis for the model year 2015 with 6 (left) and
9 clusters
Source: Own illustration.
This is also reflected by the measure of heterogeneity dk (cf. section 3.2.2) whose values
at each clustering stage k are strictly higher in 2020 than in 2015. But since the heuristic
according to Mojena (1977) and Milligan and Cooper (1985) relies on the normalized
measure dˆk (cf. eq. 3.3), this is not reflected in the choice of the optimal number of
clusters. Instead, the heuristic identifies the point at which the normalized measure
exceeds the predefined benchmark (dˆk > 1.25) and the relative increase in heterogeneity
between steps is high. This is illustrated in figure 3.6.
The final five-zone design, which again requires a correction for outliers, is given in figure
3.7. In 2020, these outliers are Vierverlaten (NL) and the new minimum-price node Le
Havre (FR) (cf. section 3.4.1).
In comparison to 2015, the final configuration leads to two instead of one French zone,
whereas the former zone consisting of Eastern France and Western Switzerland is merged
with nodes of East-Switzerland, South-Germany and Western Austria. Furthermore,
the border between the two Austrian-related zones is moved to the East. The latter
development is due to the fact that Tauern has lost its outlier status and is now merged
with West-Austrian, South-German and Swiss nodes at a relatively early stage. One
driver for the French splitting is the development of offshore wind farms along the
Atlantic Coast. Unlike in 2015, the division persists both with 5 and 9 zones. Again,
the results concerning the grouping of Eastern Germany and Switzerland are sensitive to
the number of bidding zones. A network related effect is e.g. observable in the northern
Dutch regions, where a new connection between Eemshaven and Amsterdam leads to a
merger of Amsterdam, Zwolle and Vierverlaten with the major Dutch-German zone.
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Figure 3.6: Development of the normalized measure of heterogeneity in the cluster
analysis of 2015 and 2020
Source: Own calculation.
Figure 3.7: Results of the cluster analysis for the model year 2020 with 5 (left) and
9 clusters
Source: Own illustration.
3.4.3 Zonal Dispatch with Re-dispatch
The bidding zones as described in section 3.4.2 define the network configuration which
is provided for the zonal dispatch optimization with NEULING. In comparison to the
nodal model runs, information on the network structure within a zone is removed and
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all included nodes are aggregated. Transmission lines between zones remain unchanged
except for the definition of their start and end nodes which now correspond to the
superordinate zone. The zonal dispatch provides information on locational marginal
costs which only partly reflect costs of congestion. An overview of the results is given in
table 3.6, where also the corresponding weighted average over the marginal costs of the
zones’ nodes as calculated in the nodal dispatch is given. Positive as well as negative
deviations of zonal from nodal averages are observable due to the neglect of external
network effects.
Table 3.6: Average marginal costs in zonal systems in 2015 and 2020
2015
[EUR/MWh] A B C D E F
Zonal (6) 47.63 53.69 49.94 52.06 53.09 52.17
as in Nodal 51.42 53.72 52.65 52.84 53.56 51.54
A. FR, B. AT, C. FR/CH, D. DE/AT/CH, E. BE/NL, F. DE/NL
[EUR/MWh] I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Zonal (9) 47.20 47.96 53.88 53.11 49.66 52.00 53.45 51.67 52.05
as in Nodal 51.07 52.03 53.72 54.34 52.65 52.68 53.56 50.36 51.83
I. FR[NW], II. FR[S], III. AT, IV. CH[E], V. FR/CH, VI. DE/AT, VII. BE/NL,
VIII. DE[E], IX. DE/NL
2020
[EUR/MWh] A B C D E
Zonal (5) 54.06 55.85 62.59 62.12 60.63
as in Nodal 53.41 57.65 62.75 62.16 60.51
A. FR[NW], B. FR[S], C. DE/AT/CH, D. BE/NL, E. DE/NL
[EUR/MWh] I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Zonal (9) 54.43 56.04 62.30 63.66 60.95 62.06 62.15 60.44 60.29
as in Nodal 53.41 57.65 64.83 63.43 60.55 62.22 62.16 60.79 59.05
I. FR[NW], II. FR[S], III. AT, IV. CH[E], V. CH[W], VI. DE/AT, VII. BE/NL,
VIII. DE/NL, IX. DE[E]
Source: Own calculation.
The information on the nodal net input under zonal pricing is used to calculate the
resulting power flows over the full network. This implies that the utilization of the
interconnectors between zones is calculated again, too. The re-dispatch algorithm now
chooses the least-cost option to relieve congestion. Thereby, NEULING can access run-
ning power plants for downward re-dispatch with the exception of units with balancing
market obligations. The generating units are ramped down in the order of decreasing
cost savings and decreasing effectiveness with regard to congestion relief. No restric-
tions on the geographic distance between re-dispatchable plants and congested lines are
imposed, such that perfect cooperation between the control areas is implied.30 When
the conventional potential for downward re-dispatch is exhausted, RES-E can be cur-
tailed. This option is least attractive since curtailment of renewables does not yield
30Joint cross-border re-dispatch is currently not implemented in the CWE region, but envisioned as
an element of the IEM (ETSO (2003)). At the moment, curative cross-border congestion management
is performed via counter trade.
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savings in variable generation costs. Concerning upward re-dispatch, the model may ac-
cess spinning units with unused capacity, again under consideration of balancing market
commitments. Furthermore, quick-starting units like open cycle gas-turbines (OCGT)
may be activated.
In the 2015 six-zone case, congestion occurs in 7,678 hours of the year and requires a
total amount of re-dispatch of 12,055 GWh. RES need to be curtailed in 1,954 hours
to guarantee the stability of the network. In comparison to the flow-based coupling of
national copperplates (CU), the proposed zonal model saves 741 GWh of re-dispatch
and at the same time avoids 11.6 GWh of RES-E curtailment. Further reductions
can be achieved by implementing the zonal configuration based on nine clusters which
only requires 10,551 GWh of re-dispatch. Thereby, RES are used for supplementary
downward re-dispatch in 1,709 out of a total 7,449 hours.
The same pattern is observable in 2020, although on a higher level: The lowest amount of
re-dispatch is required in the nine-zone setup, where 20,895 GWh have to be rescheduled,
including a RES-E curtailment of 2,405 GWh. In comparison to the nine zones of 2015,
the necessary congestion management measures have thus almost doubled. Concerning
the frequency of congestion, one or more lines of the CWE+ network are now overloaded
in 8,213 hours of the year, whereas the feed-in of renewables is cut in 2,888 hours.
Reducing the number of zones from nine to five further increases re-dispatch by 1,535
GWh up to 22,430 GWh, now requiring 2,562 GWh of downward re-dispatch from
RES. Congestion occurs in 8,240 hours, curtailment in 3,039 of them. But again, the
maximum re-dispatch occurs in the CU case, even though it contains one additional
zone: Maintaining national bidding zones leads to a total of 24,469 GWh of re-dispatch
(+91% compared to 2015) and to RES-E curtailment to the amount of 3,783 GWh.
The observed stepwise decrease in congestion management measures from national mar-
ket coupling to the five- and six-zone set-ups and finally to the nine-zone models can be
attributed to two effects. First, a higher level of detail in transmission system modeling
reduces congestion. The more restrictions on electricity transmission are imposed on the
dispatch, the less violations of line capacities are observed in the ex-post calculation of
the flows over the entire network. This especially shows in the comparison of the zonal
models. The second effect is not only related to the number of bidding zones but also
to their delimitations: Since the endogenous aggregation of nodes implicitly considers
bottlenecks in the grid, congestion is pushed to the borders of the resulting zones. In
consequence, the 2015 six-zone dispatch does not necessarily account for more lines than
the CU computation, but reveals the utilization of the more critical lines. This is under-
lined by the changing proportions of internal and external congestion. In the 2015 CU
model, 4,116 GWh/a (given 369 GW of transmission capacities) are not transmittable
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within countries, whereas between countries the overload resulting from the wholesale
market dispatch amounts to only 787 GWh/a (given 61 GW of network capacities).31
Although the allocation of total transmission capacities within and between zones is
not changed much in the six-zone configuration (368 GW and 61 GW respectively), the
internal overload is reduced by almost 40% to 2,543 GWh/a while the excessive external
flows rise up to 1,404 GWh/a.
3.4.4 Total System Costs
NEULING provides information on the total costs originating from the wholesale market
dispatch and from ex-post re-dispatch. An overview of the total system costs for all
market configurations analyzed so far is given for the model years 2015 and 2020 in
table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Total system costs of electricity supply in 2015 and 2020
2015
[Million EUR] Nodal Zonal (9) Zonal (6) CU (6)
Wholesale 95,977 95,955 95,892 95,822
(CWE+ only) (37,676) (37,271) (37,202) (37,291)
Re-dispatch 0 780 957 1,099
Total 95,977 96,735 96,849 96,922
(CWE+ only) (37,676) (38,051) (38,158) (38,390)
2020
[Million EUR] Nodal Zonal (9) Zonal (5) CU (6)
Wholesale 114,828 114,635 114,553 114,507
(CWE+ only) (44,286) (43,423) (43,817) (43,778)
Re-dispatch 0 1,732 1,962 2,447
Total 114,828 116,367 116,516 116,954
(CWE+ only) (44,286) (45,155) (45,779) (46,225)
Source: Own calculation.
The comparison of annual wholesale market costs in the year 2015 shows only small
deviations between nodal and zonal models. Only small ”savings” (-22 million EUR/a)
are realized by reducing the number of bidding zones from 72 to 9, whereas the cost
difference between the nine- and six-zone models is slightly higher (-63 mio. EUR/a).
Again, the decrease in dispatch-related costs is due to the softer constraints on power
flows and the increasing neglect of local structural limitations. In 2020, the wholesale
market costs also decrease from 114,828 mio. EUR/a in the nodal case to 114,635 and
114,553 mio. EUR/a in the nine- and five-zone models respectively. Although the first
steps of the aggregation (72 to 9 nodes, -193 mio. EUR/a) now lead to higher cost
reductions than the later (9 to 5 zones, -82 mio. EUR/a), the relative ”savings” per step
31The first-stage dispatch is calculated under consideration of the reduced international or zonal
network and guarantees the compliance with the associated constraints. Nonetheless, overloading of
interconnectors may occur as soon as the nodal distribution of generation and load is revealed and the
full network is considered. Therefore, lines between countries or zones may cause re-dispatch, too.
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still increase in the course of the aggregation process. At this point, the development
of the CWE+ wholesale market costs in the year 2020 is noteworthy: Unlike the total
dispatch costs, the CWE+ costs on the wholesale level do not strictly decrease with
advancing aggregation, thus indicating that the potential benefits of network extensions
within CWE+ may partly be allocated in neighborring regions.
Regarding the costs caused by re-dispatch in the core regions, a higher number of zones
is clearly preferable. Although the amount needed for re-dispatch in 2015 is only 14%
higher in the six-zone than in the nine-zone configuration, costs increase by more than
23%. Analogously, the 7% increase in re-dispatch measures between 2020’s nine- and
five-zone models leads to 13% higher costs. This is due to the slope in the re-dispatch
merit order which implies increasing marginal costs. The relative significance of the re-
dispatch costs becomes slightly more apparent when comparing them to the wholesale
market costs of the CWE region, Switzerland and Austria only. Given dispatch related
costs of 37,271 mio. EUR/a and 37,202 mio. EUR/a in 2015’s nine- and six-zone cases
respectively, re-dispatch costs amount to 2.1% and 2.6% of the wholesale market costs of
the core regions. A further increase in re-dispatch costs up to 1,099 mio. EUR/a or 2.9%
of the respective wholesale market costs results from the CU model and the implementa-
tion of political instead of fundamental bidding zones. In 2020, the substantial increase
in necessary congestion management measures as described in section 3.4.2 results in
significantly higher re-dispatch costs, both in absolute and relative terms: Compared
to the dispatch-related costs, additional 4% and 4.5% fall upon the five- and nine-zone
re-dispatch respectively, while 5.6% are reached in the CU case.
In total, the nodal pricing model is - from a static, cost-based point of view - clearly
preferable to the zonal options. Nonetheless, the increase in overall system costs remains
small in relative terms, although the underlying aggregation is substantial. It also has
to be kept in mind that a strict compliance with cluster analysis which allows for single-
node zones would lead to lower total system costs of the zonal configurations and to
even smaller differences in comparison to the nodal model. Furthermore, the results
suggest that the level of physical market integration in the meshed CWE network is
already high and that aggregation does not lead to significant cost increases until the
very late stages. Nevertheless, a lower number of zones than tested for in this paper
may still reveal critical losses in efficiency as soon as truly fundamental bottlenecks are
disregarded or the last part of the exponentially increasing re-dispatch merit order is
reached.
Another noteworthy insight generated from the comparison of total system costs is that
not only the number of bidding zones but also their delimitations are decisive: As shown
for 2015, refraining from the status quo of national borders (CU) and implementing a
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design derived from true structural barriers decreases overall costs even when keeping
the number of bidding zones constant. Moreover, the 2020 example demonstrates that a
reduction in overall system costs may even be achieved with fewer zones than countries,
provided the bidding areas are chosen with respect to fundamental criteria.
Besides the quantitative effects, the definition of market zones also influences the spatial
allocation of costs. Exemplary for 2015, figure 3.8 displays the variations in re-dispatch
quantities and costs on a national level, which are derived from the respective nodal data.
The absolute costs and quantities per country do not rise strictly from the nine-zone
to the CU model but are shifted in accordance with the zonal delimitations. Further-
more, upward and downward re-dispatch are not allocated symmetrically since internal
congestion does not need to be relieved by re-dispatch within the zones. Instead, the
availability of re-dispatchable plants and their costs may turn cross-border congestion
management into the more efficient option. In consequence, the national net costs are
not necessarily positive. This observation adds another dimension to the issue of distri-
bution effects: In addition to the differences in marginal costs (cf. section 3.4.1), the
allocation of expenses and income from re-dispatch has to be taken into account and
may lead to debates on source-related cost allocation.
Figure 3.8: Re-dispatch quantities and costs 2015
Source: Own calculation.
Finally, the disregard of dynamic effects in the given setup has to be considered. Due to
the analysis of isolated scenario years, beneficial effects of system adaptation triggered
by locational price signals are not included. Thus, the presented total system costs are
not fully comprehensive.
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3.5 Conclusion and Outlook
From the analyses of this paper useful insights into both methodological as well as
real-world aspects of the debate on congestion management schemes have been gained.
The calculation of the optimal nodal prices has highlighted the importance of in-depth
modeling of generation and transmission systems for the identification of scarcities and
unexploited potentials for increasing efficiency. At the same time, the model results show
that nodal pricing in Europe comes with a noticeable heterogeneity in locational marginal
prices which underlines the (political) relevance of distribution effects. Furthermore,
the application of cluster analysis has given valuable insight into structural differences
and similarities between regions and has eased the way to the identification of suitable
bidding zones. Nonetheless, the instrument needs to be supplemented with information
such as the desirable minimum zonal size and an ex-post test on the optimality of the
results.
In this paper, no optimal zonal configuration has been defined. Especially, various
important issues such as market concentration, liquidity and transaction costs have
been excluded. Nonetheless, the comparative static analysis of total costs in European
nodal and zonal systems allows for several relevant conclusions. First, the nodal-based
delimitations of bidding zones in a strongly meshed network most often not coincide with
national borders, even with relatively large zones. Second, even a dramatic reduction
in the number of bidding zones yields only a relatively small increase in overall system
costs. Third, nodes with extreme characteristics do exist and are worth identifying.
The first two points suggest that efficiency gains from redefining market areas can be
realized without compromising relevant factors such as liquidity. The third point leads to
research questions related to dynamic effects of market design changes. Transparency on
structural bottlenecks is indispensable for stimulating the adaptation of both generation
and transmission systems. Nonetheless, the magnitude of price signals which is necessary
to trigger changes in behavior has not yet been identified. This is especially true if zonal
delimitations are dynamic themselves.
Chapter 4
On the Dynamic (In-) Efficiency
of Re-dispatch
Re-dispatch is a widespread congestion management mechanism in Europe. Its popular-
ity mainly stems from the possibility to adhere to uniform pricing on the national spot
markets. Nonetheless, given the substantial delay in network expansions and increas-
ing internal congestion, this approach has its limitations. The necessity to coordinate
generation and transmission investments suggests an integration of local price signals
into congestion management. With the help of theoretical models, this paper analyzes
the short- and long-term efficiency of different re-dispatch designs and thus evaluates
their ability to set regional incentives. The results show that although a well-designed
re-dispatch is able to implement the optimal allocation of production, the mechanism
does not induce dynamically efficient incentives for generators. Moreover, some designs
may introduce additional distortions.
4.1 Introduction
Liberalized electricity markets with uniform pricing schemes are struggling with the
coordination of power plant and transmission network investments. In spite of other
well-known shortcomings, vertically integrated systems have the advantage of a simulta-
neous optimization of investments within the area of the regional monopolist.32 Today,
the obligation to connect supply and demand is generally imposed on the transmission
system operators (TSOs) alone. Given the uniform wholesale market price within the
bidding area, the choice of location on the part of the generator solely depends on the
specific costs of the site, including the availability of cooling water and the transport
32Cf. Pollitt (2008), Ho¨ﬄer and Kranz (2011).
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costs of primary fuels. In consequence, the individual costs of less favorable power plant
sites are no longer weighed against the social costs of network extensions. As demon-
strated in Dietrich et al. (2010) for the case of Germany, the locations of projected power
plant investments thus deviate from the welfare maximizing siting.
Furthermore, an anticipation problem arises in the course of the network planning.33
This problem is especially relevant due to the different leadtimes of generation and
transmission investments. Accordingly, the process of long-term network planning is
extremely complex. Given the important part of the transmission grid in the implemen-
tation of the Internal Electricity Market, noticeable efforts in network planning have
been made both on international and national levels.34 Despite this progress, the highly
bureaucratic process of approving investments as well as the so-called NIMBY attitude
(short for not in my backyard) prevail. Nonetheless, especially with regard to the high
pace of the development of renewable energy sources (RES), network extensions advance
slower than desirable. Overall, well-directed placing of new generation capacities could
reduce the need for grid extensions.
Besides the long-term challenges, uniform pricing also complicates the day-to-day op-
eration of the transmission network. In contrast to so-called electricity transmission
pricing models such as locational marginal pricing (LMP, as developed by Schweppe
et al. (1988)), the uniform wholesale market does not reveal the scarcity of internal
network capacities and the associated costs of transmission to the market participants.
Consequently, the resulting dispatch may overload the network. Therefore, uniform
pricing systems come with the necessity to implement curative (sometimes also called
corrective) congestion management mechanisms. Instruments such as re-dispatch resolve
internal congestion by ex-post modifications of the generation schedules. In general, the
TSO identifies the overloading of transmission lines and selects generators to increase
or decrease their production. In the export-constrained region, the generation surplus is
decreased by ramping down local units, whereas plants in the import-constrained deficit
region are ramped up. Thereby, upward and downward re-dispatch have to be equal in
volume, such that the balance between demand and supply is kept. The procedure of
selecting generators for re-dispatch as well as their remuneration varies with the specific
design.35
33Cf. Rious et al. (2011).
34Refer to ENTSO-E (2010) for the European approach and to 50Hertz Transmission GmbH et al.
(2012) for the German Network Development Plan.
35Re-dispatch is sometimes differentiated from counter trade or counter purchases. The latter mech-
anisms are usually based on separate markets or auctions, in which the TSO acts as only buyer or
seller of energy, again to the end that generation is increased and decreased locally. In this paper, all
curative congestion management measures based on ex-post modifications of generation schedules are
denominated as re-dispatch, irrespective of the procurement procedure.
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Since in a uniform pricing system neither the social costs of network usage nor the social
costs of location decisions are transparent for market participants, the question how to
compensate the lack of locational signals is raised. Although locational marginal pricing
(often called nodal pricing) provides a sophisticated alternative in theory, the political
hurdle to the implementation of several price regions within one country will probably
not be taken in the near future. Under the premise of uniform pricing, the attention is
thus drawn to the existing congestion management scheme of re-dispatch. Given that
re-dispatch (at least indirectly) reveals the location and costs of congestion as well as the
nodes suitable for congestion relief, it is the only and thus the best available indicator
of the relative quality of power plant locations.
In this paper, a joint analysis of the short- and long-term efficiency of re-dispatch is
presented. Thereby, the focus is on the quality of the dynamic incentives for generators
induced by the remuneration schemes of different designs. In addition to some gen-
eral considerations, the two most common re-dispatch designs (so-called cost-based and
market-based re-dispatch) as well as recently discussed variations using spot price-based
remuneration are analyzed in detail.36
The first criterion of static efficiency defines the optimal allocation of re-dispatch vol-
umes. The optimum is achieved when congestion is relieved and demand is satisfied at
least cost under consideration of all network constraints. Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2007)
state that optimal locational marginal prices implement this optimal allocation. The
authors argue that the prices are unique in the sense that electricity is valued efficiently
at each node. Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2007) therefore conclude that nodal pricing may
be used as a reference in the evaluation of congestion management methods: In order to
provide the optimal results, the methods have to be consistent with the optimal nodal
values.
The static efficiency of the most common re-dispatch designs has been analyzed re-
peatedly, both qualitatively and analytically.37 For example, De Vries and Hakvoort
(2002) evaluate cost-based and market-based re-dispatch designs in a static framework
of inelastic demand and perfect competition. By the means of theoretical models, the
authors demonstrate that static efficiency is achieved through both mechanisms.
Provided that the efficient short-run result is achieved, the dynamic efficiency of re-
dispatch may be assessed on the basis of the allocation of surpluses among the market
participants. In order to identify the optimal level of re-dispatch remuneration, the
divergence between the surplus from uniform pricing and an efficient benchmark has to
36The coupling of re-dispatch remuneration to spot prices is currently discussed in consultation pro-
cesses of the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), cf. BNetzA (2012b) and BNetzA (2012a).
37For a qualitative discussion, see Inderst and Wambach (2007). Analytical evaluations are presented
in De Vries and Hakvoort (2002) and Hermans et al. (2011).
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be determined. In contrast to the static case, the discussion of the dynamic efficiency
of re-dispatch falls short of systematic analytical evaluations.
With the help of numerical examples, De Vries and Hakvoort (2002) demonstrate that
consumer costs and generator surplus deviate under different re-dispatch mechanisms.
However, they neither define a benchmark for the efficient distribution of surplus nor ex-
plicitly evaluate the effects analytically. In their brief discussion of long-term incentives
of congestion management methods, the authors come to the conclusion that curative
mechanisms do not set incentives to change the market participants’ behavior and thus
do not reduce congestion. In contrast, Inderst and Wambach (2007) state that market-
based re-dispatch may send long-term signals to a certain degree, but do not elaborate
further on the issue of dynamic efficiency.
Ding and Fuller (2005) primarily study the distribution of producer and consumer sur-
plus for nodal, uniform and zonal pricing systems. In the latter cases, re-dispatch is
shown to implement the efficient allocation of production. Assuming that re-dispatched
generators are compensated for their incurred opportunity costs, the authors implicitly
evaluate a cost-based re-dispatch design. By the means of theoretical models with de-
mand and supply step functions, Ding and Fuller (2005) find that the total surplus is
identical in all systems, but that the allocation of surplus among the market participants
may differ substantially. Nonetheless, the authors argue that an adequate assessment of
the magnitude of the differences requires quantification on the basis of realistic data and
hourly model runs. Also Hermans et al. (2011) demonstrate analytically that although
the generators’ costs are identical in nodal pricing and uniform pricing with cost-based
re-dispatch, the generators’ surplus varies between the systems.38
Following the general line of argument from short to long term, the first part of this paper
(section 4.2.1) defines the social planner benchmark for a statically efficient re-dispatch
design. The applied setting is characterized by perfect competition, perfect foresight as
well as by in-elastic demand. In the same section, the theoretical benchmark is analyzed
with special regard to its practical limitations. Thus, the basic properties of a re-dispatch
design which is both statically efficient and relatively robust can be identified. In section
4.3, the link between statically and dynamically efficient re-dispatch is established via
considerations on the allocation of producer surplus. Again, an efficient benchmark has
to be constructed. The discussion of the long-term incentives set by efficient short-
run electricity prices reveals the necessity to further restrict the theoretical framework.
Therefore, the assumptions of no economies of scale in generation and fixed network
capacities are introduced. On this basis, three categories of re-dispatch mechanisms
38Hermans et al. (2011) use the term social welfare synonymously with producer surplus. This is
misleading, since the net costs of re-dispatch ultimately borne by the consumers need to be included in
a welfare analysis.
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are tested with regard to their ability to introduce locational signals into electricity
markets with uniform pricing. Section 4.4 then gives a critical acclaim of the underlying
assumptions and discusses their influence on the quality of the results. The last section
4.5 concludes the analysis and identifies related issues in need for further research.
4.2 Static Efficiency of Re-dispatch
The analysis begins with some general considerations on statically efficient congestion
management. Therefore, a theoretical social planner approach is consulted. Subse-
quently, the practical limitations of the model are discussed. On this basis, the charac-
teristics of a statically efficient re-dispatch design are identified.
4.2.1 Efficient Allocation of Electricity Production
Per definition, the welfare maximization problem of the social planner leads to the
efficient allocation of consumption and production under consideration of all relevant
constraints. Evidently, this first-best solution also satisfies the criterion of Pareto opti-
mality. According to the first welfare theorem, Pareto optimality is also reached in every
competitive equilibrium. Then, utility maximizing producers and consumers base their
individual decisions on market prices they take as given and achieve the same allocative
efficiency as the benevolent planner.
In their seminal work, Schweppe et al. (1988) show that these principles also apply to the
electricity market, provided that network constraints are explicitly taken into account.
According to Kirchhoff’s laws, power flows vary with voltage magnitudes and phases
and largely depend on the network topology. Thus, the flows over a meshed network are
never bidirectional but divide themselves among all lines connected to the node where
the power is injected. As another consequence of the physical laws governing power flow,
congestion on one line influences all flows within the transmission system. Accordingly,
efficient market prices for electricity need to reflect the scarcity of the network and the
external effects of its use.
The principle of locational marginal pricing (LMP) developed by Schweppe et al. (1988)
therefore implies that in addition to the marginal costs of generation, also marginal costs
of transmission losses and the opportunity costs of congestion are included in efficient
spot prices. Hence, the prices paid by consumers depend on their location in the network
and may vary on a nodal basis. The authors also state the duality of LMP and welfare
maximization: The equilibrium prices resulting from the market may also be derived
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from the shadow prices of the social planner’s dispatch problem and lead to the same
allocation of production and consumption.
Under the assumption of a completely inelastic demand function, the minimization of
production costs leads to maximal welfare.39 Therefore, the optimal dispatch can be
found as the solution to a problem minimizing the total cost of electricity supply TC in
a (closed) system with N nodes.40 Thereby, TCN equals the sum of all nodal production
costs, which are represented by functions Cn(Qn), n ∈ {1, . . . , N} of nodal generation.
The central balance constraint requires supply Qn less net exchange to equal exogenous
residual demand dn for all nodes n at all times. The net exchange corresponds to the sum
of power flows Fn,m from all neighboring nodesm to node n. The flows may be positive or
negative depending on their direction, thus resulting in negative net input when the flows
entering node n exceed those leaving node n (and vice versa). Furthermore, dispatch
and power flows are restricted by the capacity limits of generation q¯n and transmission
l¯n,m between nodes n and m, m ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The optimization problem is given by
min
Q,F
! TCN =
∑
n
Cn (Qn) (4.1a)
s.t. Qn −
∑
m
Fn,m = dn (4.1b)
0 ≤ Qn ≤ q¯n (4.1c)
−l¯n,m ≤ Fn,m ≤ l¯n,m (4.1d)
for all n,m ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The efficient solution is given by the allocation of generation
QNn and the corresponding flows F
N
n,m. Again, this outcome may be perfectly reproduced
by the individual decisions of profit-maximizing producers in a competitive market under
nodal pricing.
The key advantage of nodal pricing is the transparency of all network related constraints.
The market clears under consideration of power flows and transmission capacities and
thus manages congestion implicitly. In contrast, implementing a zonal or uniform pric-
ing regime implies the aggregation of nodes into bidding areas, in which power flow
constraints are neglected (or, equally, transmission capacities are set to infinity). Thus,
internal congestion has to be relieved explicitly after market clearing by re-dispatch.
39Short-term demand inelasticity is not a necessary condition to prove the following, but simplifies
notation considerably.
40The following formal representation does not include physical power flows, but resorts to the simple
definition of bi-directional exchange between nodes. This has no impact on the economic intuition of
the problem. A representation including the optimal power flow problem can be found in Hermans et al.
(2011).
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Just as for the dispatch, the optimal re-dispatch can be derived from a social planner
approach, which is now deconstructed into a two-stage problem.41 The first stage is
represented by the dispatch problem. In comparison to the nodal model, the balance
constraint is relaxed as to request the zonal equality of demand and supply only:42
min
Q
! TCZ =
∑
n
Cn (Qn) (4.2a)
s.t.
∑
n
Qn =
∑
n
dn (4.2b)
0 ≤ Qn ≤ q¯n (4.2c)
for all n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In the presence of binding transmission constraints the optimal
quantities QZn and Q
N
n at each node will differ and the zonal dispatch will overload the
network given the corresponding FZn,m. At the second stage, the social planner therefore
restores the feasibility of the generation schedules by an ex-post adaptation Rn with
flows FRn,m:
min
R,FR
! RC =
∑
n
[
Cn
(
QZn +Rn
)
− Cn
(
QZn
)]
(4.3a)
s.t. QZn −
∑
m6=n
FZn,m +Rn −
∑
m6=n
FRn,m = dn (4.3b)
0 ≤ QZn +Rn ≤ q¯n (4.3c)
−l¯n,m ≤ F
Z
n,m + FRn,m ≤ l¯n,m (4.3d)
for all n,m ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Since the optimal solution to a network constrained dispatch
is QNn , the statically efficient re-dispatch is given by R
R
n = Q
N
n −Q
Z
n . In consequence,
RC =
∑
n
[
Cn
(
QNn
)
− Cn
(
QZn
)]
(4.4)
= TCN − TCZ
holds. Equation 4.4 thus reveals two important insights: First, ”optimal” re-dispatch
costs equal the dead-weight loss (DWL) in total welfare caused by the scarcity of trans-
mission capacity, which is referred to as the costs of congestion (cf. Rious et al. (2009b)).
Second, given a completely inelastic demand, the social planner achieves identical levels
of total system costs in both the two-stage optimization and the integrated approach.
41Although the social planner has no reason to split the optimization, this representation allows for
a more direct link to the real-world and the corresponding application of the first welfare theorem.
42In the following, the term ”zone” refers to a bidding zone which contains more than one node and is
prone to internal congestion. In this sense, a zone may be defined on a national level, too. Although the
usage of the term zone commonly suggests the implementation of locational marginal pricing to some
degree, whereas a national market with uniform pricing does not, no further differentiation between the
designs is made in the remainder of the paper.
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Consequently, the efficient re-dispatch does not impair total welfare either. However,
these results can only be achieved if the deconstruction of the integrated problem does
not cause any friction that further restricts the original solution space. Especially, the
cost functions of dispatch and re-dispatch need to be identical.
Analogously to the duality of the social planner’s one-stage dispatch and nodal pricing,
the implementation of the efficient re-dispatch depends on the availability of an appro-
priate market-based mechanism. Whereas the competitive zonal wholesale market is
assumed to reveal an efficient solution to the relaxed dispatch problem, the optimality
of the second stage cannot be taken for granted. The next section therefore discusses
the prerequisites for and the properties of a statically efficient re-dispatch design.
4.2.2 Implementing the Efficient Re-dispatch Allocation
The transfer of the social planner’s two-stage problem to the real world comes with
several pitfalls. The first is given by the previous assumption of a friction-free sep-
aration of dispatch and congestion management. The associated identity of the cost
functions of day-ahead dispatch and intra-day re-dispatch implies full technical flexi-
bility of generating units, such that congestion management on short notice does not
lead to any additional costs. Most likely, this condition will not hold in reality: Due to
the difference in the respective planning horizons and the available window for ramp-
ing, re-dispatch costs per unit will usually be higher than the costs of dispatching the
same plant day-ahead.43 Furthermore, intra-day trade and unplanned deviations from
generation schedules or RES-E volumes lead to uncertainty of location and magnitude
of congestion and may conceal the efficient re-dispatch allocation. Nonetheless, the as-
sumption of cost identity and perfect foresight as a prerequisite for ”perfect re-dispatch”
will be kept in the following.
This said, the main requirement placed on a re-dispatch design is its ability to re-
lieve overloaded transmission lines at least cost. The statically efficient allocation of
re-dispatch is characterized by the optimal trade-off between the generators’ marginal
costs and the effectiveness of a change in their production level with regard to conges-
tion relief. Since in a meshed network a variation in one node’s demand and supply
balance affects the power flows on all connected transmission lines, even a modification
of production at the start or end node of a congested line will never translate in a relief
to the same amount. Thereby, the effectiveness of a re-dispatch option is usually the
smaller, the greater the distance between node and line. In consequence, the re-dispatch
43A similar line of argument is followed in Hermans et al. (2011).
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of a costly but highly effective generator may be substituted by a cheaper but less effec-
tive option without diminishing efficiency. Although re-dispatch volumes will increase
due to the smaller effect on the overloaded line, total re-dispatch costs will not change
inevitably. Thus, choosing minimal re-dispatch volumes is neither a necessary nor a suf-
ficient condition for static efficiency. Finally, optimal re-dispatch requires transparent
information on the availability of generation capacities.
In practice, the calculation of the least-cost re-dispatch is highly complex and requires
noticeable computational effort. Besides the extensive amount of data, numerous addi-
tional constraints have to be handled. First, reducing power flows on one line must not
overload another one, such that a re-dispatch option may be infeasible unless counterbal-
anced by further measures. Second, the power flows have to respect (n-1)-security, i.e.
the feasibility of power flows for a given set of nodal net inputs has to be maintained in
the case of an outage of one random line. Third, congestion may occur simultaneously
on several lines, such that the interplay between the re-dispatch options is of special
importance.
Nonetheless, the crucial barrier to statically efficient re-dispatch is not the calculation
itself but the availability of accurate data. In the unbundled electricity systems of Con-
tinental Europe, the transmission system operators (TSOs) are responsible for system
security and therefore for adequate congestion management. Their key competence lies
in the operation and management of the transmission system, thus providing the rel-
evant information and methodology to perform load flow calculations. Therefore, the
effectiveness of re-dispatch measures can be determined. Additionally, the coordinators
of balance circles provide the TSOs with quarter-hourly schedules of generation and con-
sumption, which could be easily extended to contain information on capacity available
for re-dispatch. The information on the costs of re-dispatch options is thus most critical.
In the case of Germany, generators commit themselves in obligatory, bilateral grid con-
nection or usage contracts with the regional TSO to provide information on their variable
and ramping costs. On request by the TSOs, generators have to prove the adequacy
of the indicated costs in a financial auditing process. Obviously, this process gives rise
to problems associated with asymmetric information. Due to opaque, the statically ef-
ficient re-dispatch allocation may be missed. Furthermore, the limited incentives for
generators to reveal their true costs are complemented by lacking incentives for TSOs to
beat down the costs of re-dispatch, since the expenditures for congestion management
are most commonly socialized via grid usage fees.
Nonetheless, the generators’ scope to exploit their advantage may be reduced by in-
creasing the credibility of cost control, either on behalf of the TSO or the regulator.
This approach implies that an ex-post verification of the indicated re-dispatch costs is
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indeed possible, for example by checking the producers’ accounts. What is not verifiable
though, is the efficiency of the incurred cost.44 The case of inefficient behavior of a
regulatee is often brought forward with regard to the exaggerated assignment of general
or administrative costs to positions subject to cost reimbursement. However, mixing the
accounts of general with re-dispatch relevant variable costs is most likely difficult. Sim-
ilarly, deliberate under-performance in power plant operation during re-dispatch seems
to be of little relevance.
Alternatives to regulatory enforced cost control are market-based estimators or incen-
tives for cost disclosure. Given perfect competition, the generators’ spot market bids
are an indicator of their marginal costs. If the TSO is granted access to the individual
bids including information on the generator and her location, problems of information
asymmetry are reduced to the identification of the ramping cost component, provided
a well-designed re-dispatch mechanism is in place.45 Such a mechanism will guarantee
an efficient selection of generators on the basis of their bids, and at the same time en-
sure that the re-dispatch remuneration does not distort the spot market allocation. As
soon as strategic behavior on the part of the generators is induced, their simultaneous
optimization of spot and re-dispatch profits may diminish the quality of the bids as an
indicator for marginal costs of production.
Under the assumption that true re-dispatch costs are revealed by cost control (or the
threat thereof), so-called cost-based re-dispatch will achieve the efficient allocation of
production. With this mechanism, the TSO re-dispatches the system under considera-
tion of available capacity, variable costs and the effectiveness of congestion relief. Pro-
vided that the regulation encourages the TSO to minimize total re-dispatch costs, the
operator will implement the efficient allocation. The remuneration scheme supports the
TSO’s behavior, since it merely reflects re-dispatch costs: Generators called for upward
re-dispatch are compensated for the incurred variable costs and ramping. Generators
reducing production during re-dispatch save variable costs, which they are obliged to
transfer to the TSO. Given perfect information on the costs, both payments thus render
the generators indifferent with regard to being re-dispatched and do not interfere with
the individual surplus from wholesale market trade.
Whether the efficient outcome is also achieved on the basis of spot market bidding curves
without cost control is not quite clear. Even under perfect competition, generators eligi-
ble for upward re-dispatch may raise their bids above marginal costs, if the forfeit spot
44This line of argument is for example followed in Shleifer (1985).
45In electricity markets managed by an independent system operator (ISO), the tasks of dispatch and
congestion management are handled by the same institution, usually via implicit auctions. The ISO
therefore has direct access to the bidding curves. However, the ISO depends on the transmission system
owner to supply information on the network topology.
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market revenues are compensated by increased expected re-dispatch remuneration.46
The other way round, potential suppliers of downward re-dispatch may want to bid
below their marginal costs. This behavior induces distribution effects and may conceal
the least-cost re-dispatch. However, these strategies are not sustainable in a market
without barriers to entry and with power plant sites available in the deficit region. In
consequence, the potential for strategic behavior on the spot market under a cost-based
re-dispatch regime is assumed to be small.
4.3 Dynamic Efficiency of Re-dispatch
Although the statically efficient allocation of production may be implemented in a zonal
pricing system through re-dispatch, the quality of the associated long-term incentives
remains to be assessed. Compared to the short-run perspective, the debate on dynami-
cally efficient locational signals in electricity markets is more controversial. Hogan (1992)
states that relying on a series of efficient short-run pricing decisions to achieve the op-
timal long-run outcome would only be possible in an ideal world with decreasing or at
least constant returns to scale. In this sense, the lumpy transmission network makes it
unlikely that electricity markets constitute an ”ideal” case. Brunekreeft et al. (2005)
further elaborate that since the production set of the network violates the requirements
of the standard model of competitive pricing with respect to convexity (no economies
of scale, proper pricing of externalities and public goods such as reliability), LMP will
not reflect the marginal costs of the network adequately. In consequence, an investor’s
decision on location and plant type based on (future) nodal prices and the resulting
present value of electricity only may be biased from a system-wide point of view.
Nonetheless, the extent of the bias also depends on the nature of generation investments.
If the production set of generation is convex and thus exhibits no economies of scale,
the investment decisions may be decentralized by competitive prices, provided that the
network is planned efficiently by a central planner or TSO.47 According to Brunekreeft
et al. (2005), the variability of the capacity of combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) and
their small size in comparison to peak demands suggest that this assumption may not
be overly critical. But the authors also highlight that the remaining assumptions of
perfect foresight and competition put their own question mark on the applicability of
46This strategy is often denoted as economic capacity withholding. Examples are given in Inderst
and Wambach (2007).
47Cf. Brunekreeft et al. (2005). Given the complex process of coordinated network planning (as
recently observed in the case of the German network development plan) and its reliance on fault-prone
forecasts of power plant (de-) commissionings, this is a highly demanding assumption.
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the theoretical concept. Even so, the approach retains its charm since it limits the nec-
essary locational differentiation to the spot prices, irrespective of further cost-recovering
network charges.
In the following, the simplified framework, in which locational marginal prices are (apart
from fixed and variable costs) the only indicator of a site’s relative profitability, is used to
derive a benchmark for dynamic efficiency. In this context, a generator’s nodal surplus
sets the optimal long-run incentives. Thus, interdependencies between power plant and
network investments are excluded from her location decision. Furthermore, the assump-
tions on perfect competition and foresight are maintained in compliance with section
4.2.1. Despite the limitations of the setup, systematic deviations between this first-best
outcome and the producer surplus from a zonal wholesale trade and re-dispatch can be
identified and are likely to persist in more complex settings.
Although in a perfect world the total system costs do not change between the nodal
benchmark and zonal models with re-dispatch, the distribution of rents between the
market players may vary: First, the zonal aggregation leads to a neglect of external
effects of network usage to some degree. Thus, the local distribution of surplus result-
ing from zonal wholesale trade will be biased in the presence of congestion. Second,
re-dispatch may come with changes in the generators’ revenues.48 In this section, dif-
ferent re-dispatch designs will therefore be tested for their ability to compensate for the
wholesale market bias, i. e. to internalize the opportunity costs of congestion ex-post.
In addition to the present German system of cost-based re-dispatch, two remuneration
schemes based on cost estimators derived from spot market prices as well as a market-
based design are discussed.
4.3.1 Producer Surplus in Nodal and Zonal Systems
As preparation for the following evaluation of re-dispatch designs, some general consid-
erations on the relationship between nodal and zonal producer surplus are of help. In
the given setting of price-taking generators, the hourly producer surplus PS resulting
from the respective dispatch can be written as
PSNn = p
N
n Q
N
n − Cn(Q
N
n ), (4.5)
PSZn = p
ZQZn − Cn(Q
Z
n ). (4.6)
Thereby, pNn and p
Z denote the hourly prices for electricity resulting from the nodal and
zonal markets. As demonstrated in chapter 4.2.1, the zonal production costs differ from
48Also see De Vries and Hakvoort (2002).
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the nodal costs provided that internal transmission constraints are binding. More pre-
cisely, the nodal restrictions on the solution space result in a costlier dispatch. Drawing
conclusions from this result with regard to the total producer surplus in both systems
is however not always possible. Figure 4.1 gives two examples.
Figure 4.1: Examples of diverging nodal and zonal producer surplus (PS)
Source: Own illustration.
In both diagrams, the ordinates depict the marginal costs C ′ and the market prices p at
nodes 1 and 2. Furthermore, the length of the abscissa equals the total demand of both
nodes, which may be served by production from either node (q1, q2). If both nodes belong
to a single bidding zone, the market equilibrium leads to a price pZ and production levels
qZ1 , q
Z
2 . However, if nodal pricing reveals a binding transmission constraint, production
levels adapt to qN1 , q
N
2 and the resulting nodal prices p
N
1 , p
N
2 diverge. In consequence,
the nodal producer surplus PS changes in comparison to zonal pricing. The difference
in their sum (area ruled in grey) may both be positive or negative. If in both markets
the respective production costs and producer surplus are symmetric, e. g. in the case
of linearly increasing cost functions with ordinate intercepts of zero (left diagram), the
result will always be positive. However, the outcome is not self-evident in the more
realistic case of asymmetric step functions (right diagram).
Nonetheless, propositions concerning the differences in producer surplus of a single gen-
erator g can be made. According to Ding and Fuller (2005), the following three main
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cases can be distinguished by the relationship between zonal and nodal production lev-
els:49
(a) QZn,g = Q
N
n,g: PS
Z
n,g − PS
N
n,g = ∆PSn,g =
(
pZ − pNn
)
QNn,g.
(b) QZn,g < Q
N
n,g: ∆PSn,g ≤ 0. If in addition p
Z < pNn holds, then ∆PSn,g < 0.
(c) QZn,g > Q
N
n,g: ∆PSn,g ≥ 0. If in addition p
Z > pNn holds, then ∆PSn,g > 0.
The results indicate that generators in net exporting regions are by trend favored in zonal
wholesale markets, while generators in net importing regions are most likely better off
in nodal systems. However, the surplus of generators who are ultimately subject to re-
dispatch (cases (b) and (c)) may be influenced by the congestion management mechanism
in place.
4.3.2 Dynamic Incentives of Re-dispatch Designs
The degree to which congestion management is able to internalize external effects of
network usage depends on the remuneration scheme. The first design to be analyzed is
cost-based re-dispatch, followed by schemes with spot price-based remuneration. Finally,
the incentives of market-based re-dispatch are assessed.
4.3.2.1 Cost-based Re-dispatch
Cost-based re-dispatch as described in 4.2.2 compensates the generators for their addi-
tional costs or charges them for their savings. Still, the information on the generators’
opportunity costs of re-dispatch are assumed to be transparent. The associated pay-
ments In,g(Rn,g) thus lead to the following total producer surplus:
PSn,g = p
ZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
+ In,g (Rn,g) (4.7)
= pZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
+
[
Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
− Cn,g
(
QZn,g
)]
= pZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g
)
.
Furthermore, if
Rn,g 6= 0 and p
N
n 6= p
Z (4.8)
49Ding and Fuller (2005) also list a fourth case, in which two generators at the same node are re-
dispatched in different directions at the same time. Given least-cost zonal and nodal dispatch solutions,
this case can only occur, when the re-dispatch is cost neutral and a benevolent planner would be indif-
ferent concerning the dispatch of both generators. Then, zonal and nodal prices as well as the sum of
the producers’ surplus will be identical.
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then
PSn,g 6= p
N
n Q
N
n,g − Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
. (4.9)
The producer surplus of the re-dispatched generator remains on the zonal wholesale
market level, such that the nodal benchmark is missed whenever zonal and nodal prices
diverge. In consequence, the nodal allocation of production is implemented via re-
dispatch without internalizing the costs of congestion.50 Thus, no market participant is
incentivized to deviate from the behavior induced by zonal pricing.
However, the most prevalent criticism passed on the current German cost-based system
is the opaque of the bilateral contracts between generators and TSOs. Furthermore, the
implemented design only allows for quarter-yearly updates of re-dispatch costs, which
prevents the exploitation of short-term fluctuations in variable costs. Alternative designs
therefore either define objective, time-variant estimators of variable re-dispatch costs
which reduce problems of information asymmetry, or rely on a market mechanism to
reveal the generators’ costs. Their performance with respect to dynamic efficiency is
analyzed in the following.
4.3.2.2 Spot Price-based Remuneration
The simplest approach to the definition of a general cost estimator is to make use of
the information contained in the hourly spot price. This can be done by fixing the re-
dispatch remuneration to the current price plus or minus a given percentage, depending
on the direction of re-dispatch. The rate is then multiplied by the individual generator’s
re-dispatch quantity.51 As a starting point for the formal representation, it is assumed
that the given re-dispatch scheme does not influence the spot market outcome. In a
general case of this ”fixed-rate” approach, where the percentage value is denoted as δ,
the resulting producer surplus thus amounts to
PSn,g = p
ZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
+ In,g (Rn,g) (4.10)
= pZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
+ δpZRn,g
= pZ
(
QZn,g + δRn,g
)
− Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
.
Furthermore, if
δ =
pNn Q
N
n,g − p
ZQZn,g
pZRn,g
(4.11)
50This corresponds to the findings in Ding and Fuller (2005) and Hermans et al. (2011).
51This remuneration scheme has been debated in a currently ongoing consultation process of the
German regulator Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), cf. BNetzA (2012b). During the process, a percentage
of 10% has been proposed.
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then
PSn,g = p
N
n Q
N
n,g − Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
. (4.12)
At the first glance, the generated equality between zonal and nodal surplus appears to
be promising. Under the given assumptions, the implementation of the nodal surplus
would set the first-best investment incentives for the long run. Given a closer look, equa-
tion 4.10 however reveals several flaws of the fixed-rate approach. First, an arbitrary
percentage will most likely not do the trick since δ corresponds to the ratio between the
surplus difference and the (zonal) spot market value of re-dispatch. Thus, an administra-
tively set δ needs to depend on the zonal price level, the severeness of congestion (which
influences the difference between zonal and nodal prices), as well as on the generator’s
individual re-dispatch level.
Therefore, any simplification in the form of a uniform δ will most likely lead to distor-
tions. These inefficiencies for example show in the symmetry of payments for upward
and downward re-dispatch, which ignores the increasing slope of the merit order (also
see figure 4.1). Furthermore, a cost-minimizing TSO will select generators according to
their effectiveness only, such that static efficiency is jeopardized: Since every generator
is remunerated with the same rate, differences in variable costs are no longer a crite-
rion of choice. The generators thus face a risk of being under-payed or over-charged for
re-dispatch, since there is no link between the spot market merit order and the individ-
ual costs of the most effective producers. Last but not least, infra marginal generators
needed for upward re-dispatch are always better off if they do not bid in the spot market,
just as the dominant strategy for extra marginal producers is to bid below cost if they
are being paid to ramp down afterwards. The simplicity of the remuneration scheme
may thus induce significant inefficiency.
Some of the drawbacks of a fixed-rate approach can be avoided by a modification of the
link between remuneration of the re-dispatched generators and the spot market price.
The advanced model relies on an individual marginal cost estimator that is derived from
the observed spot market behavior of a generator. In the expectation that producers
bid their marginal costs, either the lowest market price at which the generator is called
or the lowest price at which the generator is no longer called is used as an indicator for
the re-dispatch costs. In a perfectly competitive environment, the prices will eventually
deliver information on the true variable costs of starting up and turning off a power
plant.52
52This estimator has also been discussed in the BNetzA consultation, cf. BNetzA (2012a). In the
proposal, the spot market behavior of the last four weeks is suggested as an adequate basis for the
estimation.
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The following equation gives a general description of the effect of a marginal cost esti-
mator ǫ on the producer surplus:
PSn,g = p
ZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
+ In,g (Rn,g) (4.13)
= pZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
+ ǫn,gRn,g.
Furthermore, if
ǫn,g =
Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
− Cn,g (Qn,g)
Rn,g
(4.14)
then
PSn,g = p
ZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g
)
. (4.15)
Since ǫ is a punctual estimator, its value is independent of the re-dispatch quantity R.
Thus, the estimator will only reflect the costs of re-dispatch, if the marginal costs of
production are constant themselves. For a single generator, the assumption of constant
marginal costs may not be overly critical, although it neglects part load losses etc.53
However, a correctly determined ǫ never allows for a re-dispatch margin different from
zero, such that the final producer surplus remains on the zonal level. Hence, no locational
incentives are set.
Whether the estimator is able to capture the marginal costs also depends on the defini-
tion of the reference price. The proposition to derive separate estimators for upward and
downward re-dispatch, i. e. on the respective prices at the time of starting or suspending
production, has for example been made in BNetzA (2012a). The underlying motivation
stems from the fact that the respective reference prices may differ, since the price at
which a plant begins operation needs to cover additional start-up costs, whereas the
variable costs of ramping down are in general negligible. However, this approach will
systematically over-price the positive re-dispatch of spinning units. This is especially
true if an additional compensation of ramp-up costs is allowed for.54 Nevertheless, this
bias can easily be avoided by using a single estimator only, which equals the minimum
of the former reference prices. Then, ramp-up costs may e. g. be set to the difference
between the reference prices and can be compensated separately. In this modified form,
the estimator accurately reveals a generator’s (constant) marginal costs.
In practice, not variable start-up but opportunity costs pose the biggest threat to the
accuracy of the estimator. For example, the opportunity costs of ramping as well as of
balancing reserve provision may lead to deviations in the spot market bids from variable
costs (for empirical evidence, cf. Nicolosi (2010)). Especially in the latter case, the
53On the market level, the assumption implies a step-wise merit order, which is a common simplifi-
cation.
54This is e. g. suggested in BNetzA (2012a).
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obligation to keep the power plant spinning may lead to continuous production in times
of prices below costs. Since the losses are compensated by the reserve market’s capacity
prices, this behavior is completely rational. However, in the presence of an estimator
ǫ, re-dispatch costs may be underestimated. As a remedy, a minimum payment for re-
dispatch can be introduced. This floor may lower the risk of faulty estimations, if it is
specified on the basis of long-term observations or a technology-specific benchmark, and
if it holds both for positive as well as for negative re-dispatch payments.55 Nonetheless,
it needs to be shown whether the floor constantly dominates the estimator due to the
day-to-day presence of opportunities.
4.3.2.3 Market-based Re-dispatch
Instead of using spot market proxies, the pricing and procurement of re-dispatch may be
organized with the help of a separate market. As before, all markets are assumed to be
perfectly competitive. On the re-dispatch market, generators bid quantities and prices
in auctions. The TSO then selects producers for re-dispatch according to costs and
effectiveness. In the following, the market is defined as to remunerate energy only, such
that no capacity payments are made. One possible auction design is uniform pricing,
in which all winning generators are remunerated with the price bid of the marginal
generator. The dominant strategy in this type of auction is to bid one’s marginal costs, as
this maximizes the probability of a call without diminishing the potential revenue.56 In
such auctions for positive and negative re-dispatch, the generators therefore reveal their
marginal costs of increasing or decreasing production. If the market performs efficiently,
the last winning local generator will correspond to the marginal generator under nodal
pricing. In consequence, the marginal costs of re-dispatch equal nodal prices, such that
pRn = p
N
n .
57 Under uniform pricing, all selected generators are remunerated adequately
with pNn Rn. The payment is either positive or negative, depending on the sign of the
55In BNetzA (2012a), a minimum payment of 25 EUR/MWh is suggested for positive re-dispatch
only.
56Cf. Grimm et al. (2008). In contrast to uniform pricing, pay-as-bid auctions remunerate the winners
according to their individual bid. In this design, no incentives to reveal marginal costs exist, since it is
most profitable to set one’s bid to the expected price paid to the marginal generator. In an ideal world,
pay-as-bid pricing leads to the same calls and payments as uniform pricing. However, given uncertainty
and bounded rationality, the efficient outcome is often missed in practice, cf. Grimm et al. (2008).
57This implies that re-dispatch prices are calculated per node, or else that the surplus and deficit
regions are separate copperplates.
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re-dispatch. This leads to the following producer surplus:
PSn,g = p
ZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
+ In,g (Rn,g) (4.16)
= pZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QZn,g +Rn,g
)
+ pNn Rn,g
= pZQZn,g − Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
+ pNn
(
QNn,g −Q
Z
n,g
)
=
(
pZ − pNn
)
QZn,g + p
N
n Q
N
n,g − Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
This equation reveals important insights into the nature of the re-dispatch market,
especially with regard to the interplay with the zonal spot market. In the case of
positive re-dispatch, the relevant generators are situated at import-constrained nodes.
Thus, the zonal market price will be lower than the nodal price paid for re-dispatch.
Accordingly, the volumes sold at the spot market reduce the generator’s total surplus.
PSn,g =
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
pZ − pNn
)
QZn,g + p
N
n Q
N
n,g − Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
(4.17a)
⇒ argmax
QZn,g
PSn,g = 0 (4.17b)
⇒ PSn,g = p
N
n Q
N
n,g −Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
(4.17c)
In consequence, the dominant strategy of generators in the deficit region is not to partic-
ipate in the spot market in times of congestion. This aggravates the congestion such that
all previously infra-marginal generators can rely on being called for re-dispatch. In the
extreme, all relevant generators migrate to the re-dispatch market and are remunerated
as under nodal pricing.58 This is both statically and dynamically efficient. Nonetheless,
this strategic behavior induces substantial distribution effects.
These incentives also influence the remaining market players. The gap left by the gen-
erators of the deficit region at the spot market has to be filled by producers located
at export-constrained nodes. Thus, previously extra marginal generators now win in
the spot market auction and the market clearing price increases. After the closure of
the spot market, all of the previously extra marginal generators have to be constrained-
off additionally. On the negative re-dispatch market, the generators located at surplus
nodes bid their avoided marginal costs, since this behavior never renders them worse
off than before re-dispatch. Again, the re-dispatch market yields prices which equal
the nodal prices at export-constrained nodes. All winning generators are remunerated
with the price of the local marginal re-dispatch generator, such that (in analogy to the
positive re-dispatch market) infra marginal generators are left with additional margins.
But, in the case of the negative market, this is problematic since from a system-wide
58This implies that sufficient capacity is available in the surplus region, which can fill the gap at the
spot market.
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point of view the surplus of generators with QZ > QN is already too high after dispatch
and thus even higher after re-dispatch. Even if an auction design ensuring that each
generator is remunerated individually according to her bid could be implemented, the
surplus after re-dispatch would never be lower than after zonal dispatch.
PSn,g =
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷(
pZ − pNn
)
QZn,g + p
N
n Q
N
n,g − Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
(4.18a)
⇒ argmax
QZn,g
PSn,g = Q
max
n,g (4.18b)
⇒ PSn,g > p
N
n Q
N
n,g −Cn,g
(
QNn,g
)
(4.18c)
The negative re-dispatch market thus invokes dynamic inefficiency by overshooting the
nodal pricing level of revenues. In the long run, this result would lead to a build-up
of overcapacities in the export-constrained region. As the inefficiency takes the form of
excess producer surplus, it is however difficult to counteract. Given that spot market
trade has already rewarded the constrained-off generators, a market mechanism to skim
this profit margin can hardly be found. In the end, it would need to leave the generator
as if he had not participated in the spot market at all.
4.4 Discussion
So far, three classes of re-dispatch designs have been analyzed with respect to their
static and dynamic performance. Under the central assumptions of perfect competition
and foresight, inelastic demand, fixed network capacities and no economies of scale
in generation, the allocation of production and the distribution of producer surplus
serves as an indicator for the mechanisms’ economic efficiency. Although short-run
allocative efficiency may be achieved in any well-designed system, none of the designs
shows promising results with regard to dynamic efficiency.
Both cost-based re-dispatch and individual spot price-based estimators of re-dispatch
costs have been shown to implement the optimal allocation of production. Whereas
cost-based re-dispatch systems may struggle with information asymmetry and delayed
cost updates, the intention of the developed estimators is to reduce asymmetries and
to allow for time-variant payments. Spot price-based designs thus have the potential to
increase static efficiency in practice, as long as the basis of calculation is designed with
due diligence. However, neither design influences the producers’ surplus from wholesale
trade. Accordingly, the opportunity costs of congestion cannot be internalized.
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In the case of market-based designs, the biggest practical obstacle to static efficiency
is strategic behavior. Nonetheless, strategic behavior in itself does not prevent an effi-
cient allocation of production in theory. Moreover, market-based re-dispatch is shown
to be the only one of the analyzed designs which at least partly achieves an efficient
distribution of producer surplus. Since all generators appointed for upward re-dispatch
are remunerated with the marginal costs of the last required nodal supplier, their sur-
plus is raised to the nodal level. However, the positive effect of a single nodal price
for re-dispatch cannot be transferred to the market for downward re-dispatch. In order
to reach the efficient level of surplus, the generators appointed for negative re-dispatch
would need to hand over their profit margin from wholesale trade. Instead, the down-
ward re-dispatch market leaves winning generators with additional margins. In the end,
no free market sets incentives to bid below one’s opportunity costs.
A further limitation to the dynamic efficiency of all re-dispatch designs is the restric-
tion of payments to a limited group of market participants. Even if a mechanism that
induces the optimal producer surplus could be found, all generators not appointed for
re-dispatch would still be remunerated with the inefficient zonal spot market price. Hy-
pothetically, the optimal design could indicate the necessary adjustment payments for
those generators who are already dispatched efficiently after the clearing of the spot
market. As in the optimum the marginal costs of re-dispatch equal nodal prices, the
difference between marginal costs and zonal prices may be used to derive the difference
in nodal and zonal surpluses. However, if structural congestion calls for comprehensive
local incentives for power plant investors, re-distributing potentially large rents by the
means of re-dispatch seems to be a far-fetched plan.
Given the strict assumptions imposed in the analysis, the performance of the re-dispatch
mechanisms need to be challenged further in a more realistic setting. The case of mar-
ket power and congestion management has a prominent place in the literature. For
example, Green (2007) highlights that the inefficiency resulting from neglecting trans-
mission constraints on the dispatch level rises in the presence of market power. An
extensive analysis of strategic behavior in the case of market-based re-dispatch is pro-
vided in Harvey and Hogan (2000). The authors demonstrate the incentive for market
players to provoke congestion in order to profit from the later re-dispatch remuneration.
This so-called inc-dec game has amongst others been observed in the UK and in the
California ISO system. The problem is aggravated, when congestion creates pockets
of local market power. However, cost-based re-dispatch usually performs better in the
presence of limited competition. In a comparative analysis of congestion management
mechanisms, Inderst and Wambach (2007) show that cost-based re-dispatch mitigates
the abuse of regional market power, especially in the case of a small number of stable
bottlenecks. Similarly, the potential for the abuse of market power in spot price-based
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re-dispatch systems is assumed to be small, provided that the wholesale market is com-
petitive. The persistence of local market power finally depends on the barriers to entry.
In contrast to the wholesale market level, the regional barriers are largely determined
by the availability of new power plant sites.
The assumption on demand (in-) elasticity is presumably less critical. However, Green
(2007) indicates that the difference in generator surplus between nodal and uniform
pricing with cost-based re-dispatch decreases with rising demand elasticity, whereas the
welfare loss increases. Concerning the efficiency of re-dispatch in particular, the partici-
pation of the demand-side in congestion management is decisive. If demand responds to
price signals, the limitation of re-dispatch to generators will prevent the implementation
of the nodal pricing result and hence will increase the associated costs.
The role of perfect foresight in the given analysis is twofold. On the one hand, it al-
lows for statically efficient re-dispatch. On the other hand, uncertainty diminishes the
quality of locational marginal pricing as a benchmark for dynamic efficiency. Accord-
ing to Brunekreeft et al. (2005), the lumpiness of transmission investments may lead
to large deviations between present nodal prices and their long-run equilibrium. The
uncertainty of network extensions may therefore complicate the price forecast on which
a power plant investment decision is based. In this context, Brunekreeft et al. (2005)
emphasize the importance of hedging opportunities such as financial transmission rights.
Furthermore, the defined benchmark requires the network to be planned centrally and
efficiently. However, Inderst and Wambach (2007) state that due to the long planning
horizons for generation and network capacity investments, the alternating expectations
on investments are likely to effect capacity developments. This is confirmed by Rious
et al. (2011), who show that the costs of anticipating power plant investments may de-
termine the degree to which the TSO takes new generation into account when planning
the network.
Smeers (2006) further elaborates the challenge of developing long-term signals in the
presence of discrete investment decisions. The author derives pricing schemes which
rely on nodal pricing to induce efficient dispatch, but also invoke payments related
to the choice of location. Thus, the mechanisms explicitly account for the lumpiness
of generation and transmission investments. In the basic pricing scheme, the fixed
payment is made when the generator or consumer decides to connect to a specific node.
The resulting two-part tariff is dynamically efficient, but discriminatory and not yet
cost-reflective. Smeers findsthat the mechanism can be further developed to be cost-
reflective, whereas non-discrimination comes with a loss of efficiency.
Also Rious et al. (2009a) develop a two-part tariff in the context of lumpy transmis-
sion investments. The pricing scheme relies on nodal pricing to send short-run signals,
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whereas long-run incentives are set by an average participation tariff. The authors find
that implementing locational network tariffs even has a higher priority than the im-
plementation of nodal pricing in the process of coordinating network and generation
investments. However, the optimal allocation of new generation capacities cannot be
guaranteed by the given approach.
The presented considerations reveal the limitations of the LMP benchmark applied in the
presented analysis. Nonetheless, the literature suggests that the optimal nodal allocation
of production and surplus is still worth striving for, such that LMP remains a valuable
indicator in the evaluation of congestion management schemes. Given that uniform
pricing will still dominate most of the European markets in the next few years, the focus
of future research should be on the evaluation of the potential second-best combination
of preferably efficient re-dispatch and local charges for network cost recovery. Besides the
approach suggested in Rious et al. (2009a), other forms of locally differentiated network
tariffs (so-called G- and L-components) may be worth considering.
4.5 Conclusion and Outlook
The theoretical analysis presented in this paper reveals the limited ability of re-dispatch
to induce efficient long-run incentives for generators in a uniform pricing system. With
the help of analytical models, formal representations of the impact of different remuner-
ation schemes on the surplus of re-dispatched generators are given. Thereby, the nodal
producer surplus of a locational marginal pricing system serves as a benchmark for ef-
ficient long-run signals. Accordingly, systematic deviations from the point of reference
are identified.
In the case of cost-based and market-based mechanisms, the analysis complements the
qualitative discussions on the long-term inefficiency of both designs. Whereas cost-
based re-dispatch does not yield any revenues for re-dispatched generators, market-
based congestion management may come with benefits for suppliers. However, not
all of the benefits contribute to a more efficient distribution of producer surplus. In
contrast, the remuneration of generators providing negative re-dispatch even aggravates
the divergence of the total zonal surplus from the nodal outcome in the respective
locations. Furthermore, two recent variations of spot price-based remuneration schemes
are discussed. The theoretical analysis reveals structural deficits that prevent an efficient
allocation of producer surplus and may even jeopardize static efficiency.
Despite the strict assumptions which limit the analysis to an ideal framework, the re-
sults suggest that re-dispatch is an inadequate tool for internalizing the external effects
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of congestion. The presented discussion already hints the relevance of issues related
to information asymmetries, strategic behavior and the selective nature of re-dispatch
mechanisms, which further impair the performance of re-dispatch in practice. In this
context, regional market power is of special importance for some re-dispatch designs.
Overall, the selection of a robust re-dispatch mechanism that does not introduce addi-
tional distortions seems to be more rational than aiming for a re-dispatch design which
sets local incentives. This draws the attention to cost-based and well-designed spot
price-based mechanisms. With regard to the latter, the designs’ practical performance
needs to be analyzed in greater detail. Especially the trade-off between the mecha-
nisms’ transparency and accuracy is worth evaluating. However, the central question
that remains to be answered concerns the original bias of the uniform pricing system.
Ultimately, the pressure to introduce regionally differentiated signals and to enforce net-
work extensions rises with the magnitude of the divergence between the outcome of the
national and the efficient nodal market.
Due to the limited scope of the analysis, other instruments to improve the coordination
of generation and network investments have not been addressed. Besides measures
which aim at power plant investors, the central role of the TSO needs to be considered.
Especially, the interaction of network user and network operator is of interest in the
analysis of incentive schemes.
Chapter 5
Quantifying the Economic Effects
of Congestion Management -
The Case of Germany
The design of congestion management has a significant impact on the efficiency of elec-
tricity markets and influences the allocation of costs and surpluses. Using the exam-
ple of Germany, this paper quantifies the associated effects. The impact of congestion
management on the wholesale market is demonstrated by a comparison of the current
uniform pricing system to nodal pricing as a benchmark for short-term efficiency. Both
approaches deviate in their ability to internalize the opportunity costs of congestion and
thus in the allocation of generation. In consequence, the presented analysis reveals signif-
icant distribution effects within Germany as well as differences in the overall wholesale
market costs. The analysis of the uniform pricing system is complemented by the evalu-
ation of three re-dispatch designs, which resolve internal congestion after the clearing of
the spot market. Since even a well-designed re-dispatch mechanism will most likely miss
the efficient allocation of generation in practice, the analysis indicates the magnitude of
the associated bias. The results show that the details of the re-dispatch design largely
determine the degree to which additional distortions are introduced.
5.1 Introduction
Much has already been said on the efficiency of electricity transmission pricing. In the
short run, the optimal use of the transmission system can be induced by locational
marginal prices which reflect the marginal costs of generation as well as the opportunity
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costs induced by congestion (cf. Schweppe et al. (1988)). This market design thus man-
ages congestion implicitly on the wholesale market level. In the long-run, the associated
local signals may contribute to a beneficial allocation of new generation capacities and
load centers (cf. Smeers (2006)). Nevertheless, locational marginal pricing (often called
nodal pricing) in its full spatial resolution has not been implemented in Europe so far.
Besides the introduction of zonal designs in the Nord Pool spot market and in Italy,
national uniform pricing is still the dominant market design.
As demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4, electricity market designs based on uniform pric-
ing come with losses in efficiency of two origins. First, the national wholesale market
neglects internal congestion. The resulting dispatch may thus overload the transmission
network. Furthermore, the allocation of wholesale market costs and surpluses will not
signal the external effects of network usage at a given node. In consequence, individual
location decisions will not consider the scarcity of network capacities. Second, uni-
form pricing will require the management of internal congestion after the clearing of the
wholesale market. Besides network-related measures such as topology optimization, the
re-allocation of generation by the means of re-dispatch is often used to relieve overloaded
lines. However, the characteristics of the specific re-dispatch design will influence the
efficiency of congestion management, both with regard to the allocation of production
as well as to the distribution of costs and surpluses.
The analysis presented in this paper aims at the quantification of the impact of conges-
tion management design choices using the example of Germany. Complementary to the
theoretical approach presented in the previous chapter, the focus is on the magnitude
of the bias induced by uniform pricing and re-dispatch, as well as on its geographical
allocation. In analogy to the two levels of the issue at hand, the analysis is split. In the
first part, the losses in efficiency are identified on the wholesale market level. Thereby,
the distribution of generation and producer surplus under uniform pricing is compared
to a nodal pricing benchmark for congestion management. In the second part, three
re-dispatch models are tested for their relative cost efficiency and their impact on the
generators’ revenues. Hereby, the reference case is defined by the currently implemented
cost-based design, which does not create any additional surplus but is most likely to
achieve the least-cost solution to congestion (see chapter 4). All calculations are based
on the fundamental electricity market model NEULING as described in chapter 2. For
each scenario, 8760h of the year 2015 are modeled in a European context. Power flows
resulting from dispatch and re-dispatch are calculated by the means of a DC load flow.
As opposed to the ideal world of the theoretical re-dispatch model, some practical ob-
stacles such as limited short-term flexibility are introduced in the model and enable a
realistic evaluation of congestion management in Germany.
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The nodal pricing model applied in part one (section 5.3) defines the first-best conges-
tion management mechanism. This benchmark is used to identify the efficient allocation
of electricity production and generator revenues in Germany. Thereby, an approxima-
tion of local producer surplus is derived from hourly marginal cost-based prices, variable
costs and production levels. As discussed in section 4.4, nodal pricing does not neces-
sarily induce the optimal long-run level of producer surplus, especially in the presence
of lumpy generation and transmission investments. Nonetheless, locational marginal
pricing (LMP) usually is one building block of dynamically efficient pricing schemes.59
Therefore, assessing the magnitude of the uniform pricing bias in comparison to a nodal
benchmark may give a first indication of the distortion of local investment incentives.
This approach is for example followed in Green (2007). The author quantifies the welfare
effect of changing from uniform pricing with re-dispatch to nodal pricing for a 13-node
DC load flow model of England and Wales. Green (2007) calculates average prices,
generators’ profits and the change in consumer surplus with responsive demand. Re-
dispatched generators are remunerated according to their opportunity costs, such that
no additional profit from re-dispatch is made.60 The input data is taken from the years
1996 and 1997. Ten sets of demand curves per winter and summer seasons represent
different demand levels. The weighted results give the yearly values, which indicate that
welfare under uniform pricing is (measured in percent of the generators’ revenue) 1.3%
lower than under nodal pricing. This figure results from a decrease in consumer surplus
by 3.4% and an increase in generator profit by 2.1%. Thereby, costs and generator
profits are calculated under consideration of operational costs only. Green (2007) also
highlights, that the gains from optimal nodal pricing are market-specific.
For the Italian market, Ding and Fuller (2005) illustrate the divergence in producer and
consumer surplus under nodal, zonal and uniform pricing regimes. The authors create
artificial offer and demand curves consisting of four and five bids per node respectively.
Ding and Fuller (2005) use a randomized procedure to match the bidding curves with
historical data and further define three cases in which nodal demand is uniformly lowered,
average or uniformly increased. For each case and each pricing scheme, one set of local
surpluses is derived. The authors state that consumers benefit from uniform and zonal
pricing in the low demand case compared to the nodal setting, but lose in the case of
average and high demand. However, they question the robustness of their results, since
the offer and bid data is only loosely related to reality.
Regarding the German market, an evaluation of the welfare gain from nodal pricing can
be found in Weigt (2006). In the presented analysis, a DC load flow based on data of
59This refers to so-called two-part tariffs as discussed in Smeers (2006).
60This concept corresponds to a cost-based re-dispatch design.
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the year 2005 is calculated for Germany and its neighboring countries. Weigt (2006)
analyzes one winter and one summer day with 24 consecutive hours each and derives a
total benefit of 90 mEUR/a. This result comes with an increase in consumer surplus
and a decrease in producer surplus. Per winter day, the change for consumers amounts
to +0.79%, whereas producers lose 3.55%.
However, the literature on the quantitative effects of re-dispatch mainly focuses on cost-
based designs. For example, Nu¨ßler (2012) evaluates the development of re-dispatch
costs for the case of Germany under consideration of the current cost-based mechanism.
Thereby, the focus is on the influence of different fundamental drivers such as wind
power feed-in and local consumption. To this end, Nu¨ßler (2012) calculates the re-
dispatch for several scenario years on the basis of power transfer distribution factor
(PTDF) matrices. Thereby, the scenarios are represented by 12 type-days with 24 hours
each. A different angle is introduced in Kunz (2011), where the benefit of combining
cost-based re-dispatch with network topology optimization is assessed for the case of
Germany. The analysis is based on a DC load flow model, which is used to compute
nine single hours per scenario year. The re-dispatch model introduced in Linnemann
et al. (2011) is based on a methodology that allows for the iterative optimization of (n-1)-
secure congestion management. However, the model still equals cost-based re-dispatch
in its economic properties.
The analysis presented in this paper adds an in-depth analysis of congestion manage-
ment within the German electricity market to the existing literature. Especially, the
high temporal resolution as well as the detailed consideration of international power
flows contribute to a robust basis for the evaluation of the current uniform pricing sys-
tem. Furthermore, the second part of the analysis allows for a profound evaluation of
the impact of re-dispatch on the overall performance of the German market. Besides
the current cost-based design, two re-dispatch mechanisms using spot price-based remu-
neration schemes are analyzed in detail. Overall, a wide range of alternative congestion
management mechanisms is put to the test. As stated by Bjørndal and Jørnsten (2007),
the variation in the costs of congestion across different congestion management schemes
may well be substantial.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 5.2, the data and the assumptions under-
lying the quantitative analysis are presented. Furthermore, the dispatch and re-dispatch
scenarios are defined, including a description of the corresponding model setup. Section
5.3 constitutes the first part of the central analysis, which focuses on the impact of con-
gestion management on the wholesale market. The second part (section 5.4) is dedicated
to the identification of internal congestion resulting from the German uniform pricing
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dispatch and to the comparison of re-dispatch mechanisms. Section 5.5 closes with a
general discussion and remarks on the need for further research.
5.2 Data and Scenarios
The quantitative analysis presented in this paper is based on calculations with the fun-
damental electricity market model NEULING. As described in chapter 2, the model
computes the least-cost dispatch and re-dispatch under consideration of inelastic de-
mand, exogenous electricity production from RES as well as from combined heat and
power plants (CHP). Thereby, the associated power flows are subject to DC load flow
constraints and network transfer capacity (NTC) limits. The temporal resolution of
the dispatch model allows for an inter-temporal optimization across 8760 consecutive
hours of a given scenario year, in this case 2015. The re-dispatch model also optimizes
congestion management for all hours of the year, but neglects inter-temporality.
5.2.1 Data and General Assumptions
Although the focus of the analysis is on Germany, the model regions cover Central
Western Europe (CWE, including France, BeNeLux and Germany) plus Switzerland
and Austria, their direct neighbors as well as Great Britain and Scandinavia. The high
number of considered power markets ensures an accurate representation of inter-regional
trade and power flows. Depending on the scenario, the spatial resolution of the model
is increased as to reveal nodal regions within CWE, Switzerland and Austria (in the
following denoted as CWE+ or core regions).61 These nodal regions are designed to
represent the basic structure of the high-voltage transmission network, such that within
the regions all consumers and suppliers are assumed to be connected to one central node.
The 31 German nodal regions are displayed in figure 5.1.62
The data on the European 220 and 380 kV transmission network is kindly supplied by
the Institute for Energy Systems, Energy Efficiency and Energy Management (ie3) at TU
Dortmund University. The considered transmission capacity expansions comply with the
Ten-Year Network Development Plan provided by the European Network of Transmis-
sion System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E (2010)). In order to compensate for
the lack of (n-1)-security constraints, the loss-less DC power flow over the transmission
61The regions are identical to those modeled in chapter 3. For a graphical illustration, refer to figure
3.1 on page 38.
62The delimitations of the German regions were first defined in Nu¨ßler (2012) on the basis of the ie3
network model. The original definition has been changed slightly in the case of region 24, which now
covers Luxembourg as well. Given the high integration of the transmission networks of Luxembourg and
the German TSO Amprion GmbH, this is a legitimate simplification.
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Figure 5.1: German model regions with average wind speeds and solar radiation
Source: Own illustration.
lines is restricted to 80% of the lines’ thermal capacity.63 The network model is used
to calculate the DC load flow (as introduced in Schweppe et al. (1988) and discussed
in chapter 2) within and between the countries of CWE+, as well as between CWE+
and its continental European neighbors. The DC load flow model is complemented with
ENTSO-E data on the interconnectors to and between satellite regions, including high
voltage direct current (HVDC) lines to Great Britain and Scandinavia. The exchange
via these interconnectors is restricted by NTC values.
The assumptions on the development of CHP and conventional power plant capacities in
Europe are based on the database of the Institute of Energy Economics at the University
of Cologne (EWI). The power plant database contains information on the units’ location,
such that the capacities can be assigned to the corresponding model region. Furthermore,
expected decomissionings and commissionings of power plants until 2015 are taken into
account.64 The assumptions on fuel and CO2 costs are taken from EWI (2011) and
are displayed in table 5.1. The national electricity production of CHP plants is based
on EURELECTRIC (2011), which is allocated among the regions in proportion to their
CHP capacity. The exogenous feed-in is finally derived from hourly heat demand profiles.
63This is a standard assumption, e. g. applied in Weigt (2006) and Dietrich et al. (2010).
64Detailed data can be found in appendix B.
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Table 5.1: Fuel and CO2 price assumptions
[EUR/MWhth] Uranium Lignite Hard Coal Nat. Gas Oil
2015 3.60 1.40 13.20 25.70 47.20
CO2 2015: 22.00 EUR/tCO2
Source: EWI (2011).
Concerning the development of RES, the national capacities as well as the total elec-
tricity production are set to the targets specified in the National Renewable Energy
Action Plans (NREAP, cf. EC (2010)). A bottom-up analysis of the current distribu-
tion of installed RES capacities, regional potentials and historic capacity developments
has been conducted for the CWE+ region and allows for the allocation of the forecasted
installations. In the case of Germany, the data is based on Nu¨ßler (2012). The feed-in
structure of wind and solar power is derived from regional hourly data on wind speeds
and solar radiation of the year 2008 (cf. EuroWind (2011)). Thus, a pattern of RES-E
production which is consistent over time and space is developed.65,66
The assumptions on total electricity consumption (including network losses) are based
on EURELECTRIC (2011), whereas hourly demand profiles are derived from historical
data provided by ENTSO-E.67 Total regional consumption is specified on the basis of
information on regional electricity demand or on population and its future development.
Again, the assumptions on the regional allocation of total consumption in Germany stem
from Nu¨ßler (2012).68
5.2.2 Scenario Definition and Model Configuration
In order to quantify the deviations in wholesale market costs, quantities and revenues
from the efficient level, two dispatch scenarios are defined. The nodal pricing scenario
(NP) sets the benchmark for efficiency and is characterized by the highest spatial model
resolution available. In contrast, the second scenario implements national power markets
with uniform pricing (CU) and thus represents the current market design in the CWE+
region. Both scenarios thus differ in the quality and quantity of the network constraints
imposed upon the dispatch. Otherwise, the model setup is identical.
65Detailed data can be found in appendix B.
66Although the regional distribution of RES-E capacities in Germany is consistent with Nu¨ßler (2012),
the methodology of calculating wind and solar power production is different. First, the meteorological
data is not identical. Second, the calculation in Nu¨ßler (2012) is based on type days, whereas the work
presented in this paper is based on 8760 hours. Thus, the regional in-feed is allocated differently.
67Refer to https://www.entsoe.eu/resources/data-portal/consumption/.
68Detailed data can be found in appendix B.
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In the NP scenario, each core model region of CWE+ constitutes one bidding area. In
the end, the dispatch of 72 nodal regions and 11 one-node regions is optimized. Out
of the total 83 model regions, 79 are connected by the 434 lines of the DC network
model. The optimal DC power flow resulting from the nodal dispatch thus respects all
associated capacity limits and guarantees the regional balance of supply and demand.
In the CU scenario however, all internal network constraints are neglected. Hence,
only interconnectors between countries restrict power exchange. Electricity transmission
between the countries of the CWE+ region as well as between those countries and their
continental neighbors is still modeled by a (reduced) DC load flow, now considering only
102 lines. In consequence, the framework resembles a flow-based coupling of national
markets. In this setup, the model’s balance constraints only guarantee the equality
of demand and supply on a national level. The regional origin of domestic supply is
therefore no longer relevant.
Although the focus of the analysis is on Germany, in-depth modeling of inter-regional
exchange increases the quality and plausibility of the results. This also motivates the
implementation of nodal pricing throughout the entire CWE+ region in the benchmark
scenario. Overall, a coordinated change in the European market design will yield greater
benefits than an isolated reorganization of a national market. Furthermore, a joint
implementation of nodal pricing in Central Western Europe is much more plausible. In
the end, the highest level of efficiency obtainable within the framework of the presented
analysis is used as a reference to evaluate the German uniform pricing system.69
The dispatch scenarios are evaluated with a special focus on the allocation of supply and
producer surplus in Germany. However, as demonstrated in chapter 3, a thorough analy-
sis of a uniform market should include an assessment of the required internal congestion
management. Since congestion management most certainly affects the allocation of sup-
ply and may also influence the generators’ surplus, three re-dispatch scenarios based on
designs presented in chapter 4 are analyzed for the case of Germany.
In addition to the present German cost-based re-dispatch design, two remuneration
schemes that couple the remuneration to spot market prices are analyzed. Whereas a
fixed-rate remuneration rewards or charges generators with a given percentage of the
hourly spot price, individual marginal cost estimators can be derived from the genera-
tor’s production schedules and the corresponding price curves. The latter options are
69One may argue that a scenario with nodal pricing in Germany only would simplify the comparison of
the two market designs as well as the identification of the effects of internal congestion. However, also in
the case of national nodal pricing scenario the exchange between German and neighboring regions would
differ from the CU results. Therefore, a perfect isolation of the effects of national network constraints
will not be possible in either nodal setup.
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presently discussed by the German regulator Bundesetzagentur (cf. BNetzA (2012b)
and BNetzA (2012a)).
All three designs rely on (more or less standardized) bilateral contracts between TSO
and generators and resign auction-based re-dispatch procurement. As discussed in chap-
ter 4, the selection of plants for re-dispatch and the associated costs will however vary
between the designs. In each scenario, the re-dispatch model of NEULING calculates
the least-cost congestion management in accordance with the respective remuneration
scheme. Thus, the model’s objective can be interpreted as a minimization of the TSO’s
expenditures. Consequently, the potential hidden costs of the designs which stem from
the true variable costs of the re-dispatched generators have to be determined subse-
quently.
The DC load flow-based re-dispatch model optimizes congestion management on an
hourly basis, such that no inter-temporal restrictions are imposed. However, the hourly
availability of generators for re-dispatch is restricted due to balancing market obliga-
tions as well as by the plants’ operating status after dispatch. The configuration of the
re-dispatch model applied in this paper limits the start-up of standing capacities to flex-
ible technologies such as combined cycle and open cycle gas turbines (CCGT, OCGT),
pumped hydro storage plants and hydro reservoirs.70 The usage of hydro power plants
is further restricted to the generator units. Additionally, measures compensating for the
lack of inter-temporal storage constraints are taken. The corresponding assumptions and
their impact on the scenario results is discussed further in section 5.4.2. Furthermore,
the production of RES may be decreased in the course of re-dispatch as a last resort.
In the presented analysis, the re-dispatch calculation is limited to Germany and its
internal lines. Furthermore, only domestic plants may be used to relieve congestion.
This national approach reflects the status quo in Germany. So-called joint cross-border
re-dispatch would however reduce the overall costs of re-dispatch. Although an inter-
national approach to re-dispatch is aspired by the European TSOs (cf. ETSO (2003)),
their cooperation is mostly limited to the management of international congestion. The
relief of overloaded interconnectors is not considered in the presented analysis, such that
only a part of the total congestion management measures is evaluated.
70While OCGTs are well known to start up in less than an hour, CCGTs may need one to five hours
for start-up, depending on the standstill time, cf. Kasper et al. (2012). Since most of the congestion
is already revealed after the clearing of the day-ahead market by the TSO’s load flow calculations, it
is assumed that standing CCGTs may be noticed in time. However, some congestion may result from
short-term fluctuations of the feed-in of RES and from intra-day trade. The latter effect is assumed
to be small, since the German TSOs have the right to reject intra-day schedules that endanger system
security, cf. §5 Stromnetzzugangsverordnung (StromNZV, engl. Act on the Access to the Electricity
Network).
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5.3 Surplus and Costs under Nodal and Uniform Pricing
In this section, the focus of the analysis is on the wholesale market level. Nonetheless,
the comparison of uniform and nodal pricing reveals the economic effects of neglecting
or including congestion management into the optimization of the dispatch. Thus, the
spot market bias under uniform pricing can be identified with regard to the allocation
of generation and surpluses.
5.3.1 Total Costs of Production and Allocation of Generation
The first finding from the dispatch calculations with NEULING is an increase in the
German costs of electricity production under uniform pricing compared to the nodal
case. Given nodal pricing costs of 14,813 mEUR/a, the additional costs of a uniform
pricing system amount to 454 mEUR/a or roughly 3%. Knowing the basic theory, one
would expect a contrary development. Since uniform pricing imposes fewer restrictions
on the dispatch, the optimal solution should come at a lower price than on a nodal level.
However, the German power market is not an island system, such that a change in its
design influences the interaction with the surrounding markets. In consequence, the
predicted effect first reveals itself on the international level. Taking all countries subject
to nodal pricing into account, the total costs of electricity production are 385 mEUR/a
higher than the corresponding dispatch costs under uniform pricing.71 However, the
allocation of costs and benefits of design changes depends on the fundamental structure
of the regional markets. As will be demonstrated later on, this pattern repeats itself on
the national level.
Getting back to the German case, the higher production costs under uniform pricing
are mainly due to an increase in generation compared to the nodal pricing benchmark.
Although Germany is a net-exporting region in both systems, domestic production is
8 TWh higher in the copperplate model. Since regional congestion limits the benefits
of international trade, the neglect of internal network constraints in uniform pricing
systems leads to deviations from the nodal pricing results. In the case of Germany, the
efficient level of exchange is overshot when trade is determined on a national basis.
However, the quantitative effects of uniform pricing are not distributed evenly among the
regions. On the left hand side of figure 5.2, the regional proportion of total consumption
and total generation (including RES-E and CHP production) under uniform pricing is
given. The figure’s right hand side illustrates the divergence in the annual net input
71Considering all model regions, the wholesale market cost reduction of the uniform pricing systems
amounts to only 155 mEUR/a. These results correspond to the aggregated values presented in section
3.4.4.
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(defined as generation minus consumption) between the CU and the NP scenario. Since
demand is identical in both scenarios, the change is attributed to the difference in local
generation.72
Figure 5.2: Annual consumption and generation under uniform pricing (left) and
difference in net inputs between uniform (CU) and nodal pricing (NP) (right) in 2015
Source: Own illustration.
The highest positive deviation from the efficient allocation of production is revealed in
the north-eastern regions ”Berlin” (no. 13) and ”Wolmirstedt” (no. 12), which gain
additional 241% and 158% in comparison to the respective nodal levels. This increase
amounts to a total of 4.9 TWh over the whole year. Also the ”Ruhr” regions (14 and
15) in (North-)Western Germany register a substantial absolute rise in generation by
1.2 (+5.7%) and 0.6 TWh/a (+4.8%) respectively. Further noteworthy net-increases
take place in other regions situated in the northern half of the country. However, also
the southern region ”Mu¨nchen” accounts for a positive effect of quantity under uniform
pricing, which adds up to additional 411 GWh/a (+3.1%) of production. Since this
observation is contrary to the previously described geographic pattern, the result sug-
gests that the decrease is rather driven by cross-border network effects than by internal
congestion.
Moreover, the net-effect in other southern regions is negative or zero, indicating that
production in South Germany tends to be inefficiently low under uniform pricing. The
72Detailed results can be found in appendix B.
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highest net-decreases of 724 GWh/a and 217 GWh/a can be observed in ”Stuttgart”
(28) and ”Mannheim/Karlsruhe” (27) respectively. The nodal level of production is also
higher than the corresponding CU result in ”Frankfurt/Mainz” (no. 25, 118 GWh/a)
and ”Eichstetten” (no. 29, 26 GWh/a). However, three out of seven regions with
negative net-effects under uniform pricing are situated in the North (no. 8 ”Diele”, 205
GWh/a) and in the East (no. 18 ”Lauchsta¨dt”, 3.6 GWh/a, and no. 19 ”Schwarze
Pumpe”, 13.5 GWh/a). Regions 8 and 19 are located at the Dutch and Polish borders
respectively, such that the result may again be driven by cross-border effects.
As opposed to the spatial effects, the influence of the market design on the utilization
of different technologies is less clear. Despite the increase of production under uniform
pricing, the overall generation mix does not change notably in comparison to the bench-
mark scenario. However, regions which register lower domestic production in the CU
scenario usually exhibit a lower utilization of local capacities with relatively high variable
costs. In the case of the four southern regions, uniform pricing reduces the production
by hard coal fired plants and older CCGT units in comparison to the point of reference,
whereas the local nuclear power plants produce irrespective of the market design. The
perceived lack of congestion in the CU scenario thus leads to a cheaper local dispatch in
Southern Germany. On the contrary, high-cost generation by trend benefits in regions
with a higher level of production in comparison to the benchmark. For example, this
shows in the increase of production by CCGTs in ”Berlin” (no. 13) and ”Wolmirstedt”
(no. 12) under uniform pricing, as well as in higher output of hard coal power plants in
”Bremen” (no. 6) and ”Landsbergen” (no. 10). Accordingly, the explicit consideration
of limited transmission capacities will reduce the costs of production in the northern
regions.
However, the deviations between the nodal and the national dispatch depend on more
factors than variable costs of generation. Especially the impact of the respective nodal
net-inputs on the underlying network will influence the efficient nodal dispatch. Fur-
thermore, the local dispatch depends on the timing and magnitude of congestion. In an
isolated system though, the trend towards a less expensive generation mix under uniform
pricing will be more pronounced. In the presented analysis, this effect is overcompen-
sated by the decrease in domestic generation and by the re-allocation of production
within the CWE+ region.
5.3.2 Marginal Costs of Supply
Ultimately, the differences in the scenarios’ dispatch as well as in the number and severity
of network constraints result in diverging marginal costs of supply. In the CU scenario,
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the model is indifferent between generation of identical costs at any two German nodes.
Due to the neglect of internal network constraints, the national merit order as well as
the opportunity costs of international exchange define the marginal costs of supply. In
consequence, electricity is valued equally at all German nodes. In contrast, nodal prices
reflect both the local marginal costs of production as well as the influence of the local
net-input on the opportunity costs of congestion throughout the entire network. Since
a change in the net-input of a single node affects the flows on all (directly or indirectly)
connected lines, a single congested line leads to a divergence in marginal costs of supply
at all nodes.
In the CU scenario, the uniform average marginal costs of supply in Germany amount to
52.04 EUR/MWh in the year 2015. Under nodal pricing, the demand-weighted average
of the mean marginal costs at all German nodes of 51.74 EUR/MWh is slightly lower.
Again, this effect is driven by the change in total domestic generation. However, just
as local generation levels show both positive and negative deviations from the nodal
outcome, the national average marginal costs (AMC) both overshoot and undercut the
efficient nodal values in individual regions. In contrast to the slightly heterogeneous
spatial distribution of generation in- and decreases, the differences in the AMC of both
scenarios show a clear geographical pattern. Although the majority of the regions ac-
counts for higher AMC under uniform than under nodal pricing, a cohesive area of eight
nodes in South-West Germany exhibits lower AMC in the national setup. A graphical
illustration of the average marginal costs in the nodal pricing scenario is given in fig-
ure 5.3. The black line separates the north-eastern nodes with higher AMC in the CU
scenario from those with lower values.73
With regard to the 23 north-eastern regions, the average decrease in marginal costs
under nodal pricing ranges from -1.99 EUR/MWh in ”Ro¨hrsdorf/Eula” (23) to -0.04
EUR/MWh in ”Ruhr West” (14). In nine regions, the nodal reference level of the AMC
is more than 1 EUR/MWh lower than the national value, and in another five regions
the marginal costs still decrease by more than 0.50 EUR/MWh. In comparison, the
AMC increases triggered by nodal pricing are less pronounced. The smallest rise can
be observed in ”Frankfurt/Mainz” (25), where average marginal costs only rise by 0.01
EUR/MWh. Out of the eight nodes with higher AMC, five regions exhibit an increase
of less than 0.40 EUR/MWh. The highest differences between nodal and national AMC
result in ”Eichstetten” (no. 29, +0.83 EUR/MWh), ”Herbertingen/Vo¨hringen” (no. 30,
+0.82 EUR/MWh) and ”Stuttgart” (no. 28, +0.51 EUR/MWh).
As stated before, the effects of the market design on local generation levels and local
marginal costs not necessarily have the same sign. Despite the lower levels of local
73Detailed results can be found in appendix B.
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Figure 5.3: Average marginal costs of nodal pricing in 2015
Source: Own illustration.
generation at the south-western nodes 20, 24, 30 and 31, the nodes’ average marginal
costs of supply increase under nodal pricing. Vice versa, the higher production level
resulting from the nodal dispatch in the northern and eastern regions 8, 18 and 19
coincide with lower AMC. These examples demonstrate the relevance of network-related
elements in the marginal costs of supply. The internalization of positive and negative
external effects of network usage may thus overcompensate the change in the marginal
costs of generation.
Furthermore, the regional distribution of demand is reflected in the pattern of AMC
deviations. Five out of eight regions with inefficiently low AMC belong to the top-six
nodes with the highest annual consumption. In the order of decreasing consumption, the
said regions are ”Ko¨ln” (20), ”Mu¨nchen” (31), ”Stuttgart” (28), ”Mannheim/Karlsruhe”
(27) and ”Weiher” (24). But also the remaining three nodes ”Frankfurt/Mainz” (25),
”Herbertingen/Vo¨hringen” (30) and ”Eichstetten” (29) are under the top-fifteen demand
regions. By trend, the change from a national merit order of supply to a local portfolio
has a stronger effect on the average marginal costs of high-demand regions.
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5.3.3 Producer Surplus
Finally, the scenarios’ dispatch results can be used to derive an estimation of the re-
specitve producer surplus. Since the only available indicator for market prices is given
by the marginal costs of supply, the practical relevance of the estimation is limited.
Especially, (competitive) scarcity prices of generation cannot be captured by the model.
However, the difference in the magnitude and in the allocation of producer surplus be-
tween nodal and uniform pricing indicates the potential relevance of the associated bias.
Even though, the results should be interpreted as a short-term snapshot whose explana-
tory value with regard to dynamic efficiency is limited. In the following, the hourly
marginal costs as well as the variable costs of production (fuel and CO2 costs as well
as other variable costs of operation) are used to calculate the producer surplus. Fixed
operation and maintenance costs are neglected since they are identical in both scenarios.
The analysis is therefore restricted to the part of the surplus influenced by variations in
production levels and marginal costs.
In line with the findings on total generation and average marginal costs, the total German
producer surplus under uniform pricing is found to be higher than in the nodal reference
case. In total, the results of the CU scenario reveal an increase in producer surplus by
146 mEUR/a. Given the total surplus of 6,441 mEUR/a under nodal pricing, the short-
run bias amounts to 2.3%. But again, the gains and losses resulting from the choice of
a specific market design are not distributed evenly. While the majority of the regions
still benefits from uniform pricing, some nodes reveal higher producer surpluses under
nodal pricing.74 Figure 5.4 illustrates the regional net-effects.
Almost all of the nodes which exhibit higher AMC in the NP scenario also register a
higher producer surplus in comparison to uniform pricing. The largest absolute bias
induced by uniform pricing is observable in ”Herbertingen/Vo¨hringen” (30), where the
producer surplus is 15.7 mEUR/a (2.5%) below the nodal reference point. The next
largest deviations occur in ”Mannheim/Karlsruhe” (no. 27, 7.2 mEUR/a or 1.7%),
”Stuttgart” (no. 28, 6.5 mEUR/a or 1.8%) and ”Ko¨ln” (no. 20, 5.7 mEUR/a or 0.4%).
The nodes ”Weiher” (24) and ”Mu¨nchen” (31) still account for deficits in comparison
to the benchmark that amount to 2 and 1.6 mEUR/a. Among all nodes with negative
deviations from the nodal surplus, ”Eichstetten” (29) registers the highest relative bias
of 29.2% (0.6 mEUR/a). In the regions 30, 24, 31 and 20 the negative price effect under
uniform pricing thus dominates the corresponding effect of quantity, which is positive in
the case of the last three regions and zero in the case of node no. 30.
74Detailed results can be found in appendix B.
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Figure 5.4: Difference in producer surplus under uniform (CU) and nodal pricing
(NP)
Source: Own illustration.
In the previously described south-western area, the only exception is ”Frankfurt/Mainz”
(25). At this node, the smallest difference in average marginal costs (-0.01 EUR/MWh
under uniform pricing) is observed. Despite the lower level of production (-0.9%), local
producer surplus is 0.7 mEUR/a (+0.2%) higher under uniform pricing. Although the
observed relative differences are very small, this result indicates that the hourly constel-
lation of production and marginal costs may be of greater relevance than the aggregate
change of single influencing factors. Including ”Frankfurt/Mainz”, the total deviation
in the surplus in South-Western Germany amounts to -38.6 mEUR/a (-1.1%) compared
to the nodal benchmark.
At the north-western nodes however, the uniform pricing bias leads to additional surplus
in comparison to the point of reference. In comparison to nodal pricing, the regions
register a total producer surplus which is 184.8 mEUR/a (+6.6%) higher in the CU
scenario. The discrepancy between the scenario results is the highest in ”Schwarze
Pumpe” (19), where the surplus under uniform pricing overshoots the nodal result by
86.3 mEUR/a (+8.4%). Further substantial deviations can be observed at ”Lauchsta¨dt”
(no. 18, 31.2 mEUR/a or +7.5%), ”Dollern” (no. 2, 15.5 mEUR/a or +15.9%) and
”Brunsbu¨ttel” (no. 3, 9 mEUR/a or +2.7%). The largest relative gains from uniform
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pricing occur in ”Berlin” (no. 13, +176% or 2.7 mEUR/a) and ”Wolmirstedt” (no. 12,
+137% or 0.9 mEUR/a).
However, three nodes in the North-West also register lower surpluses under uniform
pricing than under nodal pricing. The power plant mix in these regions is dominated
by pumped hydro storage plants (PSP), which are the only available technology in
”Hamburg” (3) and ”Borken” (16) and provide 50% of the capacity in ”Ro¨hrsdorf/Eula”.
At all three nodes, the producer surplus from PSP is higher in the NP scenario, despite a
lower level of production. This general pattern is repeated for PSP capacities at almost
all German nodes. This observation suggests that while the number of profitable cycles
is smaller under nodal pricing, the remaining opportunities yield higher profits from
temporal price arbitrage. Since the network-related flexibility of the nodal system is
diminished in comparison to the national model, the remaining flexibility options such
as storage plants are more valuable.
With regard to other technologies, trends are less simple to identify due to the mixing
of price and quantity effects. In the regions where the national AMC are below the local
benchmark, some of the additional producer surplus from nodal pricing falls upon high-
cost technologies such as old lignite and hard coal plants or less efficient CCGTs. These
units reach a higher number of full load hours than under uniform pricing, since they
are less frequently in merit on a national level. Ultimately, these differences mirror the
direct costs of congestion. But also low-cost units such as nuclear power plants that are
equally utilized in both scenarios benefit from higher nodal prices. A contrary effect can
be observed in regions which show lower AMC under nodal than under uniform pricing.
Although base-load capacities do not run less frequently, their surplus diminishes in the
NP scenario due to the price effect.
5.3.4 Intermediate Conclusion
Overall, the comparative analysis reveals the influence of congestion management and
market design choices on the short-term allocation of generation and producer surplus
and thus indicates potential long-term impacts. First, the dispatch under uniform pricing
leads to a sub-optimal allocation of production and an inefficient (if not infeasible) use of
the network in the presence of congestion. Second, the remuneration of both inefficiently
and efficiently dispatched generators does not reflect the opportunity costs of congestion
in a uniform pricing system. In the long-run, the bias in the producer surplus may lead
to a sub-optimal siting of new generation capacities from the network’s perspective.
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In the case of Germany, a systematic bias with regard to the spatial distribution of
producer surplus is identified. While generation in the North-East shows to be over-
priced, production capacities in the South-East are by trend under-valued in the given
scenario. This relationship implicitly demonstrates the mismatch of local generation
and network capacities. If nodal pricing was implemented, the drop in the surplus
of generators situated in the North-West would by trend discourage local investors,
whereas the increase in the revenues of southern producers would possibly encourage
investments. To assess whether the demonstrated re-allocation of producer surplus would
be sufficient to actually trigger the construction of new plants however requires a complex
analysis. Besides investment and other fix costs, the expected profits would have to
compensate potential disadvantages of the sites, for example with respect to primary
fuel costs. Ultimately, the trade-off between the network extensions and the allocation
of power plant capacities in high-cost regions should determine the investments on both
sides. Especially with regard to the lifetime of power plants and transmission lines, the
aggregate effects of location decisions can be substantial.
Although the magnitude of the long-term effects of market design choices cannot be
assessed by the means of the presented analysis, the short-term distribution effects are
shown to be notable. In the presented setup, the beneficiaries of uniform pricing gain
185.5 mEUR/a, whereas other generators forfeit 39.5 mEUR/a. With regard to the
short-run surplus, producers can thus be expected to favor uniform pricing. However, the
wholesale costs of consumption can be shown to behave differently. Under nodal pricing,
256 mEUR/a savings in consumer costs are realized at 24 nodes, whereas consumer
cost increase by 49.6 mEUR/a in the remaining regions. Not surprisingly, the regional
allocation of savings and losses for consumers exactly contrasts the spatial distribution
of the producers’ gains and losses (cf. figure 5.5).
In the presented framework, the wholesale market net-effect including changes in con-
sumer costs and producer surplus amounts to 60.4 mEUR/a of benefits under nodal
pricing. The benefits thus equal 0.4% of the total nodal pricing production costs in
Germany. In line with the findings in Green (2007), the distribution effects are shown
to be considerably higher than the total gain. However, this comparison is by no means
comprehensive. First, nodal pricing also generates congestion rents, which account for
93.9 mEUR/a. Congestion rents are paid by market participants to the TSO. Although
the payments are higher than the net-benefit for producers and consumers, this does not
necessarily overturn the balance of costs and benefits under nodal pricing. Depending
on the regulation, the TSO may use the rents to cover a part of its infrastructure ex-
penditures.75 Thus, the rents may finally reduce network tariffs, which also incur under
uniform pricing but are not considered in the presented analysis.
75Cf. Brunekreeft (2005).
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Figure 5.5: Difference in producer surplus (left) and consumer costs (right) under
uniform (CU) and nodal pricing (NP)
Source: Own illustration.
Second, the calculation does neither account for the costs of implementing a new market
design, nor for additional transaction costs associated to trade and market operation.
Furthermore, the analysis does not cover issues related to market liquidity and market
power. Both aspects are of special importance for small bidding zones.76 A further issue
not yet analyzed in this paper is the costs of congestion under uniform pricing. In the
end, market participants have to bear the costs of curative congestion management that
incur apart from the wholesale market. This aspect is discussed in further detail in the
following section.
5.4 Evaluation of Re-dispatch Designs
The wholesale market perspective adopted in the previous section ignores the impact
of internal congestion on the performance of the German uniform pricing system. In
the following, the significance of internal transmission constraints is highlighted from
the perspective of re-dispatch. First, the overload of the German high voltage network
resulting from the dispatch is identified. Second, the performance of cost-based and
fixed-rate re-dispatch as well as of spot price-based estimators of re-dispatch costs is
evaluated quantitatively.
76Especially in comparison to a local re-dispatch market, nodal pricing may be less prone to the abuse
of local market power. These issues are e. g. discussed in Harvey and Hogan (2000).
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5.4.1 Power Flows and Congestion
As a preparation for the re-dispatch scenarios, the power flows resulting from the copper-
plate dispatch have to be determined. Therefore, an additional DC load flow calculation
is based on the local generation schedules resulting from the CU scenario. The calcu-
lation yields the true utilization of both national and international transmission lines,
which may well exceed the thermal capacity of some lines. In the following, the analysis
is limited to congestion occurring within Germany.
Within Germany, the network model represents 163 high and extra high voltage trans-
mission lines which divide themselves among 58 routes. In the scenario year 2015, the
lines account for 193.6 GW of available electricity transmission capacities after consid-
eration of the 80% security margin. After the uniform pricing dispatch, the average
absolute flows on the lines amount to 328 MW, which translates into an average capac-
ity utilization of 28%. However, single lines register noticeably higher transmission. The
connection between the regions ”Lauchsta¨dt” (no. 18) and ”Erfurt” (no. 22) exhibits
the highest average values per line, both in terms of absolute flows (1072 MW) and
utilization (75%). Similarly high results (895 MW and 63%) can be observed for the
lines connecting ”Wahle” (11) ”Wolmirstedt” (12).
Since the indicated results refer to the flows resulting from uniform pricing, they include
the line overload in times of congestion. In total, congestion within Germany occurs in
2,151 hours (25%) of the year 2015. The non-transmittable flows add up to 2,452 GWh
and reach an hourly maximum of 10.7 GWh. Thereby, 53 lines or 23 routes are prone to
congestion throughout the year. On average, each of the lines is overloaded in 302 hours,
such that the average number of simultaneously congested lines amounts to seven.
With congestion in 20% of the hours, the most frequently congested connection again
lies between ”Lauchsta¨dt” and ”Erfurt”, whereas the line between ”Erfurt” and ”Et-
zenricht/Raitersaich” registers the highest average magnitude of congestion (305 MW).
Figure 5.6 illustrates the aggregate power flows between the German network regions as
well as the corresponding frequency and magnitude of congestion.
5.4.2 Allocation of Re-dispatch Volumes, Remuneration and Costs
In the end, the failure of the network due to overloading has to be prevented by re-
dispatch. For this purpose, the re-dispatch model of NEULING selects local generators
to simultaneously increase and decrease their output (cf. chapter 2). The effects of these
changes in the nodal net inputs on the transmission lines are again determined by a
DC load flow. The optimal re-allocation of supply eventually relieves the overloaded
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Figure 5.6: Power flows and congestion under uniform pricing in 2015
Source: Own illustration.
lines at least cost and guarantees the local balance of demand and supply at the same
time. However, the definition of re-dispatch costs and hence the final allocation depends
on the remuneration scheme. Given that the TSO minimizes her expenditures, the
net-payments to the generators rather than the true variable costs will be the deciding
factor.77
5.4.2.1 The Reference Case: Cost-based Re-dispatch
Cost-based re-dispatch is currently used to manage congestion of the internal trans-
mission network in Germany. As discussed in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3.2.1, this design
will implement the efficient allocation of generation provided that information on the
true variable costs is available and that re-dispatch is friction-free (cf. section 4.2.2). In
the setup of NEULING, the transparency of the costs is accounted for by setting the
variable costs of re-dispatch to the hourly values of the corresponding dispatch param-
eters. Consequently, the equality of dispatch and re-dispatch cost functions, which is
one property of a friction-free re-dispatch, is guaranteed within hours. However, the
model’s lack of intertemporality leads to an overestimation of ramping costs in between
hours. Even when a unit is re-dispatched consecutively, ramping costs incur in every
hour. Furthermore, the freedom of re-dispatch is limited by restricting the start-up of
77Detailed results of the following sections can be found in appendix B.
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standing capacities to CCGTs, OCGTs and hydro power. This induces greater friction
in comparison to the ideal world of chapter 4, but achieves more realistic results.
A further comment has to be made with regard to pumped-hydro storage plants (PSP)
and hydro reservoirs, which are handled differently from conventional technologies in
the re-dispatch model. Since the variable costs of hydro power are very small, the cost-
based re-dispatch model would call these plants before all other types. To some degree,
this can be prevented by using opportunity costs rather than variable costs to value
the production of hydro power plants. Since stored water can only be used once, the
generation of electricity during re-dispatch comes with a loss of spot market revenue. In
the CU scenario, the average marginal costs at which hydro plants produce electricity
are found to be EUR 57.17 (PSP) and EUR 56.44 (reservoir). However, using these
values as a cost estimator would still lead to a frequent utilization of hydro plants in the
course of re-dispatch. This is critical since the re-dispatch model does not account for
intertemporal storage constraints. In consequence, the provision of positive re-dispatch
by hydro power would often violate the storage constraints. For this reason, the costs
for re-dispatching hydro plants are set to a dummy value of 100 EUR/MWh. The costs
are therefore higher than for most other technologies (including the ramping costs of
conventional plants). Accordingly, the utilization of hydro power for positive re-dispatch
is most certainly underestimated, but most likely feasible. In the case of negative re-
dispatch of hydro power plants, the savings are set to the (very small) variable costs just
as for any other technology. Again, this makes hydro power a less favorable re-dispatch
option.
All of the discussed characteristics of the re-dispatch model will lead to deviations be-
tween the allocation of generation implemented via re-dispatch and the results of the
efficient nodal pricing benchmark. In addition, the geographical scope of the nodal
model allows for the international coordination of congestion management, whereas re-
dispatch is limited to Germany. As a result, a reduction of the overall level of generation
as observed under nodal pricing cannot be achieved via re-dispatch. With national re-
dispatch, the level of supply is kept constant, such that only the allocation of production
is changed. In consequence, a direct comparison of both scenarios would be misleading.
Results
In the scenario year 2015, cost-based re-dispatch leads to a re-allocation of 3,691 GWh
of generation within Germany. Considering the net value of upward and downward re-
dispatch, downward re-dispatch is concentrated in the north-eastern part of Germany,
whereas upward re-dispatch is mostly applied in the South-West. This pattern reflects
the location of congested transmission lines, which are especially found between the said
regions (cf. figure 5.6). However, almost all regions provide both negative as well as
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positive re-dispatch at some point of the year. This is due to the hourly variation in the
flow pattern and the potential necessity to counterbalance flows induced by other re-
dispatch measures. Figure 5.7 illustrates the aggregated re-dispatch volumes per node.
Figure 5.7: Re-dispatch volumes (cost-based) in 2015
Source: Own illustration.
The largest absolute re-dispatch volumes as well as the highest net volumes can be
observed in ”Mu¨nchen” (no. 31) and ”Lauchsta¨dt” (no. 18). Whereas ”Mu¨nchen”
mainly provides positive re-dispatch (1,360 GWh net), generation in ”Lauchsta¨dt” (no.
18) is primarily reduced (-999 GWh). The latter region is the start node of the most
heavily congested connection in the model. Since ”Lauchsta¨dt” accounts for a positive
net input (nodal exports are higher than imports), downward re-dispatch reduces the
node’s exports, which are mainly southbound. In comparison, the location of ”Mu¨nchen”
in the network is more favorable, such that the node’s additional generation supplies the
southern deficit region. Further important nodes for positive re-dispatch can both be
found in the South-West (”Mannheim/Karlsruhe”, 373 GWh net) as well as in the
North-West of Germany (”Emsland”, 343 GWh net). In contrast ”Berlin” (13) and
”Brunsbu¨ttel” mainly provide negative adjustments of generation (-645 GWh net and
-491 GWh net).
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Given that only extra-marginal capacities can be ramped-up during re-dispatch, mid-
and peak-load plants supply most of the positive re-dispatch volumes. Gas fired plants
provide 95% of the positive adjustments, supplemented by hard coal (4%), lignite and
hydro power plants (less than 1%). Nuclear power plants are never used for positive re-
dispatch since they already operate at full capacity in the relevant hours. The allocation
of re-dispatch to power plant technologies changes in the case of negative re-dispatch,
which can only be provided by spinning capacities. In consequence, the share of base-
and mid-load plants is higher. Between 26% and 31% of the re-dispatch volumes are
attributed to CCGTs, hard coal and lignite plants each. Now, also nuclear plants are
ramped down to secure the network (7%).
If the (local) availability of conventional plants is insufficient to fulfill the re-dispatch
requirements, RES-E can be curtailed. Since the reduction of electricity production from
renewables does not save any variable costs, curtailment is the least favorable option.
However, since there are no local differences in the savings, the efficient allocation of
curtailment is identical to the most effective allocation. In total, 8% of the downward
re-dispatch (286 GWh) are provided by RES. The observed curtailment is limited to the
North-East of Germany and occurs no farther south than ”Erfurt” (22) and ”Borken”
(16). The highest reduction (168 GWh or 59%) is however observed at the northern-
most node of ”Brunsbu¨ttel” (1), followed by the regions ”Lauchsta¨edt” (no. 18, 14%),
”Schwarze Pumpe” (no. 19, 9%) and ”Bertikow” (no. 7, 8%).
In contrast, RES cannot contribute to the provision of positive re-dispatch within the
model, since they are assumed to operate at the hourly limit. In three hours in February
and December, the available conventional capacities however prove themselves insuffi-
cient to serve local demand in all regions. The model nonetheless solves by using a
so-called dummy-variable, which is activated at the most effective node. In all three
hours, the dummy is located in the south-western region of ”Eichstetten” (29) and sup-
plies 89 MWh of additional generation in total. Since the dummy may be interpreted as
a demand for cross-border congestion management or demand side management (DSM),
this result does not indicate a failure of the network in the real world.
Excluding the costs of procuring DSM or international re-dispatch, the costs of re-
dispatch amount to 136.5 mEUR/a in the scenario year 2015.78 This value mirrors the
sum of the additional costs of positive re-dispatch and the savings of negative re-dispatch.
Although the volumes of upward and downward adjustments are in absolute terms iden-
tical, re-dispatch will rarely be cost-neutral. This is due to the fact that infra-marginal
generators are substituted by extra-marginal units. Concerning the remuneration of
78Thereof, 2.2 mEUR/a are associated to the positive re-dispatch of hydro storage plants, priced at
roughly 100 EUR/MWh.
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re-dispatched generators, cost-based designs ensure that the induced changes in the pro-
ducers’ variable costs are exactly compensated, either by payments or charges. Thus,
the producers’ surplus from the wholesale market is not changed (section 5.3.3).
In consequence, cost-based re-dispatch is not able to internalize the external effects of
network usage and congestion. However, within the limited scope of the re-dispatch
model, the design implements the least-cost re-dispatch. This solution is optimal in the
sense that all true costs are taken into account. Thus, no hidden costs lead to deviations
between the expenses of the TSO and the generators’ opportunity costs. Although the
inefficiency in the allocation of producer surplus under uniform pricing is not reduced,
no additional distortions are introduced in the market through cost-based re-dispatch.
In the following, the design is used as a point of reference in the evaluation of alternative
re-dispatch schemes.
Classification of Results
As stated in the monitoring reports published by the German regulator BNetzA for the
years 2007 to 2010, the maximum congestion management costs up to now amount to
45 mEUR/a (2008).79,80 Given the (expected) expansion of renewable energy sources
and the reduction of conventional surplus capacities between the years 2008 and 2015,
a triplication of congestion management costs does not seem to be an unrealistic result.
A comparison of the calculated re-dispatch volumes (+/- 3,691 GWh) with real-world
data is much more difficult, since the BNetzA has so far only published the quantities
for the year 2010. In the corresponding monitoring report, the total increase in gener-
ation arranged by the German TSOs in the course of congestion management is stated
as 141 GWh. The total decrease is indicated with 1,996 GWh.81 No explanation is
given concerning the divergence of the two values, which may be due to international
congestion management. Furthermore, the NEULING model does not allow for conges-
tion management through network topology optimization. In consequence, the need for
the re-allocation of generation may be overestimated (cf. Kunz (2011)). This effect is
however opposed by the spatial resolution of the network model, which neglects large
parts of the transmission grid.
In the literature, the case of cost-based re-dispatch in Germany has been studied by
Nu¨ßler (2012) and Kunz (2011). In Nu¨ßler (2012), roughly the same data set for Ger-
many as in the presented analysis is used. However, the methodology applied in Nu¨ßler
79The reports (German: Monitoringberichte) are published online at www.bundesnetzagentur.de.
80In this paper, the meteorological data of the year 2008 has been used to calculate the hourly feed-in
of RES-E. In this respect, a comparison with the scenario year 2015 is not overly farfetched.
81Both values include re-dispatch and counter-trading volumes. The regulator defines the latter as
purchases and sales of electricity across control zones. Since it serves the exact same end as re-dispatch,
the differentiation is irrelevant in this context.
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(2012) differs in various aspects. First, the use of type-days hinders the representation
of extreme constellations of local demand and RES-E feed-in, which come with espe-
cially high transmission requirements. Furthermore, load flow calculations are restricted
to Germany and its interconnectors and are based on power transfer distribution fac-
tor (PTDF) matrices. Thereby, the security margin is set to 90% of the thermal line
capacities, which is a less strict assumption than the one applied in this paper (80%).
Overall, the calculated re-dispatch volumes and costs of the year 2015 are lower than in
the presented analysis (608 GWh/a and 35.5 mEUR/a).
Kunz (2011) analyzes the combination of cost-based re-dispatch with congestion man-
agement through network topology optimization (switching lines on or off). The author
conducts a comparative static analysis for Germany, which is based on a European sce-
nario of the year 2008. Within this framework, the development of conventional and
wind power capacities, of load and internal network capacities is modeled for Germany
only. On this basis, DC load flow-based dispatch and re-dispatch are calculated for
nine single hours of the scenario years. The findings of Kunz (2011) indicate that the
management of congestion by the means of re-dispatch alone leads to an increase in
German congestion management costs by factor six between the years 2008 and 2020.
Kunz (2011) uses this base case to highlight the relevance of network topology optimiza-
tion, which reduces the respective costs to 0 in 2008 and by 98% in 2020. With respect
to the analysis presented in this paper, the findings in Kunz (2011) highlight that the
costs of congestion management by the means of re-dispatch only will most certainly be
overestimated.
5.4.2.2 Fixed-rate Re-dispatch Remuneration
The advantages of fixed-rate re-dispatch remuneration as described in BNetzA (2012b)
and section 4.3.2.2 are its simplicity and the avoidance of problems rooted in information
asymmetries. According to a transparent rule, the payments to re-dispatched generators
are set to the hourly spot market price plus a fixed percentage, whereas charges are set
to the spot price minus the same amount. This mechanism is based on the assump-
tion that the national merit order can be used as an indicator for the variable costs of
re-dispatched generators. Since this ignores the geographical component of congestion
management which influences the selection of generators for re-dispatch, fixed-rate re-
dispatch will most likely prevent an adequate remuneration. Furthermore, the fixed rate
does not reflect the non-linear slope of the merit order, such that the suppliers of posi-
tive and negative re-dispatch face different risks of insufficient remuneration. However,
the intention of the design is to lower transaction costs and to increase transparency.
Putting strategic behavior on the generators’ part aside, for example by assuming that
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the unpredictability of congestion prevents a systematic advantage of gaming, the mag-
nitude of the mechanism’s bias is therefore analyzed in the following. Exemplarily, the
fix percentage is set to +/-10%, as proposed in BNetzA (2012b).
As described in chapter 4.3.2.2, the remuneration of all generators at a fixed rate leaves
the TSO indifferent with regard to the selection of power plant technologies. Under the
assumption that the TSO always minimizes her expenditures, the optimization problem
is reduced to one of volume minimization. The TSO therefore selects the most effectively
located generators only. In the NEULING model, this is reflected by setting all cost
parameters included in the original objective function to one and by considering the ab-
solute values of the variables only. In consequence, ramping costs are excluded from the
calculus and need to be compensated separately.82 The assumptions on the technologi-
cal flexibility remain unchanged. With regard to the re-dispatch of hydro power plants,
the feasibility of the results as well as the comparability to the cost-based re-dispatch
scenario is maintained by introducing a similar scaling factor for upward re-dispatch.
In the case of fixed-rate re-dispatch, the factor is not directly coupled to the payments
but exerts the same influence. Again, the factor leads to a preferred re-dispatch of fos-
sil technologies such that the deployment of hydro plants is the less favorable option.
Additional measures to restrict the downward re-dispatch of spinning hydro generators
are not taken, since the spill of surplus water is assumed to be possible at all times. In
consequence, hydro power plants are handled as every other technology with regard to
negative re-dispatch.
Results
In line with the intuition described above, the total re-dispatch volumes are reduced
by 7.5% (276.5 GWh/a) in comparison to the cost-based reference case. Furthermore,
the allocation of the re-dispatch volumes changes notably. Although the availability
of physical capacities still limits the selection of generators, the results of the fixed-
rate re-dispatch indicate the relevance of single nodes for the transmission network. In
the case of positive re-dispatch, the adjustments are now provided at 19 instead of 24
nodes. Due to the standardized rate, the trade-off between costs and effectivity is no
longer relevant. In consequence, suppliers which are re-dispatched in the reference case
because of their relatively low costs are disregarded in the fixed-rate scenario. The
opposite is observed in the case of negative re-dispatch. Whereas the cost-based model
selects generators at 22 different nodes, now five additional nodes provide downward
adjustments. Thus, the neglect of differences in the generators’ savings leads to a finer
geographical differentiation. An illustration of the regional re-dispatch volumes in direct
comparison to the cost-based results is given in figure 5.8.
82This is in line with the proposal of the German regulator, cf. BNetzA (2012b).
Chapter 5. Economic Effects of Congestion Management 105
Figure 5.8: Comparison of re-dispatch volumes (cost-based left, fixed rate right) in
2015
Source: Own illustration.
The higher geographic concentration of upward re-dispatch especially shows in a cluster
in the North-West and in the South of Germany. In the North-East, three nodes register
substantially higher volumes, namely ”Emsland” (no. 9, +177 GWh/a or 48%), ”Lands-
bergen” (no. 10, +150 GWh/a or 340%) and ”Ruhr Ost” (no. 15, +15 GWh/a or 12%).
In exchange, the positive adjustments in neighboring regions decrease. In the South,
”Stuttgart” (no. 28) and ”Frankfurt/Mainz” (no. 25) register an increase in positive
re-dispatch of 133 GWh/a (+97%) and 23 GWh/a (+10%) respectively. Instead, sup-
pliers in the regions ”Mu¨nchen” (31), ”Mannheim/Karlsruhe” (27) and ”Weiher” (24)
are called less. Another noteworthy effect of fixed-rate re-dispatch is observable in the
North-East of Germany. In contrast to the cost-based scenario, the nodes ”Wolmirst-
edt” (12) and ”Berlin” (13) no longer provide positive re-dispatch. This amounts to a
local decrease of 33 GWh/a and 46 GWh/a. The same effect occurs in ”Brunsbu¨ttel”
(1), ”Schwarze Pumpe” (19) and ”Lauchsta¨dt” (18), although to a smaller extent.
Concerning the allocation of negative re-dispatch, the highest changes under fixed-rate
re-dispatch occur in Eastern Germany. Especially, additional negative adjustments
in ”Schwarze Pumpe” (19) and ”Lauchsta¨dt” (18) replace downward re-dispatch in
”Wolmirstedt” (12) and ”Berlin” (13). Thus the measures are taken in a greater prox-
imity to the critical lines connecting the East and the South. In general, the more direct
aim at the congested lines thus decreases the overall need for adjustments. This also
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holds with regard to the necessity to curtail the feed-in of RES. Since the smaller volumes
of fixed-rate re-dispatch require less conventional capacities, supplementary curtailment
can be avoided more often. In comparison to cost-based re-dispatch, 179 GWh/a or 63%
of RES-E curtailment can thus be saved.
Regarding the selection of power plant technologies, the logic of the fixed-rate remunera-
tion directly translates in a shift towards high-cost technologies for upward and towards
low-cost technologies for downward re-dispatch. Whereas the provision of additional
generation by lignite is completely suspended (-6.5 GWh/a), the share of hard coal fired
plants in upward re-dispatch is reduced from 4.3% to 1.3% (-114.7 GWh/a). In con-
trast, older gas fired units provide more upward re-dispatch in the fixed-rate scenario.
Although the absolute volumes supplied by CCGTs and OCGTs also diminish due to
the overall reduction of re-dispatch, their share rises from 92% to 98%. Because of the
corresponding parameterization, the deployment of hydro power plants does not change
significantly. Nonetheless, the effect of quantity also reduces the positive re-dispatch
volumes provided by pumped storage plants by 360 MWh/a. In contrast, the share of
gas and hard coal plants in downward re-dispatch decreases notably in the fixed-rate
scenario. In return, lignite and nuclear power plants are ramped-down more often in the
course of re-dispatch. Their shares now amount to 64% and 11% respectively, despite the
low savings in variable costs. Especially in the case of lignite plants, this development
is driven by their location in the North-East of Germany. Furthermore, the provision of
downward re-dispatch by spinning hydro power plants is increased in comparison to the
reference scenario. Since hydro power plants offer the lowest savings per reduced MWh
apart from curtailment, the technologies are seldom selected for downward adjustments
under cost-based re-dispatch. Now, the fixed rate leads to the deployment of hydro
power plants at effective nodes, such as ”Erfurt” (22) and ”Ro¨hrsdorf/Eula”’ (23).
The expenses of the TSO finally amount to 187.9 mEUR/a including the payments for
ramping, which are assumed to be revealed truthfully and to be remunerated accord-
ingly.83 Excluding hydro power plants, whose remuneration is defined by the fixed-rate
as well, the expenses are slightly reduced to 187.5 mEUR/a. Both values are higher than
the corresponding costs of the reference scenario (136.5 mEUR/a incl. hydro power, 134.2
mEUR/a excl. hydro). Even though the re-dispatch volumes decrease, the fixed-rate de-
sign does not come with a reduction in the TSO’s expenses. However, the discrepancy is
even more pronounced when the true variable re-dispatch costs are taken into account.
Under consideration of the generators’ hourly variable and ramping costs as applied in
the cost-based scenario, total re-dispatch costs of 264.4 mEUR/a (253.6 mEUR/a excl.
83Necessary payments to loads or international suppliers which are associated to the use of the
dummy variable are not included. The remuneration scheme has no impact on the dummy variable
and its allocation, such that the corresponding values do not change in comparison to the cost-based
reference case.
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hydro) are revealed. In consequence, the loss in efficiency triggered by a fixed-rate design
can be valued at -127.9 mEUR/a (or -119.4 mEUR/a).
However, with regard to different technologies, the fixed-rate remuneration has mixed
effects. In the case of positive re-dispatch, technologies with variable costs within the
range of the marginal system cost plus 10% benefit from the TSO’s payments. In the
given scenario, especially hard coal power plants are remunerated above their true costs.
Their additional revenues from re-dispatch amount to 252,200 EUR/a and to an average
of 5.60 EUR/MWh. In contrast, effective generators with relatively high variable cost
are most likely in an inferior position. This holds true for gas fired power plants, which in
total suffer losses from re-dispatch to the amount of 16.2 mEUR/a or 19.46 EUR/MWh.
However, the rate of 10% appears to be sufficient for modern CCGTs, although their
average benefit of 1.24 EUR/MWh is lower than for hard coal technologies. Due to the
steeper slope of the merit order towards its end, the capacities which fall within the
pre-defined range will be smaller at high hourly marginal costs than in the middle of
the merit order. Over all fossil technologies, the shortfall in compensatory payments
amounts to 15.9 mEUR/a.
Concerning negative re-dispatch, the pattern is reversed. In the case of low-cost tech-
nologies, the probability that the true savings are below the charges of the TSO are
greater than for costlier power plants. In the given scenario, nuclear and lignite plants
pay 11.7 mEUR/a (29.62 EUR/MWh) and 41.3 mEUR/a (17.50 EUR/MWh) more to
the TSO than covered by their savings in variable costs. In contrast, hard coal and gas
fired plants generally benefit from downward re-dispatch under a fixed-rate regime (2.35
EUR/MWh and 5.57 EUR/MWh). Nonetheless, the charges of the TSO exceed the true
savings of fossil-fuel plants by a total of 50.1 mEUR/a.
Overall, the error of the fixed-rate remuneration is observed to be significantly higher
in the case of negative re-dispatch. However, as stated in chapter 4 and already hinted
above, a 10% markup of the hourly marginal system costs will cover less capacities along
the merit order than a 10% reduction. Thus, the probability that a plant is insufficiently
remunerated is higher in the course of upward re-dispatch than during downward re-
dispatch. Nonetheless, this pattern does not dominate the presented results. This is due
to the fact that the theoretical example does not account for the plants’ location. In
consequence, the error may well be higher for generators providing negative re-dispatch
if the variable costs of the most effective plants happen to be considerably lower than
the system marginal costs.
Furthermore, no geographical pattern of additional revenues or losses can be observed.
Since both upward and downward re-dispatch can generate benefits and losses at the
same node at the same time, the regional distribution depends on the local capacity
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mix rather than on the nodes’ position with respect to the bottleneck. In accordance
with chapter 4, this demonstrates that a well-aimed compensation for inefficiently low
or excessively high regional producer surpluses from uniform pricing is thus not possible
by the means of fixed-rate re-dispatch. Instead, the design introduces further distortions
into the market. Given that the associated inefficiencies roughly double the true conges-
tion management costs, the potential benefits from saving transaction costs or reducing
information asymmetries are most likely insufficient to justify the implementation of
such a design.
5.4.2.3 Spot Price-based Re-dispatch
The use of a less simple but possibly more accurate spot price-based remuneration
scheme may however reduce the inefficiency of a fixed-rate design while still offering the
possibility to mitigate information asymmetries. In this section, the performance of a
generator-specific marginal cost estimator as discussed in section 4.3.2.2 will be tested.
The estimator equals the lowest price at which a given generator is called at the wholesale
market. Assuming that all market participants bid according to the principles of perfect
competition, the estimator indicates the generators’ marginal costs. In order to minimize
the impact of start-up costs on the estimator, the minimum marginal system costs are
used to price both positive as well as negative re-dispatch provided by a given generator.
This is a slight variation of the proposal made in BNetzA (2012a). In addition, ramping
costs are compensated separately.
In the presented analysis, the results of the dispatch model applied in the CU scenario
are used to derive technology-specific estimators. Since the variable costs of power plants
within one vintage class are identical and since the order in which the local plants are
called during dispatch is not justified by fundamental differences, the estimator is not
differentiated locally. In reality, the estimator would rarely be identical for any two
plants. However, the definition of the estimator allows for a variation in time. Its hourly
value is thus defined by the minimum marginal system price at which a vintage class
was in operation during the previous four weeks. Should a technology not have been
used during the last four weeks, the estimator is set to its last positive value rather
than to zero. The variable costs of technologies that never run are set to their true
variable costs. The case of hydro power is once again handled by setting the variable
costs of positive re-dispatch to roughly 100 EUR/MWh. All remaining assumptions of
the cost-based reference case are left unchanged.
In the presented scenario, no floor is introduced such that no artificial lower bound of
the estimator is provided. This gives room to the effects of opportunity costs, which
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may push the estimator below variable costs. In the applied model setup, the oppor-
tunity costs incurring during dispatch mainly stem from ramping costs.84 Thus, a first
indication of the relevance of opportunity costs for the remuneration of re-dispatched is
given.
Results
The first effect of the estimator shows in the overall re-dispatch volumes which rise by
35 GWh/a in comparison to the reference case. This observation indicates that the
trade-off between the variable costs and the effectivity of available re-dispatch options
has changed. Given the rising volumes, the change in the relative costs of effective
and less effective generators apparently shifts the balance towards low-cost options at
weaker nodes. In the case of upward re-dispatch, some nodes which have been iden-
tified as especially effective during the analysis of the fixed-rate scenario now register
smaller volumes than under cost-based re-dispatch. This for example holds true for the
southern nodes ”Mu¨nchen” (31), ”Frankfurt/Mainz” (25) and ”Stuttgart” (28), which
respectively provide 64 GWh/a, 36 GWh/a and 9 GWh/a less than in the reference case.
Analogously, the northern regions ”Emsland” (no. 9, -58 GWh/a) and ”Ruhr Ost” (no.
15, -24 GWh/a) account for smaller positive adjustments.
In the case of downward re-dispatch, the effect is less clear. While in Eastern Germany
a shift of re-dispatch volumes towards more effective nodes such as ”Lauchsta¨dt” (no.
18, +204 GWh/a) and ”Schwarze Pumpe” (no. 19, +102 GWh/a) can be observed, also
less prominent nodes now provide additional re-dispatch. This is for example the case
in the north-western region ”Ruhr West” (no. 14, +188 GWh/a). However, increasing
adjustments at more remote nodes can be both attributed to a change in the perceived
local costs as well as to the overall higher re-dispatch volumes. The general development
of regional re-dispatch volumes is illustrated in figure 5.9 in comparison to the reference
case. Overall, the geographical diversification of re-dispatch increases slightly in the
spot price-based scenario.
The use of the estimator has a technology-specific effect on the selection of generators for
re-dispatch. With regard to positive adjustments, especially hard coal fired plants and
modern CCGTs provide additional volumes. The increases to the amount of 13 GWh/a
and 382 GWh/a also compensate for a reduced provision of upward re-dispatch by lignite
(-4 GWh/a) and other gas fired plants (-356 GWh/a). Furthermore, a minimal change
(+54 MWh) in the supply of positive re-dispatch by PSP can be observed due to slight
changes in the technologies’ relative costs. In contrast, the estimator leads to a stronger
84In the given model set-up, positive balancing reserves are mainly provided by quick-starting OCGTs.
Furthermore, sufficient capacities are usually online for the provision of negative reserve. Imposing
more severe balancing market restrictions would increase opportunity costs and the difference between
marginal cost-based prices and variable costs.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of re-dispatch volumes (cost-based left, spot price-based
right) in 2015
Source: Own illustration.
preference for low-cost plants in the course of downward re-dispatch. In contrast to the
reference case, nuclear power plants account for additional negative adjustments to the
amount of 43 GWh/a. Furthermore, lignite plants provide 320 GWh/a more downward
re-dispatch. Both technologies thus compensate the decrease in volumes provided by
hard coal and CCGT units (-152 GWh/a and -196 GWh/a, respectively). Furthermore,
the production from hydro reservoirs is slightly more often subject to downward re-
dispatch (+22 MWh/a). The overall increase in re-dispatch volumes also affects the
curtailment of RES, which is increased by 19.7 GWh/a. The additional reductions
mainly take place in the North-East.
Concerning the total costs of re-dispatch, the presented spot price-based remuneration
scheme comes at total expenses of 207.1 mEUR/a for the TSO, which is the highest net-
payment observed so far. Subtracting the payments to hydro power plants, which are
remunerated for upward re-dispatch at a fixed price of 100 EUR/MWh, the expenses
amount to 204.9 mEUR/a. However, also the estimator induces hidden costs of re-
dispatch. Under consideration of the generators’ true variable costs, the total costs
of congestion management amount to 215 mEUR/a (212.7 mEUR/a excluding hydro
power). The error of the pricing scheme is thus considerably smaller than with a fixed
rate (7.9 mEUR/a instead of 76.5 mEUR/a), despite the lack of a floor price.
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Again, the error of the estimator is observed to affect the suppliers of upward and down-
ward re-dispatch asymmetrically. In the case of positive re-dispatch, the TSO pays a
total of 334.8 mEUR/a to fossil-fuel plants, including ramping costs. The true costs
of increasing local generation by conventional plants however amount 355.8 mEUR/a.
Since ramping costs are assumed to be remunerated adequately, the bias of 21 mEUR/a
is restricted to the estimation of the variable fuel and CO2 costs plus other variable
operating costs. For downward re-dispatch, ramping costs are assumed to be negli-
gible. Based on the estimator, the charges imposed on generators providing negative
re-dispatch amount to 129.9 mEUR/a. Unlike in the case of upward re-dispatch, the
true savings in variable costs register above the estimated value. In consequence, 13.1
mEUR/a of savings remain with the re-dispatched generators. Both results indicate
that the estimator by trend underestimates the true variable costs. Whereas this yields
losses for producers subject to positive re-dispatch, it generates additional revenues for
generators ramped-down. With regard to the inefficiency of the local producer surplus
induced by uniform pricing, the observed pattern aggravates the deviations from the
efficient level.
The effects of the estimator are however not homogeneous across all technologies. While
the average bias in the remuneration of suppliers of positive re-dispatch amounts to
-5.63 EUR/MWh, the underestimation is especially high for hard coal plants with a
deficit in the remuneration of 2,576 mEUR/a or -14.05 EUR/MWh. This is due to the
original dispatch of hard coal plants which often requires operation at marginal system
costs below variable costs. This is optimal from a system-wide point of view since
the dispatch mirrors the opportunity costs of ramping. However, this translates in an
inefficiently low estimation of the plants’ variable costs. In the extreme case of modern
hard coal plants, the estimator is thus constantly lower than the variable costs. This
does not mean that the plants constantly operate below costs, but that the opportunity
costs of ramping set the price at least in one hour within the four weeks. In this case,
using a shorter time frame as the basis for deriving the estimator may be an appropriate
remedy. The same principle applies to modern CCGTs which register an error of -11.31
EUR/MWh on average. However, some older gas fired plants yield slight profits of 0.52
EUR/MWh. This is due to the rule that the estimator is set to its last positive value in
case a plant has not been running since more than four weeks. If in the mean time the
variable costs of the said plants have been updated to account for seasonal fluctuations
in fuel costs, the estimator may be overestimated in short time periods.
With regard to downward re-dispatch, the underestimation of the costs of hard coal
plants and modern CCGTs now works in the opposite direction. Since the true savings
exceed the charges of the TSO, the respective plants obtain additional revenues of 9.7
mEUR/a (avg. +11.86 EUR/MWh) and 5.2 mEUR/a (avg. +4.56 EUR/MWh). On
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average, also lignite plants benefit from inefficiently low estimators. In sum, their profits
amount to 0.9 mEUR/a. However, some modern lignite technologies as well as nuclear
power plants are charged for more than their savings. Especially nuclear power plants
lose on average 9.16 EUR per MWh downward re-dispatch. This indicates that the base-
load plants not necessarily set the price in hours in which they are the only spinning unit.
Instead, network effects resulting from the DC load flow may cause opportunity costs
which push the marginal system costs beyond the marginal costs of the last spinning
domestic unit.
Whereas errors resulting from underestimated variable costs may be cured by time-
variant and technology-specific floors, the error underlying this last observation cannot
be cured by the means of a lower bound. Instead, a ceiling would need to be introduced.
However, setting bounds in every direction would finally narrow the estimator down to
the generators’ true marginal costs. Although this would indeed be efficient, it would
also implement cost-based re-dispatch once again, leading the original concept of the
estimator ad absurdum. The problem of guessing the variable costs of re-dispatch on
the basis of information provided by the producers would again dominate the mechanism.
In the presented design without any bounds except for hydro power, the true re-dispatch
costs in a spot price-based regime are however substantially higher than in a cost-based
system. In total, the presented design leads to additional costs of 78.5 mEUR/a. Given
the transaction costs of constantly updating the estimator for every generator subject
to re-dispatch, potential benefits will be thus be limited to the said effects of mitigated
information asymmetries.
5.4.3 Intermediate Conclusion
The comparison of the three different re-dispatch mechanisms highlights the impact of
design choices on the efficiency of internal congestion management. Even though no re-
dispatch design can be expected to implement the allocation of generation that results
from nodal pricing, considerable differences in the relative performance of individual
approaches can be observed.
In the given framework, cost-based re-dispatch proves to be clearly preferable to mecha-
nisms with spot price-based remuneration schemes. First, cost-based re-dispatch achieves
the least-cost solution. Although the magnitude of the re-dispatch costs is small in com-
parison to the production costs under uniform pricing (0.9% or 136.5 mEUR/a in a
cost-based system), the relative increases induced by the use of a spot price-based cost
estimator (+78 mEUR/a) or by fixed-rate re-dispatch (+127.9 mEUR/a) are substantial.
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Second, cost-based re-dispatch is found to be the only one of the designs which aligns
the expenses of the TSO with the generators’ true costs. Although the hidden costs are
relatively small in the estimator-based design (7.9 mEUR/a), the difference between the
true costs and the expenses amount to substantial 76.5 mEUR/a in a fixed-rate design.
In the end, this discrepancy may induce evasive behavior on the part of the generators
which could further increase the system’s inefficiency.
The results also reveal the sensitivity of the allocation of re-dispatch to changes in
the proportion of the local costs. In the case of the estimator, the local distribution
of the perceived variable costs indicates a cost minimum which comes at additional
re-dispatch volumes in comparison to the cost-based reference case. In contrast, the
artificial leveling of the variable costs in the course of the fixed-rate approach lowers the
re-dispatch volumes. Although this minimizes the TSO’s interference with the dispatch,
it leads to a particularly inefficient management of congestion.
Furthermore, fixed-rate and estimator-based re-dispatch rather introduce technology-
specific than region-specific effects on the generators’ revenues. Thus, the ex post in-
ternalization of external effects of network usage cannot be achieved by re-dispatch. In
contrast, additional distortions are introduced. Accordingly, the revenue-neutral cost-
based approach is the best available option.
However, the scope of the analysis does not cover an analysis of transaction costs and the
effects of information asymmetry. The necessity to update the generator-specific cost
data exists both in cost-based and estimator-based designs and will probably not induce
significant differences in transaction costs. The impact of information asymmetries is
probably more difficult to assess. Given the substantial differences in the mechanisms’
re-dispatch costs, it may nonetheless be the best strategy to enforce cost-control in a
cost-based system instead of changing the design.
5.5 Discussion and Final Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper highlights the relevance of congestion management
for a market with structural bottlenecks such as Germany. Depending on the choice of
the design, the impact of congestion on the market is either revealed during dispatch or in
the course of re-dispatch. The choice of nodal pricing leads to the efficient utilization of
the transmission network and internalizes the opportunity costs of congestion. However,
nodal pricing comes with the challanges of limited local liquidity and higher regional
market concentration. Furthermore, the presented results reveal significant distribution
effects within the country. Uniform pricing on the other hand is able to reduce the
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relevance of local liquidity and avoids regional discrimination of market participants.
Depending on the re-dispatch design, the abuse of local market power can futher be
limited. However, even a well-designed re-dispatch mechanism will most likely miss the
efficient allocation of generation in practice, especially in the presence of wide-spread
and severe congestion. Moreover, the details of the re-dispatch design largely determine
the degree to which additional distortions are introduced.
This paper demonstrates the complexity of the issue at hand and highlights the interde-
pendency between the regional and the economic structure of the market. However, the
results have to be viewed in the context of the applied methodology. First, the analysis
is limited to one scenario year. Although some of the fundamental factors shaping the
German market can be assumed to persist in the mid-term, a sensitivity of the results
with regard to structural changes can generate valuable insights.85 However, the high
temporal resolution of the model delivers robust results for the scenario year itself.
Furthermore, the dispatch model provides short-run marginal costs only, which could
be interpreted as market prices under certain assumptions, such as perfect competi-
tion and overcapacities. In particular the assumption on overcapacities can only occur
temporarily. Therefore, the short-run marginal costs cannot be interpreted as long-run
equilibrium prices in an energy-only market. In consequence, the producer surplus and
consumer costs derived on the basis of the dispatch results have limited explanatory
value. However, the calculations give a first indication of the regional impact of market
design choices. In addition, the analysis is restricted to a setting of perfect competition.
The analysis could among others be refined by introducing a regional differentiation of
fuel costs and by considering demand elasticity. Taking local fuel costs into account
would most likely increase the divergence between the nodal and the uniform pricing
model, especially with regard to marginal costs. Furthermore, an impact on the local
producer surplus can be expected. On the other hand, the price effect of nodal pricing
is by trend reduced in the presence of demand response, as demonstrated e. g. in Green
(2007).
With regard to the re-dispatch model, the lack of intertemporality complicates the rep-
resentation of hydro power plants and leads to an overestimation of re-dispatch costs by
trend. In contrast, the variable costs of operation (excluding ramping costs) are set to
the dispatch-level and may thus be underestimated. A more important factor however is
the neglect of network topology optimization. Introducing this congestion management
option would decrease the costs of re-dispatch.
85See chapter 3 and Nu¨ßler (2012).
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Furthermore, the representation of power flows and of congestion is limited to the aggre-
gate network model. Thus, the need for re-dispatch may be underestimated. Two addi-
tional effects are induced by the limitation of the re-dispatch calculation to transmission
lines within Germany. First, the consideration of cross-border congestion management
will reduce the costs of re-dispatch. Second, some of the analyzed internal re-dispatch
measures may increase the stress of the interconnectors and may not be feasible in an
international context.
With regard to future research, the analysis of interdependencies between generation
and network investments may yield valuable insights concerning the evaluation of pric-
ing systems. Furthermore, quantitative analyses on the impact of local load pockets
with market power potential may help to set the issue of market concentration into
perspective. Overall, the importance of a holistic approach to electricity market studies
including both generation and the network may be emphasized by the presented work.
Appendix A
General Parameters of
NEULING
Table A.1: Transmission line parameters per voltage level
Thermal Capacity [MW] Resistance [Ohm] Reactance [Ohm]
380 kV 1,777 0.025 0.25
220 kV 286 0.23 1.16
Source: ie3 TU Dortmund.
Table A.2: Average economical and technical power plant parameters per technology
Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal CCGT OCGT Oil
Fixed O&M Costs [EUR/kWa] 70.00 40.70 29.06 23.15 10.26 8.08
Other Variable Costs [EUR/MWh el] 9.00 3.30 3.30 1.60 1.60 1.10
Start Attrition Costs [EUR/MWh th] 1.70 3.00 4.97 10.00 10.00 10.00
Start Time [h] 6 2.9 3 2 0.4 1
Minimum Load [%] 53 41 39 37 23 40
Efficiency [%] 34 40 43 49 34 37
Source: Own assumptions.
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Table B.1: Generation capacities
No. Node Nuclear Lignite Hard Coal Natural Gas Oil Pumped Storage Hydro Reservoir CAES TOTAL
1 Brunsbu¨ttel 1,410 0 323 0 0 0 0 0 1,733
2 Dollern 0 0 2,617 0 0 0 0 0 2,617
3 Hamburg 0 0 0 0 0 120 0 0 120
4 Rostock/Gu¨strow 0 0 509 51 0 0 0 0 560
5 Lubmin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Bremen 0 0 766 0 0 0 0 321 1,087
7 Bertikow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Diele 0 0 1,506 0 0 0 0 0 1,506
9 Emsland 1,329 0 709 1,818 0 0 0 0 3,856
10 Landesbergen 0 0 1,288 330 0 0 0 0 1,618
11 Wahle 0 352 690 96 0 0 0 0 1,138
12 Wolmirstedt 0 0 0 812 0 0 0 0 812
13 Berlin 0 0 0 3,420 0 0 0 0 3,420
14 Ruhr West 0 0 7,086 1,820 0 153 0 0 9,059
15 Ruhr Ost 0 0 3,650 1,116 0 147 25 0 4,939
16 Borken 0 0 0 9 0 620 0 0 629
17 Grohnde 1,360 0 0 0 0 220 0 0 1,580
18 Lauchsta¨dt 0 2,644 0 123 0 0 0 0 2,768
19 Schwarze Pumpe 0 6,723 0 56 0 40 0 0 6,819
20 Ko¨ln 0 9,232 13 4,307 0 0 30 0 13,582
21 Gießen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 Erfurt 0 0 0 0 0 1,603 4 0 1,607
23 Ro¨hrsdorf/Eula 0 0 0 1,200 0 1,050 0 0 2,250
24 Weiher 0 0 2,192 576 0 1,296 0 0 4,064
25 Frankfurt/Mainz 1,275 0 1,088 1,425 0 160 0 0 3,948
26 Etzenricht/Raitersaich 0 0 0 0 0 284 0 0 284
27 Mannheim/Karlsruhe 1,392 0 2,429 899 0 0 0 0 4,720
28 Stuttgart 1,305 0 1,769 633 0 90 0 0 3,797
29 Eichstetten 0 0 0 0 0 1,740 1 0 1,741
30 Herbertingen/Vo¨hringen 2,572 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,572
31 Mu¨nchen 1,410 0 449 2,082 0 108 174 0 4,223
GERMANY 12,053 18,951 27,084 20,772 0 7,631 234 321 87,047
Source: EWI power plant database.
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Table B.2: Consumption, generation, costs and surplus
Conventional Generation Consumer Costs Producer Surplus
[GWh/a] [mEUR/a] [mEUR/a]
No. Node Consumption Generation RES & CHP CU NP Avg. Marginal Costs CU NP CU NP
[GWh/a] [GWh/a] [EUR/MWh]
1 Brunsbu¨ttel 9,764 12,505 11,007 10,762 51.24 518.6 509.5 339.6 330.6
2 Dollern 17,272 4,305 17,976 17,959 51.46 914.7 903.3 112.8 97.3
3 Hamburg 10,887 5,304 22 16 51.20 577.7 567.4 0.1 0.1
4 Rostock/Gu¨strow 2,682 3,226 2,703 2,367 50.81 141.6 138.1 13.3 8.8
5 Lubmin 1,915 2,603 0 0 50.61 101.2 98.3 0.0 0.0
6 Bremen 9,090 7,012 867 567 51.64 482.8 478.0 1.6 1.1
7 Bertikow 1,686 4,023 0 0 50.48 89.0 86.3 0.0 0.0
8 Diele 5,075 10,340 9,066 9,272 51.81 269.6 267.7 53.0 47.0
9 Emsland 8,286 5,580 14,429 14,220 51.94 438.9 437.2 338.4 335.1
10 Landesbergen 4,899 3,437 5,311 4,814 51.59 260.2 257.5 23.4 18.7
11 Wahle 11,646 5,597 3,374 3,059 51.29 618.5 608.5 52.7 50.2
12 Wolmirstedt 4,008 9,785 1,963 762 50.70 211.7 206.0 1.6 0.7
13 Berlin 12,720 13,385 5,224 1,532 50.50 671.9 651.1 4.3 1.6
14 Ruhr West 53,561 9,929 21,868 20,689 52.01 2,831.2 2,825.2 93.2 86.0
15 Ruhr Ost 28,630 7,808 13,491 12,868 51.85 1,517.5 1,509.5 77.3 71.6
16 Borken 11,424 2,426 120 100 51.61 606.3 600.3 0.5 0.5
17 Grohnde 6,817 2,146 10,169 10,161 51.59 362.0 358.2 326.8 322.0
18 Lauchsta¨dt 19,505 7,681 20,143 20,147 50.50 1,030.3 998.5 444.7 413.6
19 Schwarze Pumpe 16,377 6,440 51,223 51,237 50.36 865.1 836.2 1,112.5 1026.1
20 Ko¨ln 53,991 9,683 71,528 71,491 52.12 2,860.3 2,860.6 1,476.1 1481.8
21 Gießen 12,075 1,351 0 0 51.93 641.1 638.8 0.0 0.0
22 Erfurt 17,254 5,183 337 231 50.97 913.2 893.4 2.3 2.1
23 Ro¨hrsdorf/Eula 25,440 3,973 309 199 50.05 1,343.8 1,291.0 1.0 1.2
24 Weiher 31,954 5,527 8,599 8,597 52.09 1,691.4 1,693.2 28.9 30.9
25 Frankfurt/Mainz 24,311 6,497 12,659 12,778 52.05 1,290.5 1,289.2 319.8 319.2
26 Etzenricht/Raitersaich 9,125 2,282 54 33 51.28 485.9 478.1 0.2 0.2
27 Mannheim/Karlsruhe 32,980 11,142 23,725 23,942 52.43 1,750.6 1,760.9 410.6 417.8
28 Stuttgart 35,801 8,928 18,260 18,984 52.55 1,904.4 1,919.0 352.2 358.7
29 Eichstetten 13,530 5,726 356 382 52.88 719.7 730.7 1.5 2.1
30 Herbertingen/Vo¨hringen 13,730 2,697 19,144 19,144 52.86 730.3 739.7 617.7 633.3
31 Mu¨nchen 40,215 22,270 13,485 13,074 52.19 2,138.2 2,140.4 381.4 383.0
GERMANY 546,650 208,790 357,410 349,387 - 28,978.1 28,771.7 6,587.4 6,441.4
Source: Own calculation.
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Table B.3: Re-dispatch of conventional capacities
Re-dispatch of Conventional Capacities [MWh/a]
Cost-based Fixed-Rate Spot Price-Based Estimator
No. Node Upward Downward Upward Downward Upward Downward
1 Brunsbu¨ttel 470 -323,520 0 -351,172 1,106 -342,291
2 Dollern 21,252 -183,635 8,387 -55,075 24,106 -49,371
3 Hamburg 0 0 0 -368 0 0
4 Rostock/Gu¨strow 4,527 -226,683 6,588 -115,336 3,473 -63,941
5 Lubmin 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Bremen 1,047 -41,983 715 -4,276 1,537 -55,532
7 Bertikow 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Diele 7,038 -39,400 1,356 -16,846 9,470 -14,332
9 Emsland 371,977 -28,591 549,049 -5,664 313,655 -22,136
10 Landesbergen 44,207 -103,582 193,762 -13,926 38,500 -35,923
11 Wahle 9,564 -74,767 11,417 -84,905 7,377 -127,636
12 Wolmirstedt 32,506 -320,908 0 -132,639 68,056 -273,132
13 Berlin 45,698 -674,547 0 -295,787 135,055 -520,851
14 Ruhr West 354,246 -75,038 352,792 -6,813 361,069 -262,969
15 Ruhr Ost 128,001 -90,045 142,988 -9,890 103,841 -69,113
16 Borken 1,451 0 580 -502 1,263 0
17 Grohnde 0 0 0 -36,204 0 -6,795
18 Lauchsta¨dt 2,828 -960,379 0 -1,489,689 250 -1,164,244
19 Schwarze Pumpe 4,186 -169,644 0 -632,309 3,143 -271,642
20 Ko¨ln 160,161 -3,682 32,929 -3,761 210,927 -8,101
21 Gießen 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 Erfurt 0 -99 0 -10,482 0 -121
23 Ro¨hrsdorf/Eula 73,054 -5,595 40,991 -2,676 56,571 -4,877
24 Weiher 261,996 -17,392 37,363 -2,354 296,398 -19,224
25 Frankfurt/Mainz 230,485 -9,029 253,741 -11,295 194,690 -39,699
26 Etzenricht/Raitersaich 1,744 0 1,744 -364 1,744 0
27 Mannheim/Karlsruhe 383,134 -10,577 201,945 -292 415,289 -22,713
28 Stuttgart 138,105 -9,254 271,453 -5,628 129,319 -3,623
29 Eichstetten 15,974 0 15,616 0 15,980 0
30 Herbertingen/Vo¨hringen 0 0 0 -9,088 0 0
31 Mu¨nchen 1,397,143 -36,860 1,290,872 -10,426 1,333,025 -42,234
GERMANY 3,690,792 -3,405,211 3,414,288 -3,307,766 3,725,842 -3,420,498
Source: Own calculation.
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Table B.4: Curtailment of RES-E and upward dummy re-dispatch
Curtailment of RES-E and Upward Dummy Re-dispatch [MWh/a]
Cost-based Fixed-Rate Spot Price-Based Estimator
No. Node RES-E Dummy RES-E Dummy RES-E Dummy
1 Brunsbu¨ttel -167,563 0 -83,173 0 -174,818 0
2 Dollern -4,402 0 -315 0 -5,933 0
3 Hamburg 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 Rostock/Gu¨strow 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 Lubmin 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 Bremen 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 Bertikow -21,437 0 -1,067 0 -20,968 0
8 Diele -22 0 0 0 -22 0
9 Emsland 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 Landesbergen 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 Wahle -337 0 -1,908 0 -79 0
12 Wolmirstedt -2,374 0 0 0 -2,609 0
13 Berlin -16,605 0 -369 0 -17,160 0
14 Ruhr West 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 Ruhr Ost 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 Borken -461 0 -681 0 -819 0
17 Grohnde 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 Lauchsta¨dt -41,339 0 -5,539 0 -45,465 0
19 Schwarze Pumpe -26,850 0 -13,504 0 -28,054 0
20 Ko¨ln 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 Gießen 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 Erfurt -4,281 0 -55 0 -9,506 0
23 Ro¨hrsdorf/Eula 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 Weiher 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 Frankfurt/Mainz 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 Etzenricht/Raitersaich 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 Mannheim/Karlsruhe 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 Stuttgart 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 Eichstetten 0 89 0 89 0 89
30 Herbertingen/Vo¨hringen 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 Mu¨nchen 0 0 0 0 0 0
GERMANY -285,670 89 -106,610 89 -305,434 89
Source: Own calculation.
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